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论文编号：	1919
作者编号：	2002015
上传时间：	2010/5/6 8:42:41
中文题目：	基于公司治理的中小商业银行风险控制研究
英文题目：	Corporate Governance Bank Corporate
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	公司治理 银行公司治理 中小商业银行 风险控制
英文关键字：	Corporate Governance Bank Corporate Governance Medium-sized and Small
中文摘要：	中小商业银行在我国金融体系中占有着重要地位，一直以来，它承担了国有商业银行垄断结构下为小规模经济提供稀缺金融服务的功能，在社会金融资源配置过程中发挥着不可替代的作用。因此，中小商业银行的健康发展直接关系到我国金融服务体系、服务质量和经济效率的好坏。然而，随着我国即将兑现加入世贸组织时全面开放金融市场的承诺，届时中小商业银行不仅要面临着以往国内其他类型银行的竞争，而且也将面临着外资银行的竞争，其风险控制水平的高低将直接成为能否在这场竞争中存活甚至取胜的关键。基于此，如何有效控制中小商业银行风险，成为政府监管部门、银行以及学术界共同关注的问题。 然而，长期以来，国内外对于中小商业银行的研究大多停留在其生存的能力、意义和方式的研究，对于中小商业银行危机发生的的根源也仅仅从银行规模、市场竞争等方面进行探讨，对其背后的公司治理因素涉及甚少。并且，针对银行公司治理的研究，主要集中在银行公司治理与传统的工商业企业公司治理的区别上，对银行公司治理缺陷是如何产生风险并最终影响银行的风险控制体系和风险控制能力方面却鲜见论及。囿于实证研究数据的缺乏，大多数的实证研究仍然集中在大型银行上，对中小商业银行公司治理及其风险控制的实证研究仍然是一个新的领域。因此，从公司治理的视角，深入剖析中小商业银行公司治理特征及治理风险产生机理，进而有效控制中小商业银行风险将具有重要的理论和现实意义。 基于上述考虑，本文在借鉴已有研究成果的基础上，运用规范分析、比较分析和实证分析的方法，从公司治理视角对中小商业银行风险控制问题进行了研究。在研究过程中，首先，结合商业银行的特殊性，构建了中小商业银行公司治理的框架体系，并分析了其公司治理特征；其次，深入探究了中小商业银行公司治理与风险控制的关系，通过构筑股东、董事会与管理层、借款者和银行以及存款者和银行的博弈模型，分析了不同参与主体间的互动关系，并在综合考察其他相关影响的基础上，揭示了中小商业银行内部治理风险、外部治理风险和金融监管风险的生成机理；最后，结合中小商业银行的特殊性，初步建立了中小商业银行公司治理和风险评价指标体系，并实证分析了中小商业银行公司治理与风险控制的关系。 通过上述的研究工作，本文得到了如下的结论： 第一，商业银行的特殊性决定了其核心目标是金融风险最小化，内部治理机制、外部治理机制、金融监管机制是商业银行乃至中小商业银行公司治理的三大治理机制，而银行风险控制系统是这三大机制的共同出口。 第二，在过度集中股权结构和大股东控制的条件下，中小商业银行公司治理最突出的问题表现为实际控股的非国有股东可能利用其控制权侵害其他股东和存款人的利益，并由此引发金融风险。 第三，就现阶段而言，公司治理风险是目前中小商业银行面临的主要风险。并且，股东相容性风险与管理层代理风险是形成内部治理风险的要因；而借款者—银行代理风险、存款者—银行代理风险、产品市场竞争、经理人市场竞争以及资本市场并购则可能导致外部治理风险；金融监管风险则产生于金融监管工具的不完备性以及金融监管机构自身风险。 第四，实证结果显示，中小商业银行公司治理指数与风险指数呈显著负相关关系，说明完善公司治理可以有效地控制银行风险；股东大会治理指数与风险指数呈显著负相关关系，说明在我国股东大会的规范程度和参与程度对风险控制有重要影响；同时中小商业银行公司治理机制的具体组成要素如激励机制、监督机制等对银行风险的降低有较为明显的作用。
英文摘要：	As an important part of Chinese financial system, Medium-sized and Small commercial Banks (thereafter abbreviated as MSSCBs) have undertaken the scarce financial service function under the monopolistic framework of state-owned commercial banks, and effectively allocated financial resources. Hence, whether MSSCBs be soundly developed would have a directly bearing on the good or bad of Chinese financial service system, service quality and economy efficiency. Nevertheless, as China’s about to fulfill the promise of wholly opening its financial market when joining World Trade Organization (WTO), on the very occasion, MSSCBs would face the competition not only from other types of domestic banks ever before, but also from foreign banks, and their risk control level directly become the key to survival or even victory in such a drastic competition. Given this, how to effectively control MSSCB risk has attracted the common concern of government regulatory bodies, banks and academic circle. However, for a long time, most domestic & overseas researchers into MSSCBs have been hovering around their subsistence ability, significance and modes, and ascribing crisis-creating subject- MSSCBs and crisis-creating reason to such aspects as bank scale, market competition, but seldom studies the real cause of Corporate Governance and risk control behind the scenes. Nowadays, researches about bank corporate governance mainly concentrate on the distinction between bank corporate governance and traditional corporate governance of industrial and commercial enterprises, and seek to summarize the general law of bank corporate governance, while few analyses and studies are on how bank corporate governance arousing risk and finally influencing risk control system and risk control ability. Lack of empirical data, most empirical studies still center on large-scale banks, and yet with scarce researches into MSSCB governance and risk control. Thus, to launch an in-depth dissection into MSSCB governance features and risk creation mechanism, and better to effectively control the risks of MSSCBs from the perspective of Corporate Governance would have very important theoretical and practical significance. With a view to the aforementioned considerations, this article selects risk control of MSSCBs based on Corporate Governance as the research topic, which obeys the research thinking from general to special, and from theory to empirical, utilizes the research methods of normalized analysis, comparative analysis and empirical analysis to study the theoretical frame and governance features of MSSCBs, then grounded on which, thoroughly examines their risk creation mechanism, and empirically verifies the relation between MSSCB governance and risk control by use of investigation data, so as to provide policy advices for their risk control. Based on existing research achievements, this paper, firstly, borrows the mature theory framework of Corporate Governance, combining with the peculiarity of commercial banks, to construct the frame system of MSSCB and analyze its governance features. Secondly, after it seeks after the relation between corporate governance and risk control of MSSCBs, it also use game theory to analyze the relation of directors board vs. level of management, that of debtor vs. bank and that of depositor vs. bank, then based on comprehensive exploration into other essential factors to unveil the creation mechanism of MSSCBs’ internal governance risk, external governance risk and financial regulatory risks. Finally, integrated with MSSCBs’ peculiarity, it primarily constructs corporate governance index system of MSSCBs, and moreover, empirically analyzes the relation between MSSCBs governance and risk control according to investigation data. Surrounding the research contents stated above, the following conclusion is drawn from this study. Firstly, the peculiarity of commercial banks determines the core aim of bank corporater governance is the minimization of financial risk, internal mechanism, external mechanism and financial supervision mechanism is the three governance mechanisms of commercial banks and medium-sized and small banks, which share the common exit of bank risk system. Secondly, under the conditions of over concentrated stock ownership structure and big shareholders controlling, the most prominent problem in MSSCB corporate governance shows that non-state-owned shareholders practically controlling stocks might use their controlling rights to infringe on the interests of other shareholders and depositors, and consequently arouses financial risks. Thirdly, in the present stage, the risks led by corporate governance defects are the major risk facing MSSCBs for the moment. Furthermore, the congeniality risks of shareholders and the agency risks between directors board and level of the management are the vital reasons for internal governance risks, while the agency risks arising from debtors vs. banks and that from depositors vs. banks, plus product market competition, managers market competition and capital market acquisitions and mergers could induced external governance risks. However, financial supervision risks come from incompleteness of financial regulatory tools and the risks of financial supervision bodies themselves. Fourth, the empirical results show that the corporate governance index (CGI) of MSSCB and risk index have notable negative relationship, so by enhancing corporate governance of MSSCB can effectively control the commercial bank risk; the results also find that have notable negative relationship, that mean that the attending and ruling degree of general meetings have great impact for MSSCB’s risk control. We can not find any relationships between other individual index of corporate governance has relationships with risk index. The empirical results also show that incentive mechanism, supervision mechanism and etc can effectively control the commercial bank risk.
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