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论文编号：	2004
作者编号：	2002004
上传时间：	2010/4/6 10:53:42
中文题目：	民营上市公司的治理机制与公司绩效
英文题目：	Private Listed Companies
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	民营上市公司 公司治理 绩效
英文关键字：	Private Listed Companies, Corporate Governance, Performance
中文摘要：	民营上市公司的控股股东是自然人或民营企业，受到政府有关部门的约束较少，其市场特征更强。而非民营上市公司的前身都是国有大中型企业，通过改制、资产重组等方式达到上市的要求后，公开上市募集资金。这造成这两类上市公司的股权结构、董事会构成、决策监督机制等公司治理机制存在明显的差别。如果将这两类上市公司一视同仁，无论是政府有关部门制定政策法规，还是学术界进行理论研究，都会产生偏差。所以，本文以民营上市公司为研究样本，将可以回避国有股定价问题、高管激励中的政府因素、国有股股权变动的审批问题等一系列非市场因素，以寻求中国上市公司治理机制的运行规律。 公司治理是一个复杂的机制体系，大部分文献和书籍都是针对单一机制进行研究，而研究各种机制之间互动关系的文献较少。本文首先针对股权结构、董事会、高管激励约束和信息披露这四种最重要的治理机制进行实证分析，研究治理机制和绩效以及公司治理机制之间的互动关系。 股权结构体现公司内的利益分配和权力制衡关系，是公司治理机制框架的基础。股权结构会受到公司内部、外部多种因素的影响而发生变动，股权结构本身也会影响企业绩效和公司治理结构本身。实证研究结果表明：第一大股东的持股比例和绩效并不呈现线性相关关系。第一大股东持股比例较低时，两者呈现不显著的负相关；第一大股东持股较高、足以控制公司时，两者呈现正相关关系；第一大股东持股比例在20%-40%之间时，两者呈现倒U型曲线关系。非控股股东的持股比例越高，其监督控股股东和监督公司经营活动的动机越强。这些股东可以通过公司治理机制来实现自身的权利，例如董事选举，经理人的任命和更替，内、外部审计等等。第一大股东的持股比例对董事会独立性有显著的负面影响，所以应该强化外部监督的力量，尤其是独立董事的作用，以制衡大股东，保护中小股东的利益。证券市场的存在就是为公司提供更好的筹资途径，股权自由转让是证券市场的重要机制之一。实证结果表明：绩效差的公司的股权变动次数会大大增加；第一大股东持股比例越高，股权变动的次数越少；非控股股东持股比例越高的公司，股权变动次数越多。这从侧面说明，国内控制权市场具有一定程度的有效性。 董事会作为上市公司内部治理机制的核心，是公司股东的代理机构，肩负制定公司战略、监督公司管理层的职责。董事会的独立性，是董事会和公司管理层的相对独立状况，直接影响董事会的运作效率。实证研究表明：2001年证监会颁布的强制性法规，全面提高了国内上市公司独立董事的比例；上市公司在绩效较差时，在第二年会提高董事会的独立性，即增加独立董事的数量；第一大股东持股比例对董事会独立性有显著负面影响。上市公司增加独立董事的目的不仅是为满足证监会的要求，引入独立董事已经成为上市公司改善经营状况的手段之一。本文还发现：增加独立董事的确可以改善公司的绩效，这种改善需要两年或三年时间才可以体现出来，这表明公司治理机制对绩效的影响存在滞后效应。国内很多人认为“独立董事制度并不适合我国的国情”或者“独立董事制度不完善”，这些观点太片面；而希望独立董事立刻发挥作用的观点又太极端了，完全忽视了公司治理机制的滞后作用。独立董事制度发挥作用需要一个过程，而且还要和其它公司治理机制共同发挥作用，不能因为一、两年内未见“成效”就轻言放弃。 上市公司高管激励约束问题，近年来备受股民和监管部门的关注。本文研究表明，更换总经理是最有效的激励约束手段，高管的薪酬不具备激励作用。更换总经理在一定程度上会提高公司的长期价值。但是市场价值指标对总经理是否变更影响不大，公司经营业绩会影响到总经理的变更次数。独立董事数量多的公司，会在一定程度上保持高级管理人员队伍的稳定以维持公司日常经营的稳定性和连续性。高管的持股比例和本年度绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系。高管持股是解决高管和公司所有者——股东之间的委托代理问题的有效手段。通过高管持有本公司的股份，使高管成为公司的所有者之一，有效解决了“外部性”问题。但由于国内前几年的政策体系下，还不具备普遍开展股权激励的条件，使得高管的持股情况未能和绩效有效地关联起来。 信息披露机制是证券市场有效运行的制度基础之一，有效的披露制度也是证券市场成熟的特征。近五年来，国内信息披露的法律体系逐步完善，形成包括法律、行政规章和会计制度及准则的法律体系为基础，并通过会计事务所实施外部审计的一个比较完善的信息披露机制。研究发现，独立董事制度对于改善上市公司信息披露状况起到了重要作用，这也从侧面证明了独立董事制度在国内证券市场发挥了一定的积极作用。但研究还发现，会计师事务所有纵容绩效好或规模大的上市公司的倾向，对风险大的公司则要求非常严格。国内信息披露机制的改革还有很长一段路要走，仅仅通过完善法律体系在短期无法实现目标。建立公正、有效的信息披露机制，将成为我国证券市场长期、稳定发展的制度保障。 公司治理机制是一个复杂的系统，其影响因素不仅仅限于本文研究涉及到的内容。在对前面四种治理机制进行实证研究的基础上，本文建立一个相对比较简单的关系框架。该框架从实证的角度反映了公司治理机制之间存在互动作用以及公司治理机制和绩效之间存在滞后的相互作用关系。这个关系框架表明，公司治理机制之间存在复杂的相互影响，任何一个机制的变化将引起一系列连锁反应，其它各种机制也会随之而发生变化，进而影响公司绩效，并逐步建立另外一个公司治理结构。所以，无论是企业间的兼并重组、或者是公司治理改革，在进行制度设计时都不能忽视治理机制的互动关系。 为了进一步剖析公司治理机制总体状况和绩效之间的关系，本文还建立了公司治理的综合评价指数，并以此为桥梁讨论公司治理机制和公司绩效之间的内生性问题。研究表明，上市企业治理机制和经营绩效之间存在着很强的内生性关系：治理不仅对绩效有显著的促进作用，而且绩效对治理也有强烈的反馈作用。由于同时身处资本市场和产品市场，上市公司在这两个市场上的业绩也是相互影响的。上市公司注重经营绩效的同时，还要不断完善公司治理机制，才能营造良好的经营氛围。上市公司只有获得产品市场的成功，又获得资本市场的支持，才会走上可持续发展的良性循环。
英文摘要：	Due to the fact that the controlling shareholders are natural persons or private firms, private listed companies have little governmental constrains and more market characters. However, non-private listed companies come from the large state-owned enterprises, which reach the listed requirements by reforming and restructuring. Therefore, the corporate governance mechanisms such as ownership structure, composition of board of directors, decision-making and supervision are significantly different between private listed companies and non-private listed companies. Ignoring these differences will result in mistakes in the establishment of policies and regulations by governmental bureaus and theoretical researches by academic institutions. Thus, this study uses the sample of private listed companies to investigate the disciplines of corporate governance in Chinese securities markets. By focus on private listed companies, we can remove the effects of non-market factors such as pricing of state-owned shares, governmental control in executive compensation and approving of changes in state-owned shares. Corporate governance is a complex system. Most of literature analyze it from a single mechanism perspective, but rarely consider the dynamic relationship among different mechanisms. This article empirically studies the most important corporate governance mechanisms-board of directors, ownership structure, executive incentive and information disclosure, and the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and performance, as well as the interaction of different mechanisms. The ownership structure is a dynamic structure that may be influenced by the firm’s internal and external factors. On the contrary, ownership structure will affect the firm’s performance and corporate governance. The empirical results suggest that there is not a linear relationship between the stake of the largest shareholder and the firm’s performance. When the stake of the largest shareholder is low, the negative relationship exists. When the stake of the largest shareholder is so high as to control the firm, the positive relationship exhibits. If the stake of the largest shareholder lies between 20 percent and 40 percent of total share, there is a reverse U relationship between them. The more is the stake of non-controlling shareholders, the stronger is their motive of supervising the controlling shareholders and the firm’s operation. Non-controlling shareholders can protect their interests by the election of directors, appointment of executives and internal and external auditing etc. Since the stake of the largest shareholder has significantly negative effect on the independence of board of directors, the power of external supervision especially by independent directors should be strengthened to protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders. The main objective of securities markets is providing money to firms and the ownership trade is an important mechanism to fulfill this objective. The empirical results proves that the amount of ownership changes in firms with bad performance is much higher; The more is the stake of the largest shareholder, the less is the amount of ownership changes; And the more is the stake of non-controlling shareholders, the more is the amount of ownership changes. All of these prove the efficiency of market of corporate control in China. Board of directors is the core of corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results of this article suggest that the mandatory regulation enacted by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2001 significantly improved the independence of board of directors in listed companies; The independence of board of directors will be enhanced if the performance of listed companies is bad in previous year; The stake of largest shareholder has significantly negative effects on the independence of board of directors; If the size of board of directors is big or CEO is the chairman of board of directors, its independence is low. This article also proves that the increase of independent directors improves the performance of listed companies, but it will take two or three years to exhibit this effect. The introduction of independent directors to board of directors in Chinese listed companies has far-reaching influences on the reform of corporate governance. Although the functional mechanism of independent directors in corporate governance needs further research, the positive effect of this arrangement on the performance of listed companies is obvious. The executive incentive has been focused by investors and regulatory departments in recent years. This study suggests that replacing CEO is the most effective method of executive compensation. It can increase a firm’s long-term value to some extent. However, the operating performance instead of market performance affects the frequency of replacing CEO. If a firm has many independent directors, it is inclined to keep the stability of executives to maintain its continuous operation. There is a significantly positive relationship between the stake of executives and the firm’s performance in the current year. Holding ownership by executives can effectively resolve the agency problem between managers and shareholders. Through holding the ownership, executives are also shareholders, which can reduce the problem of externality. However, stock options to executives were not permitted under some policies in former years, which results in the weak relationship between the stake of executives and the firm’s performance. The efficient information disclosure is the basis and character of mature securities markets. Since last five years, the law system of information disclosure including the relevant laws, regulations and accounting principles has been established. The external auditing by certificate public accounts further ensures the accuracy and transparency of the firm’s information. This study finds that independent directors play important roles in the improvement of information disclosure in listed firms. However, certificate public accountants incline to put more rigorous requirements on the risky firms compared to large firms with good performance. This suggests that the information disclosure mechanism in Chinese listed companies is far more complete which needs a long time to improve. The establishment of fair and efficient information disclosure will guarantee the long-term and stable development of Chinese securities markets. Corporate governance is a complex system, and its influencing factors are more than those mentioned above. To simplify the complex relationship, we develop an easy analyzing framework basing the empirical research. This framework proves the interaction among different corporate governance mechanisms and the lag relationship between these mechanisms and performance. In details, the change of one mechanism will induce a chain reaction, which means other mechanisms will change accordingly and affect the performance ultimately. Therefore, neither mergers and acquisitions nor corporate governance reforms can ignore this dynamic relationship. This is a main contribution of this article. In order to describe the relationship between the overall statue of corporate governance and performance as well as the endogeneity problem, this article develop an integrate valuation index of corporate governance. The results suggest that due to the serious endogeneity problem between corporate governance and performance, we can’t solve the firm’s real problem from either perspective. Furthermore, because listed firms lie in capital market and product market simultaneously, the performances in these two markets are interactional. In addition to pay attention to the operating performance, listed firms should improve their corporate governance mechanisms continuously. Only through succeeding in product market and obtaining support from capital market can listed firms reach sustainable development.
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