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论文编号:1982 
作者编号:2220070921 
上传时间:2010/1/20 10:22:27 
中文题目:国有商业银行基层管理者道德风险的识别与控制研究  
英文题目:国有商业银行基层管理者道德风险的识别与控制研究  
指导老师:袁庆宏 
中文关键字:国有商业银行 基层管理者 道德风险 识别控制 
英文关键字:Junior Managers; the Stated-owned Commercial Banks; Moral Hazard; Prevention 
中文摘要:银行业是一个高经营风险的行业,随着各国金融监管制度的逐步完善,银行业操作风险中的道德风险问题已引起国内外广泛的关注。对于银行业,不同的所有权结构对银行的所有者、管理者行为的激励约束制度是不同的。这就决定了不同的银行所有权结构对银行道德风险的作用也将有所不同。国有商业银行是我国金融体系的中流砥柱,为国民经济的持续快速健康发展做出巨大贡献,当前我国国有商业银行正通过融资上市的方式进行股份制改革,股权变动带来的管理层动荡必将产生新一轮的权力分配,信息的严重不对称形势会逐渐得到改善,银行内部组织结构的日趋扁平化使得对基层管理者监督和约束的力度加大,这些变动对防范基层管理者的道德风险会产生积极的影响。但从另一个角度来看,基层管理者既得权力的缺失势必会触动其经济利益,因此,防范其发生变相道德风险的任务也会越来越艰巨。 近年来,不少与银行从业人员道德风险有关的银行案件频频引爆,且主要集中于国有商业银行,涉案人员大都为基层支行行长、部门经理,涉案金额少则几千万多则数十亿,给国家造成了巨大的损失,危及金融安全。我国的国有商业银行,从国家到银行总行、到各分支机构,形成了多级的委托—代理关系,在国有商业银行各个管理层中,基层管理者作为委托代理链条的最后一环,对其信息的掌握性是最小的,道德风险发生的可能性也最高,信息不对称加剧,管理效力递减,在制度约束软化、激励机制存在缺陷等情况下,作为基层代理人的银行管理人员,可能利用获得的一定控制权及自己的信息优势,摆脱所有者控制,为自己的利益而损害所有者的利益,导致银行从业人员的道德风险问题,而我国目前融资体系的失衡更加剧了这种状况。 “道德风险”一词于上世纪七十年代引入我国,在国内研究的时间还不长,目前的研究多采用针对市场风险、信用风险的研究思路,偏重于对量化模型的研究,而将操作风险与内部控制、公司治理等相关基础理论联系起来的研究较少。本文以国有商业银行基层管理者道德风险的识别与控制为主题,在对道德风险的基本含义、特点和表现形式的理论研究进行综述的基础上,对于道德风险的危害和产生的原因进行了详细的论述,提出了对银行业透明的信息披露制度、加强内部控制和外部监管、建立完善激励机制、以及建立良好的道德文化等防范和化解银行业道德风险的措施和建议,最后通过对2004年引起社会广泛关注的一起操作风险事件——中国银行黑龙江河松街支行行长高山内外勾结票据诈骗案进行案例研究,更直接的说明本论文分析阐述的理论在实践中的实际意义。总之,通过本文的研究,作者认为构建道德风险的培育道德文化与内部控制体系是解决当前我国国有商业银行操作风险事件“凸现”、金融案件频发的问题的根本途径。  
英文摘要:This is also true to the banking sector, which is the special enterprise of monetary management. The meaning of banking moral hazard is that the business dealing subjects and the operators, who want to improve their own benefit to a maximum, break the principle of honesty and credit or the regulation of objective contracts and then do great damage to others interests. On the contrary, The Stated-owned Commercial Banks(SOBs) are the main body of our banking, the absence of the management and supervisal has led the junior managers to crime frequently. At the same time, looking into the current circumstance:organization frame adjustment that follows hard after the property right system’s reform of the information is improving.The organization structure which is gradually flatting in the SOBs enhances the supervisal and restriction to junior managers,and the change will cause positive influence for preventing moral hazard of junior managers besides reducing their benefit. So the task of preventing moral hazard is more difficult.In various managers of the Stated-owned Commercial Banks(SOBs), the principal knows little about the junior managers for they are the ultimate tache of the principal-agent chain, but the possibility of the moral hazard is maximal, So they should be supervised and restricted strictly. On the contrary, the absence of the management and supervisal has led the junior managers to crime frequently. Moral hazard was brought into china in 70s of 20th century and there are still few researches on it.Nowadays,people have different understandings of the meaning of moral hazard and some ever hold misunderstandings of the meaning of moral hazard and some even hold misunderstanding.They mix up the moral hazard and professional morality.Therefore,this paper will explain the basic knowledge of moral hazard in chapter two,incuding the definition,characteristic and forms of moral hazard.The harms and causes of moral hazard will be elaborated in chapter three.Then I put in chapter four the main points of the paper,which are the measures and suggestions of preventing and resolving banking moral hazard.Thay are the reforms of property system in banking sectors;the reinforcement of internal control and external supervision;the establishment of deposit insurance syetem;the perfection of credit system and the creation of better corporate culture.  
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