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论文编号：	1918
作者编号：	2002014
上传时间：	2010/5/6 8:33:33
中文题目：	国有大型分公司治理及评价研究
英文题目：	Branch, Corporate Governance, Branch Corporate Governance,
指导老师：	程秀生 李维安
中文关键字：	分公司 公司治理 分公司治理 治理机制 治理评价
英文关键字：	Branch, Corporate Governance, Branch Corporate Governance, Governance Mechanism, Governance Appraisal
中文摘要：	进入20世纪80年代以来，随着国家经济体制由计划经济向市场经济的迅速转变，在我国国民经济发展中逐渐形成了一批具有一定国际竞争力的特大型企业集团。在这些企业集团中，采用总分公司型组织形式经营主营业务的占据了相当大的比例，其重要特征就是通过拥有几十亿甚至上百亿资产的大型分公司来开展生产经营活动。随着这些大型分公司资产规模、社会影响力、决策自主权逐步扩大，地区镶嵌程度逐步提高，以及市场竞争日趋激烈，传统的管理方式很显然不完全适合这类分公司。但是，实践中大多总分公司型国有特大企业集团依然将所属大型分公司作为附庸，一味强调对其进行严格管理和控制，而没有根据市场机制的逐步深入、各地市场竞争的加速变化及分公司逐步提高的市场地位等实际情况，来建立新型的企业集团总公司与其所属大型分公司的关系，导致总公司与下属分公司容易出现一系列代理问题，从而降低了企业集团整体公司治理质量及其综合竞争能力。 然而，在现有的理论研究方面，公司治理理论研究及公司治理评价的重点主要集中在具有法人资格的企业层面（如企业集团母公司及其下属各类子公司），而对于如何基于公司治理视角，探讨总分公司型企业集团内部的分公司治理问题却尚无论及，以国有大型分公司为评价对象的评价指标体系亦处于空白阶段，这使得国有大型分公司治理在实际运行中缺乏与之相匹配的理论支持。为此，借鉴现代公司治理理论，打破一直以来总公司和分公司之间的关系样式，从公司治理视角来诠释总公司和分公司之间的关系，通过建立国有特大企业集团的分公司治理机制，来解决分公司的治理问题并改善分公司治理状况，对于提高整个企业集团的公司治理水平，进而提升企业集团的核心竞争能力必然有所助益。因此，这不仅是公司治理理论研究不能回避的重要理论问题，更是总分公司型国有特大企业集团改革必须要解决的重大现实问题。 基于上述认知，本文以总分公司型国有特大企业集团直接所属的国有大型分公司为研究对象，运用规范研究方法与实证研究方法，依据国内外相关研究文献和国有大型分公司治理状况调查数据，沿着“为什么治理”、“如何进行治理”以及“如何评价治理”这一逻辑思路，对国有大型分公司的治理及其评价问题进行了初步探讨。本文研究成果主要体现在以下三个方面： 第一，在证明大型分公司治理必要性基础上，构建了以分公司治理机制为依托的国有大型分公司治理理论框架。本文将公司治理研究着眼点转入总分公司型国有特大企业集团内部，从公司治理视角对作为企业集团运作实体的大型分公司治理问题进行了探讨。通过所构建的国有大型分公司治理成本、管理成本转换的模型证明，随着市场经济体系的确立和市场机制的深入，当国有大型分公司资产规模、决策自主权逐步扩大、职能逐步健全及地区镶嵌程度越来越高时，总公司与分公司的关系应逐步从行政型管理向经济型治理转变。基于此，本文借鉴相关理论研究成果，构建了以国有大型分公司治理机制为依托的治理框架，提出分公司治理机制由内在机制和外在机制构成。其中，内在机制包括决策机制、制衡与约束机制，外在机制包括经理人员激励机制、总公司控制机制、财务相关治理机制以及利益相关者治理机制。上述研究成果有利于拓宽公司治理研究领域、丰富公司治理研究内容。 第二，设计了国有大型分公司治理评价指标体系，并对分公司治理与其绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析。依据中国公司治理评价与指数研究的成果，以所构建的分公司治理机制为依托，提出了国有大型分公司治理评价指标体系，有利于丰富现有公司治理评价指标体系。同时，本文对国有大型分公司治理与其绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析。实证研究结果表明，良好的分公司治理有利于分公司治理绩效的改善，这不仅进一步证明国有大型分公司治理的必要性，而且客观上也表明国有大型分公司治理是除股东行为、董事会、监事会、经理层、信息披露、利益相关者之外，影响总分公司型企业集团治理水平的又一重要因素，为总分公司型企业集团核心能力的提升找到了新的突破点。 第三，本文对国有大型分公司总体治理状况进行了评价，并提出了提高分公司治理质量的政策性建议。通过对分公司治理状况进行评价和分析后得出，国有大型分公司总体质量状况尚可，但仍有许多亟待改善之处。在国有大型分公司治理中，诸如总公司主要依据胜任能力和经营业绩聘用分公司经理人员，财务规章制度和内部审计规章制度等方面表现较好。但是，分公司治理中也有许多方面亟待进一步加强和改善，如经理人员激励机制中，经理人员的高收入并未带来经理人员激励水平的提高，以优化薪酬结构为主要内容的激励方式需要改善；财务相关治理中，总公司对分公司财务信息真实性及资金管控较弱，总分公司型国有特大企业集团存在较大的财务和资金风险，特别是财务监督、内部审计、外部审计之间尚未形成有效的逐级监督机制；决策机制中，决策风险防范和决策失误责任追究工作需要加强；制衡与约束机制中，党委及工会组织的独立性较差，对经理人员发挥的制衡作用较小；利益相关者治理机制中，以行业主管部门依法规范管理为重要内容的外部市场竞争环境需要改善。最后，针对上述问题，本文提出了完善国有大型分公司治理的政策性建议，以期为总分公司型国有特大企业集团提升治理水平提供理论指导。
英文摘要：	Since the early 1980s, with the speedy transition of our state economy regime from planned economy to market economy, some king-size group companies with international competitiveness have gradually come into being during the development of our national economy, while a considerable proportion of which operate their principal business with the organization pattern of head-office & branches system (hereafter abbreviated as HBS), and whose important feature is to carry out business through the operation of large branches with billions or even tens of billions of assets.. And then, with the enlarging of asset scale, social influence and self-decision-making power, the improving of district inlay degree, and the increasing intension of the market competition facing the large branches, traditional management model of HBS is not suitable for them obviously. But in reality, most of king-size state-owned group companies (hereafter abbreviated as KSGCs) with HBS model have still regarded their branches as vassals, been only emphasizing strict management and control over them, while not built a new type of relationship between group company and its branches according to the fact of increasingly deepening of market mechanism, the accelerating change of market competition of all quarters and the progressively elevated market status of branches. Therefore, there easily aroused series of agency problems between head office and its branches, which has dramatically lowered the total corporate governance (hereafter abbreviated as CG) quality and comprehensive competence of the whole group company. However, in the aspect of previous theoretical study, the researches on CG and its appraisal mainly focuses on the enterprise level (head office and its branches in a group company) with corporate personality, but has not referred to the governance problems of the branches, and absolutely not touched upon the appraisal index system taking large state-owned branches (hereafter abbreviated as LSBs) as evaluating objects, which has made LSBs short of theoretical support matching with its practical operation. Therefore, borrowing from modern CG theory, breaking down the relationship style between head office and its branches, and then explaining their relationship from the perspective of CG, this article tries to solve the governance problems and improve governance conditions of LSBs by constructing their governance mechanism, which is surely of benefit to heightening the governance level and further elevating the core competence of group company. Consequently, it is not only a major theoretical issue inevitable in CG theory study, but is an important issue to be tackled without fail during the reform of KSGC with HBS model. Based on the stated views, this article takes the LSBs which directly belong to KSGCs with HBS model as research objects, utilizes the approaches of normative and empirical study, and later lodges a preliminary exploration into CG and its appraisal index system of LSBs, along such a logic clue as “why to governance”, “ how to governance” and “how to evaluate” according to relative literature review domestically and abroad and the investigation data of LSB governance conditions. Moreover, the following aspects express the research findings: Firstly, CG theory frame of LSBs is constructed supported by branch governance mechanism based on certifying the necessity of branch governance. This article transfers the studying point of view to the internal part of KSGCs, and probes into the issue on CG of large branches as operating entities of KSGCs. Then, by building the converting model between governance cost and management cost in LSBs, it testifies that, with the deepening of market economy system and market mechanism, the enlarging of asset scale and self-decision-making power, the gradually perfecting of corporation function, and the increasingly heightening of district inlay degree, the relationship between head office and its branches should transform from bureaucratic model to economic model step by step. So, this article, based on relative theoretical research results, constructs the governance frame supported by LSBs governance mechanism, and advances that branch governance mechanism constitutes both internal and external part. And even that, the internal part includes decision-making mechanism, checking -balancing mechanism, while the external includes incentive mechanism of the executive level, head office controlling mechanism, governance mechanism relative to finance and t stakeholders. The stated finding not only helps to broaden the research area of CG, but also enriches its research content. Secondly, CG appraisal index system of LSBs is designed, and the relationship between its governance and performance is deeply analyzed empirically. According to the research findings of Chinese CG appraisal and index study, based on constructed branch governance mechanism, this article puts forward CG appraisal index system of LSBs, which enrich the present CG appraisal index system. Simultaneously, this article also holds an empirical analysis of the relationship between the governance and performance of LSBs, and the study result manifests sound branch CG will improve its correspondent performance, which not only has testified the necessity of branch governance and objectively shows branch governance is another important factor influencing the performance of KSGCs with HBS model, besides shareholders’ behaviors, Board of Directors, the Supervisory Board, the Executive Level, information disclosure and stakeholders, then finds the new breakthrough point for the elevation of core competence of KSGCs with HBS model . Thirdly, this article appraises the total governance conditions of LSBs and then advances the positive suggestions to perfect their CG quality. Later, after the appraisal and analysis of branch governance, it concludes that CG quality of LSBs is fairly good but still in urgent need of improvement. In LSB governance, some aspects sound better, for instance, head office employing branch managers mainly by their competence fitting for positions and performance, regulations and rules of finance and internal auditing, and etc. However, there still exist some other areas in urgent need of perfecting such as the high remuneration unable to lifting the incentive level of managers in the executive motivation mechanism, and whose incentive mode making the optimization of remuneration pattern as major content needs amelioration; moreover, in the governance relative to finance, head office has little control over the financial information veracity and fund regulation of its branches, so that comparatively big financial and fund risks are still existing with KSGCs, especially when their progressive supervision mechanism has not been formed among financial supervising ,internal and external auditing; in decision mechanism, the avoiding of deciding risks and the obligation investigation of decision making failure also needs reinforcement; in the checking-balancing mechanism, the worse independence of the party committee and the trade union makes them to brandish little restriction roles on the managers; in the governance mechanism of stakeholders, competitive environment of external market regarding legal standardizing of the industry responsible institutions also waits for improving. Lastly, aiming for the stated issues, this article puts forward positive advices to perfect LSB governance so as to provide theoretical guidelines for KSGCs with HBS model to elevate corporate governance level.
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