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论文编号：	20
作者编号：	2120051888
上传时间：	2007/6/20 21:21:54
中文题目：	上市公司董事会治理与审计定价研
英文题目：	The research on the board gove
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	董事会治理 审计收费 代理成<
英文关键字：	governance of board of directo
中文摘要：	审计作为现代企业制度委托代理关系中的一项重要制度安排，在解决企业经营者与所有者、债权人以及其他利益相关者之间经营目标不一致产生的矛盾和利益冲突中，起着重要的裁判和鉴证人的作用。其最初的目标是代表委托人监督代理人，考虑后者是否偏离委托人的目标。独立审计的作用是降低内部代理成本，缓解代理冲突，而审计收费作为委托人聘请审计师提供审计服务的对价，属于监督成本，会受到公司内部治理的影响。良好的公司内部治理意味着组织内部控制环境的改善，从而降低了审计师的风险，导致审计收费的降低。具体而言，在公司内部治理恶化的公司，内控松散，代理冲突严重，内部代理成本也相对较高，审计师对此类公司固有风险和控制风险评估水平较高，需要花费更多的时间和精力来完成审计任务，因此需要收取更高的审计费用。 董事会作为公司法人内部治理的核心，其良好的治理状况对公司业绩有两方面的作用: 一是科学的董事会决策能够通过改善公司经营状况进而提高公司竞争力来直接促进公司业绩的上升；二是高效的董事会监督能够通过降低代理成本进而减少经理人员的机会主义行为来间接提高公司业绩。高效的董事会治理表现为适度的规模，合理的机构，规范的运作和较高的独立性。 本文采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法，利用经典审计收费模型，对我国沪深两市292家非金融类A股上市公司2001-2005年的情况进行统计检验，分析了董事会治理特征与审计收费的关系，采用了董事会规模、董事会的领导权结构、董事会的构成、次级委员会的设置、董事会成员持股情况、董事会会议情况等能对董事会治理做数量描述的变量，用实证研究的方法检验了提出的七个假设。最终得到以下结论:董事长与CEO两职兼任时,审计收费较高；独立董事占董事会的比重越大,审计收费越低；是否设置审计委员会与上市公司审计收费不相关；董事会持股比例与审计收费不相关；董事会规模越大,审计收费越高；受薪董事的比例与审计收费不相关；董事会会议次数与审计收费负相关。 最后针对实证结果,提出了董事长和CEO应完全分离,创新独立董事制度,改善审计委员会，提高董事会成员持股比例，控制董事会规模等政策性建议。
英文摘要：	As an important mechanism for the agency relationship in modern enterprises,audit play the role of judgement and verification in the conflicts arisen from the different operational purposes among owners, creditors, and other profit-related members. Originally, audit aimed to surpervise the surrogates on behalf of constituents,reduce the agency costs, and keep the agency relationship harmonious . The function of independent audit is to relieve the agency conflicts,and then to some extent,audit fees are a kind of supervisory cost as an expenditure for audit service.They will be affected by the corporation’s internal governance.Good internal governance means the improvement of the organizations’ environment of internal control and it will reduce audit risks for auditors.To be concrete:when the internal governance of a company is worsened ,its internal control become slack;agency conflicts go seriously ,causing more agency costs.The auditor will assess the company’s inherent risk and control risk high,and then it will take him more time and energy to finish audit tasks so the auditor will ask for more audit fees. Board governance is the core and key part of the corporate internal governance. For one thing scientific governance of modern company's board of directors directly concerns the benefits of company and its shareholders. It has become one of the effective ways to promote enterprise quality and to perfect the capital market; for another thing , an efficient board governance mechanism can improve the company’s performance by prohibitting the management’s opportunism behaviors through supervision.A sicientific board governance obviously has appropriate scale,proper structure,standardized operation and great independence. Based on the A-stock market panel data of 292 non-financial public companies from 2001 to 2005. This dissertation adopts the integrated methods of normal research and empirical research to analyze the relationship between board governance and audit fees.By utilizing the board scale ,the lead structure of directorate,the composing of company’s board ,the establishment of professional committees,the operation of the board of directors and so on as descriptive variables ,this dissertation has verified seven hypothesises.The conclusions are as follows:when the board-chairman and the general manager of the company are the same man,audit fees are more expensive.The more independent directors the board has,the fewer audit fees the company pays.It has no obvious relationship between the establishment of Audit Committee and audit fees,and so do the proportion of shares held by the board of directors and audit fees.The larger the board of directors is,the more expensive the audit fees are.It has no statistical relationship between the conferences held by the board of directors and audit fees. On the basis of the result of the empirical research, the author propose some advice that can perfect board of directors in China’s public companies, including accelerating the separation of board-chairman and general manager,regenerating the independent director system,perfecting the Audit Committee,increasing the proportion of shares held by the board of directors .
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