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论文编号：	1920
作者编号：	2003015
上传时间：	2010/5/6 8:46:07
中文题目：	股权结构影响现金股利政策的实证研究
英文题目：	An Empirical Study on Ownership Structure Influence Cash Dividend Policy
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	股权结构 现金股利 代理成本 投资者保护
英文关键字：	Ownership Structure Cash Dividends Agency Cost Investor Protection
中文摘要：	本文在梳理国内外相关研究文献的基础上，系统地分析了股权结构对上市公司现金股利政策的影响，实证检验了西方经典股利理论在解释中国上市公司现金股利政策的适用性，并结合中国上市公司的治理状况和法律政策环境对实证结果做了独到的理论诠释。在研究方法上，本文主要运用了文献分析法、归纳法、演绎法、描述性统计、相关性分析、回归分析、参数检验等方法，注重了规范研究与实证研究方法的结合运用。 全文共分为八章：第一章是引言，介绍了选题的意义、研究视角及创新等；第二章是文献综述，对国外经典的股利政策理论与国内外相关的实证研究文献进行了回顾及评述；第三章是制度背景，分析了中国上市公司股权结构与股利政策形成的制度环境和法律政策背景；第四章是股权结构影响现金股利政策的理论分析；第五章是样本选取与初步统计分析，介绍了本文样本的选择、变量的定义，描述性统计分析及相关分析等；第六章实证检验了股权集中度、股权制衡对现金股利政策的影响；第七章实证检验了股东属性对现金股利政策的影响；第八章是研究结论与启示。与同类研究相比，本文主要有以下创新：①构造了股权结构影响现金股利政策的理论分析框架。本文从股权集中度、股权制衡、股东属性三个维度研究了股权结构对公司现金股利政策（包括是否发放现金股利、现金股利支付水平和现金股利稳定性）的影响。②建立了控股股东在现金股利决策时的收益分析模型。除了分享现金股利以外，控股股东还可以获得控制权私有收益，控股股东的决策目标是实现总收益的最大化。③运用多种方法实证检验了股权结构对现金股利政策的影响，本文在变量控制、模型建立或改进方面均有所突破，并有新的研究发现和独到的理论解释。 本文得到的主要研究结论包括：①中国上市公司中股权集中度越高的公司现金股利的支付水平越高，这与西方经典股利理论的观点相左。主要是由于在“二元”股权结构下，代理冲突主要表现在大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突，大股东利用持股成本上的优势，通过发放现金股利侵害小股东的利益。②控股股东持股比例越大，越有可能从控股股东利益最大化出发做出公司的现金股利决策。公司存在制衡股东时，控股股东的机会主义行为受到一定的约束，能有效地降低公司的代理成本，减少现金股利的非理性支付。③股权集中度不同的公司中，非控股大股东（第二到第五大股东）的作用有显著差异。在低股权集中度的公司中，非控股大股东发挥了阻止控股股东谋取控制权私有收益的作用；在高股权集中度的公司中，其发挥了阻止控股股东以共享收益的名义掏空上市公司的作用。④中国多数上市公司还没有建立起连续的现金股利政策，连续发放现金股利与非连续发放现金股利的公司在股权结构方面有显著性差异。连续发放的公司里现金股利具有稳定性；集中型股权结构比分散型股权结构的公司具有更强的稳定性；制衡股东能显著地提高现金股利的稳定性。⑤国有股偏好现金股利，国有股比例越高的公司倾向于支付更多的现金股利；社会公众股东以消极的态度对待现金股利；法人股对待现金股利的态度既区别于国有股，也不同于社会公众股。本文认为这是由各自在代理成本方面的差异及其在公司治理中发挥不同的作用所决定的。⑥近年来中国上市公司出现的现金股利热从表面来看是中国证监会出台的一系列法规政策的结果，但实质上是对中国现阶段投资者有效法律保护不足的替代。在代理成本越高的公司里，现金股利的支付水平越高，代理成本与现金股利支付水平正相关。 本文认为，股权分置改革的最终完成有助于缓和流通股与非流通股在收益实现方式上的冲突，但并不能使上市公司在股权结构方面的所有问题都迎刃而解。希望直接通过股权结构的优化来促进上市公司制定公正与理性的股利政策的想法恐怕也只是一厢情愿。英美公司中普遍存在的分散化的股权结构是其完善的市场监管与健全的投资者法律保护的产物，而中国上市公司中股权的集中则是在投资者法律保护不足的市场中投资者的一种自我保护手段。因此，合理的股权结构是公司制定公正与理性的股利政策的基础，而加强对投资者的法律保护和提高证券市场的监管水平才是优化中国上市公司股权结构的治本之策。
英文摘要：	Based on internal and external related research achievements, this dissertation systematically analyze the influence that ownership structure has on cash dividend policy, examined the applicability and limitation of the western classic dividend policy theories when they explain the cash dividend policy of Chinese listed companies and gives original theoretical explanations to the results of the empirical study according to the listed companies’ governance condition and legal environment in China. We mainly used literature analytical approach, induction, deductive method, describing statistical analysis, correlation analysis, regression analysis and parameter test etc., and we combines normative research method with empirical research method. The dissertation is divided into eight chapters: Chapter 1 mainly introduced the significance, research angles and innovations etc.; Chapter 2 is literature summarization, which reviews and appraises foreign classic dividend policy theories and internal and external related research achievements; Chapter 3 analyzed the institutional environment and legal background in which the ownership structure and dividend policy of Chinese listed companies come into being; Chapter 4 is the theoretical analysis that ownership structure influence cash dividend policy. Chapter 5 is the sample selection and the preliminary statistical analysis, introduced the sample choice, the variable definition, the descriptive statistical analysis and the correlation analysis etc. Chapter 6 examined the influence that ownership concentration and outside blockholders to the cash dividend policy. Chapter 7 examined the influence that shareholder attribute to the cash dividend policy. Chapter 8 is the conclusion and the enlightenment. Compared with similar research, the innovations of the study are: ①This paper investigates the influence that ownership structure has on cash dividend policy (including whether distributing cash dividend or not, cash dividend payment level and cash dividend stability ) from three dimensions: Ownership concentration, outside blockholders and shareholders’ attribute.②The dissertation builds up an income analytical model for controlling shareholders to make cash dividend policy. In addition to sharing cash dividend, controlling shareholders usually can also acquire private income from controlling rights. And the decision destination of controlling shareholders is to maximize total income.③We used various methods to examine the influence that stock structure has on corporate cash dividend policy. And the study makes breakthrough in the aspects of variables control, model construction and improvement, and obtains original research discovery. The main conclusions include: ①In Chinese listed companies, the higher concentration of ownership, the higher the payment level of the cash dividend is, which, is different from western classical theory. Under the “dual” ownership structure, the largest shareholder advantaged at the holding cost, usually utilizes releasing cash dividend to encroach on the minority stockholders' interests. ②The larger the controlling shareholder ratio is, the more probably they set down cash dividend policy from the maximal interests of the controlling shareholders. When the company has person who can check and balance at the shareholders, the controlling shareholder's opportunism behavior receives certain restraint, which can reduce the agent cost of the company effectively and reduce the irrational payment of the cash dividend. ③Among companies that have different ownership concentration, the non-controlling big shareholders' (from the second to the fifth shareholders) function has prominent differences. In the low ownership concentration companies, the non-controlling big shareholders' main function is to prevent the controlling shareholder from seeking dominate private income; In the high ownership concentration companies, their main function is to prevent the controlling shareholder from emptying the listed company in the name of sharing the income. ④Most listed companies in China have not set up continuous cash dividend policy yet. The companies between releasing cash dividend continuously and not releasing the cash dividend continuously have significance differences in ownership structure. The company who releases the cash dividend continuously always has stable cash dividend and the centralized ownership structure has a stronger stability compared to the decentralized ownership structure in cash dividend payment; the outside blockholders can improve the stability of the cash dividend prominently. ⑤The company with the higher ratio of state-owned shares inclines to pay more cash dividend; Public shareholders treated cash dividend negative; the legal person shares treated cash dividend already distinguishes with the state-owned shares, also is different with the public shares. This paper's opinion is that the state-owned shares’ property defect and multiple agent relation determine this kind of partiality for cash dividend of the state-owned shareholders.⑥To all appearances, that China's listed companies were interested in cash dividend crazily was the results of a series of regulation policies which China's Securities Regulatory Commission issued since resent years, but we believed, virtually, the main function of the cash dividend is the substitution to investor's insufficient legal protection at the present stage of China. In the companies with the higher agency cost, the higher the payment level of the cash dividend is. We believe that the reformation of dual-class equity structure is useful to solve the conflict between tradable and non-tradable shareholders, but not all the problems about ownership structure can be solved. It is impossible to promote the company to establish rational and fair dividend policy through optimizing the ownership structure directly. In Britain and America, the decentralized stock structure is the result of the perfect market supervision and perfect legal system about investor protection. However, in China, under the situation of deficient legal system about investor protection, concentrated stock structure becomes the way of their selves-protection. Therefore, it is the reasonable ownership structure that contributes basically to constitute fair and rational dividend policy. And it’s essential to improve the legal system about investor protection and the supervision level in order to optimize the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies.
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