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论文编号：	1932
作者编号：	043109
上传时间：	2009/12/13 10:49:27
中文题目：	大股东控制下的债务融资选择及治理效应研究
英文题目：	Study on Debt Financing Choice and Governance Effect Under the Control of Large Shareholder——An analysis based on non-tradable shares reform in the listcompanies of China
指导老师：	齐寅峰
中文关键字：	债务融资 大股东控制 治理效应 股权分置改革
英文关键字：	ebt financing controlling of large shareholder governance effect non-tradable shares reform (NTS reform)
中文摘要：	公司融资选择是现代公司财务领域内最重要的研究问题之一，债务融资对于转轨经济过程中的我国企业来说具有更重要的意义。相对而言，我国现有债务融资研究大多是应用国外财务理论、模型对中国资本市场发展状况进行检验，而忽略了我国资本市场“股权分置改革” 和“大股东控制”制度背景特征。 本文采用“演绎推理”、“比较分析”的研究方法，在公司融资理论研究框架下，对股权分置改革前后大股东控制下的债务融资选择偏好以及债务融资治理效应问题展开研究。本文研究思路如下： 首先，对国内外已有研究文献进行梳理、回顾，形成以债务融资选择理论、债务融资治理理论、大股东控制理论为主体的理论分析基础； 其次，结合我国债务融资制度背景和大股东控制特征，本文从三个视角构建了债务融资选择模型，第一是大股东控制，第二是治理性债务融资激励约束机制如何影响大股东掏空-支持行为，大股东效用以及融资选择，第三是股权分置改革如何影响大股东效用、债务融资选择及治理效应； 最后，理论研究为我国金融体制改革服务是本文出发点之一，基于此本文对我国上市公司债务融资问题进行了实证研究。实证研究突出以下特点，第一是对股权分置改革前后的债务融资问题进行比较研究，第二是加入大股东控制因素分析其对上市公司债务融资问题的影响；第三是债务融资研究内容包括大股东债务融资选择偏好、债务融资对大股东掏空-支持行为治理效应，与大股东控制下的债务融资选择模型分析假设相对应。 本文尝试了一些有意义和探索性的工作，创新之处主要体现在以下几方面： （1）结合我国上市公司债务融资制度背景和大股东控制特征，我们构建了股权分置状态和全流通状态下包含二期再谈判机制的债务融资选择模型，分析了债务融资选择的约束条件以及债务融资对大股东掏空-支持行为的治理效应，为研究我国“后股权分置时代”的融资问题做出有益尝试。 （2）从股权分置改革和大股东控制的创新性研究视角，本文对股改前后的大股东融资选择偏好以及债务融资治理效应问题进行了探索性实证研究。由于股改后上市公司投融资问题文献较少，本文通过对股改前后的平行面板数据进行比较研究，并引入大股东控制因素分析其对上市公司融资选择偏好以及治理效应的影响，这丰富了股权分置改革后投融资问题研究思路。 （3）本文构建了以CCER关联方交易数据为基础的大股东资金往来、大股东担保往来、关联方非经营性往来的创新性指标体系，对大股东掏空-支持行为进行直接计量，对债务融资的大股东掏空-支持行为治理效应进行研究。 （4）实证研究结果发现：股权分置改革之后，大股东对治理性债务融资偏好上升，债务融资对大股东担保往来行为的治理效应显著恶化；而在大股东持股比例较高或者国有控制性质的上市公司中，债务融资对大股东资金往来和关联方非经营性往来治理效应改善；大股东控制对上市公司融资偏好、债务融资治理效应均产生重要影响。 全文共七章，共涉及大股东控制下的债务融资选择及治理效应的规范性研究、实证分析和政策建议三部分。 第一章为导言，介绍选题背景、研究思路和研究框架；第二章对大股东控制以及债务融资问题研究文献进行回顾述评；第三章围绕债务融资来源结构的制度背景和股改前后大股东控制特征展开；第四章构建了包含二期再谈判机制的大股东债务融资选择模型。第二章至第四章构成了本文规范性研究部分。 第五章对股改前后大股东债务融资选择偏好问题进行实证研究，并分析了大股东控制特征对债务融资选择的影响；第六章使用大股东资金往来、担保往来、关联方非经营性往来等指标刻画了大股东掏空-支持行为，研究了股权分置改革前后债务融资对大股东掏空-支持行为的治理效应问题，第五章至第六章构成本文的实证研究部分。 第七章对相关研究结论进行总结，提出了改善债务融资结构和治理效应的对策建议，并指明进一步研究方向。
英文摘要：	Financing decision is one of the most important issues in the modern corporate finance field, whereas debt financing has more important significance to the enterprises in our country during the period of economy transformation. In some sense, the existing researches on debt financing in China is more concerned to apply foreign finance theory and model to test the status of China's capital market development, fail to pay attention to the system background and the characteristics of “non-tradable shares reform” (NTS reform) and “large shareholder control” in China's capital market. In this dissertation, we focus on the corporate debt financing issues in large shareholder control before and after NTS reform and carry out research in light of corporate finance structure theory, through the approaches of “deductive inference” and “comparison induction”. There is one main line of enquiry pursued throughout this dissertation: Firstly, in order to construct academic research basis on debt financing decision theory, debt financing governance theory, and control theory of shareholder, it is useful to review some important classical financing literatures of theoretical and empirical study at home and abroad. Secondly, combined with institutional background of debt financing and controlling of large shareholder in China listed companies, the dissertation constructs a debt financing choice theoretical model from three perspectives: (1) the large shareholder controlling characteristics, (2) how the motivation and discipline mechanisms of debt financing with governance affect tunneling and propping behavior of controlling shareholder, how to affect the overall utility of controlling shareholder, then how to affect financing choice behavior of controlling shareholder; (3) how the NTS reform affects the overall utility、the financing choice behavior of controlling shareholder and debt financing governance effect. Finally, considering theoretical research of financing choice serving the practice of financial system reform in China is one of the starting points of the dissertation, we perform empirical studies on the issue of debt financing of China's listed companies. The empirical study may be characterized with: (1) a comparative empirical study on debt financing issues before and after NTS reform, we analyze how the NTS reform affect corporate debt financing choice and debt financing governance effect of listed companies; (2) adding the influencing factor of large shareholder controlling features, we analyze how the factor of controlling shareholder affect debt financing issues of listed companies;(3)the empirical study content includes debt financing choice preference, debt financing governance effect on tunneling and propping behavior of controlling shareholder. Empirical study design is order to correspond with the assumption of debt financing choice model in control of large shareholder. The author attempts to do some significant and exploratory research work, and the main contributions of this dissertation lie in: Firstly, combined with institutional background of debt financing and controlling shareholder in China listed companies, we construct a debt financing choice theoretical model including re-negotiation mechanism in “non-tradable shares state” and “equity complete liquidity state”, and analyze the constraints of debt financing choice and the governance effect of debt financing on behavior of controlling shareholder in different equity right state background. We hope that it is significant to subsequent study on debt financing issues during post-non-tradable share period. Secondly, from new perspective of controlling shareholder and NTS reform, we perform some exploratory empirical studies on issues of financing choice preference and debt financing governance before and after NTS reform. Considering existing literatures about investment-financing issues during post-non-tradable share period are few, we implement a comparative empirical study on balanced panel data of debt financing around reform, introducing the factor of controlling shareholder to analyze the effect on financing choice preference and debt financing governance effect, and to rich the research thinking of domestic investment-financing issues to some extent. Thirdly, the dissertation constructs the index system to directly measure tunneling and propping behavior of controlling shareholder, the index system is based on related party transactions database, and includes controlling shareholder fund transfer account, guarantee transfer account with listed company, and non-operational current account with related party. We perform exploratory empirical study on debt financing governance effect on tunneling and propping behavior of controlling shareholder through the index system of controlling behavior of large shareholder. Finally, the dissertation draws several empirical findings and conclusions: compared with period during non-tradable shares state, after NTS reform controlling shareholder increases debt financing choice preference; governance effect of debt financing on tunneling-propping behavior of guarantee transfer account of large shareholder has worsened and weakened evidently, nevertheless governance effect on tunneling-propping behavior of controlling shareholder fund transfer account and non-operational current account with related party has improved in a higher share proportion or state-owned character of controlling shareholder. Apart from these, we also affirm that the characteristics of controlling shareholder have important effects on debt financing choice and governance effect of debt financing on controlling shareholder behavior before and after NTS reform. This dissertation consists of seven chapters, mainly containing theoretical, empirical and policy researches. Chapter 1 mainly provides the research background, the research value, research framework and the contributions expected to achieve. The theoretical part is to be found in chapter 2-4. Before embarking upon a further examination, it is necessary to review the existing literature in accordance with the evolution process corporate finance theory, and chapter 2 attempts to form the research basis from debt financing choice theory, debt financing governance effect, and large shareholder controlling theory. Chapter 3 introduces the institutional background of debt financing according to financing sources and the controlling characteristics of large shareholder around NTS reform. The chapter 4 puts forward to the debt financing choice model in controlling of large shareholder, including two-phase re-negotiation mechanism of debt financing, and analyzes constraints of debt financing choice and governance effect of debt financing. The empirical part of the study is to be found in chapter 5-6. Chapter 5 explores the debt financing choice preference of controlling shareholder, and investigates how the characteristics of controlling shareholder affect financing preference of listed companies in China. Chapter 6 makes an empirical research on the governance effect of debt financing on controlling shareholder tunneling-propping behavior before and after NTS reform, measuring tunneling-propping behavior of controlling shareholder with controlling shareholder fund transfer account, guarantee transfer account with listed company, and non-operational current account with related party. In the end, chapter seven attempts to propose our conclusions, advices on policy, limits as well as prospect of future research, according to the theoretical analyzed hypothesis and empirical findings of the full dissertation.
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