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论文编号：	1912
作者编号：	2003014
上传时间：	2010/5/5 17:03:13
中文题目：	监事会治理研究
英文题目：	Supervisory Board Governance
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	监事会 监事会治理 公司治理 比较制度分析 灰色关联分析
英文关键字：	Supervisory Board; Supervisory Board Governance; Corporate Governance; Comparative Institutional Analysis; Grey Relational Analysis
中文摘要：	新千年伊始，美国安然、世通、施乐等公司粉饰业绩，日本雪印食品公司骗取政府信用以及中国上市公司中名目繁多的关联交易、“掏空”等案件的相继曝光，再一次引发了人们对公司治理问题的反思。深入分析这一系列舞弊现象，不难发现，相关利益人之所以能够将动机变为现实，最根本的原因是在这些公司中，公司治理不但没能制止舞弊的发生，更没能发现已发生的舞弊。这不仅表现在由制度漏洞和执行机制所引发的外部治理弱化，更表现在由于内部监督缺位所引致的监督失灵。如何强化内部监督制度建设，成为中国乃至世界所面临的一个共同的课题。 但是，一直以来，作为主要监督机构的监事会，在中国部分上市公司中由于监督权力的旁落，已成为公司治理链条中较为薄弱的环节。加之近年来移植了欧美盛行的独立董事制度，以及日本、法国等发达国家商法和公司法的实践，使得理论界部分学者对监事会治理的有效性提出了质疑，研究者们更存在着弱化甚至取消监事会监督的倾向。即便是新公司法颁布之后，这种质疑的声音仍然不绝于耳。监事会制度在中国直面着能否在将来依然承担着维系公司治理健全性机能的两难选择。 然而，与实践中对监事会治理有效性认知的迫切要求不相匹配的是，理论上关于监事会治理相关问题的探索，相较公司治理的其它方面而言却较为薄弱。大多研究是基于单一视角而展开的，理论及现状分析较多，实证研究较少，法律角度的研究较多，经济、管理角度的研究较少。并且常常由于研究对象与方法的不同对监事会治理有效性的判断得出截然相反的结论。为此，充分借鉴国际上不同公司治理模式中内部监督的经验，从综合的、历史的、演进的视角，来探讨中国监事会治理的有效性问题将具有重要的理论与现实意义。 基于此，本论文以监事会治理的有效性为研究主题，基于历史事实、历史经验以及中国上市公司的实践证据，从关注各国内部监督制度表面差异性及其效率影响出发，经过归纳推理来探索监事会制度的生成与演进，运用实证与规范分析方法来探讨监事会与其它制度之间的关系及其影响因素，进而为中国监事会制度建设提供政策参考。 本论文在已有研究成果的基础上，首先，通过对德国、美国和日本内部监督制度的比较制度分析，梳理出了影响各自内部监督模式的制度背景因素，并认为这些只是影响制度选择的表象，内部监督制度形成的关键在于维系这些监督制度得以存在的企业、市场和社会之间的互动。作为市场与社会中间组织的企业，三者之间是“异质共生”与互补的关系，内部监督制度正是在三者相互作用过程中形成的。因此，不同的企业、市场与社会形态可能会存在不同的内部监督制度。并在此基础上，创新性的提出了内部监督制度有效性的三个基本原理，即正当性、互补性与经济合理性。其次，依据内部监督制度有效性原理，基于历史的路径依赖和战略互补的视角，分析了中国监事会制度的生成及演进，判断了监事会治理在中国的正当性；分析了控制权市场、经理人市场、产品市场、独立董事制度与监事会治理的互补关系，首次构建了监事会治理与董事会治理的互补模型，并依据所构建的监事会治理指数对其进行了验证；通过监事会治理与财务监督水平、经理层治理、利益相关者治理以及信息披露的实证分析，诠释了中国监事会治理的经济合理性。最后，针对监事会制度作为一种有效的制度安排，但并没有完全发挥人们预期效果的现实，从监事会治理的制度特征与股权因素两方面实证分析了影响监事会治理的要因。前者主要是运用灰色关联分析的方法验证了监事会的独立性、积极性与效率性以及股东监事比例、独立监事比例与职工监事比例对监督绩效与监事会治理水平的影响。后者则运用回归分析的方法从股权结构、性质两方面验证了影响监事会治理的因素。 围绕着上述内容，通过本论文的研究得到了如下结论： 第一，监事会制度的生成与演进表明，监事会治理在中国目前具有较强的正当性，只要国有企业改革没有完成，人们的观念不发生激烈的变化，这一制度安排必将持续发挥着作用，并被人们广泛的认同。同时，监事会治理不但与外部市场机制和内部的董事会治理之间具有互补关系，而且与财务监督水平、经理层治理水平、利益相关者治理水平以及信息披露质量有显著的正相关关系，具有较强的经济合理性。为此，总体而言中国监事会治理是有效的。但由于监事会制度自身存在的问题以及外部市场机制与内部其它治理机制的不完善特征，使得监事会治理不具有完全的有效性。这也客观上决定了监事会制度仍然具有进一步有效发挥作用的空间。 第二，从监事会治理的制度特征来看，作为治理特征的效率性对监事会治理水平有着重要的影响，因此，监事会效率性的改善是现阶段提高监事会治理有效性的现实选择。并且，作为人员结构特征的股东监事比例、职工监事比例与独立监事的比例，在对监事会治理水平与监督绩效的贡献方面，股东监事能够发挥更大的作用，现阶段应该在积极引入独立监事的同时，充分完善股东监事的提名与参与机制。 就股权结构和性质而言，第一大股东持股比例对监事会治理水平的影响呈现出负相关关系，而股权集中度对监事会治理水平的影响则表现出了倒 型曲线关系。同时，第一大股东的股权性质不同，将会对监事会治理水平产生不同的影响，而且相较国有企业而言民营企业能够拥有更强的监事会治理水平。为此，在积极推进国退民进战略的过程中，股权的适当集中与大股东的相互制衡更有利于监事会治理水平的改善。 第三，监事会治理的制度建设是一个系统工程，应该从监事会层面、企业层面与市场层面三个维度，以合规为原则，问责为基准来构建监事会治理的制度体系。并指出，为了中国监事会治理有效性的提高，当前应该着眼于独立监事制度的法制化、监事会结构与行为规范化、监事会权限明晰化，市场体系的完善、股权结构的优化以及适时的引入监事会协会。 最后，具体的环境变化以及一个时期内人们观念的变化，都会影响到作为共有信念维系系统的内部监督制度内涵的演变。中国的监事会制度亦然，在环境的变化引致传统“股东价值最大化”理念正在推移的今天，不能不审视其未来可能的演化路径。作为内部监督制度未来建设的着眼点，可以通过引进新的治理主体来创新监事会制度，进而带动中国上市公司治理结构的整体优化。
英文摘要：	At the very beginning of new century, some American corporations, such as Enron, WorldCom, Xerox sugarcoated their performance and Japanese Snow Branc Foods corp., cheated govermant of its credit, and more related transactions than you could shake a stick at, and some undercutting cases exposed successively among China listed companies, which foments again people’s reflecton on the issues of Corporate Governess (thereafter abbreviated as CG). To deeply analyze such series of fraud phenomena, we could find it easily that the underlying reason for relative stakeholders to change their motivations into reality is that CG in stated corporations didn’t put a check on the fraud practices, nor did they find their existence, which is not only shown in the weakening of external governance induced by institutional leakage and executive mechnisms, but in the regulatory failure by internal supervision occupancy. Thus, how to strengthen internal supervision institutional construction becomes a common research project facing China and even the whole world. But until now, as main regulatory machinery in part of China listed companies, Supervisory Board (thereafter abbreviated as SB) has become the weakest loop in the CG chain due to the replacement of its supervisory rights. Moreover, the establishment of the Independent Directors System (thereafter abbreviated as IDS) prevailing in Western Countries and the practices of Commercial Law and Corporate Law in such developed countries as Japan and France have made some scholars in the theoretical circle to launch a challenge to the effectiveness of Supervisory Governance (thereafter abbreviated as SG), and there still exists the tendency to weaken or cancel its supervision among some researchers. Even after the new Corporate Law enacting, such questioning voice remains within reach. The Supervisory Board Institution (thereafter abbreviated as SBI) has to face directly the dilemma as to whether to undertake the responsibility of maintaining the sound function of CG in the future. However, incongruous with the press for the cognizance of the effectiveness of SG, the theoretical groping for the relative issues on Supervisory Board Governance (thereafter abbreviated as SBG) appears much weaker besides other fields of CG. Many studies spread out based on a single angle with much more analyses of theory and that of status quo, but much less empirical study, also with much more research on law, but much less on Economy and Management. And directly opposite conclusions from the judgment on the effectiveness of SBG are drawn because of different research objects and methods. Therefore, to fully borrow the internal supervision experiences of different modes of CG internationally, to probe into the issue on SB effectiveness from the synthetic, historical or evolving vision would have very important theoretical and practical significance. And thereby, this paper, with the effectiveness of SBG as the research topic, based on historical facts, historical experiences, and practical evidences of China Listed Companies, starts from paying attention to internal supervisory institution (thereafter abbreviated as ISI ) in various countries of their superficial divergence and efficiency influence of, searches after the formation and evolvement of SB by induction and logic, applies the empirical and normative analyzing methods to probe into the relations between SBI and others, and its contributing factors , and finally provides policy references for the construction of China SBI. Based on the existing research results, it, firstly, by Comparative Institutional Analysis (thereafter abbreviated as CIA) of ISI of Germany, U.S.A. and Japan, tidies out the institutional background factors of their respective internal regulatory modes, and deems them only as the appearance of influencing institutional selection, while the key is the interaction between enterprise, market and society maintaining the subsistence of these regulatory institutions. The relation among the market, society, and enterprise as the intermediate organization between society and market is complementary and “coexisting with heterogeneity”, while ISI comes into being during the course of their mutual actions. So, there may exist different ISI in different enterprise, market and social shapes. On the stated issues, it innovatively proposes three fundamental principles, namely, Legitimacy, Complementarity and Economic Rationality of ISI effectiveness. Secondly, according to ISI effectiveness principles, based on the views of historical path dependence and strategic complementarity, it analyzes the formation and evolvement of China SBI, judges the Legitimacy of Supervisory Board Governance in China, analyzes the complementary relation between the Controlling Rights Market, the Executive Market, the Product Market, Independent Directors System and SBG, constructs the complementary model of SBG and Directors Board Governance(thereafter abbreviated as DBG) for the first time, later testify it based on the constructed SG index, successively explains the Economic Rationality of China SBG by the empirical analysis of financial supervisory level, Executive Governance, Stakeholder Governance and information disclosure.Lastly, aiming at the reality that SBG as an effective institutional arrangement has incompletely brandished its effects anticipated by the people, it analyzes the key elements influencing SBG from its institutional attribute and stock ownership factors. The former mainly utilizes the method of Grey Relational Analysis to authenticate the independence, initiative and efficiency of SB, and the influences on the regulatory performance and SBG level by the ratios between stockholders vs. supervisors A and independent directors vs. employee supervisors, while the latter applies regression analysis method to authenticate the factors influencing SBG from the angles of stock ownership structure and attribute. Based on the above analyses, the study concludes as follows: Firstly, the formation and evolvement of SBI manifests that SBG has much stronger Legitimacy presently in China, and that kind of institutional arrangement is sure to continuously play its roles as long as State owned enterprises reformation doesn’t finish and people’s ideas do not change drastically, which has been widely accepted by the people. In the meantime, it not only has the complementary relation with external market mechanism and internal DBG, but also is strikingly positive related to the level of financial supervisory level, Executive Governance, Stakeholder Governance and information disclosure quality. In general, Chinese SBG is found to be effective. But the problems existing in SBI itself and the incomplete characteristics of external market mechanism and other internal governance mechanism leads to SBG without complete effectiveness, which also objectively determines its space for further exerting roles effectively. Secondly, from the institutional characteristics of SBG, the efficiency as governance taint has very important impacts on it. Thus, its efficiency improvement is the practical choice to enhance its effectiveness. And as the staff structure characteristic, among the ratios of the stockowner supervisors, employee supervisors and independent directors, the stockowner supervisors could play much larger role in contributing to the SBG level and regulatory performance. Hence, we should fully better the stockowner supervisors’ nomination and participation mechanism when actively introducing independent directors. In view of the structure and attribute of stockownership, the influence of the controlling stockowner’s holding ratio on SBG level tends TO BE negatively related, while the influence of stockownership concentration degree appears as reverse U curve. Simultaneously, the dissimilarity of the attribute of controlling stockownership would impact distinctly on SBG level. Moreover, SBG level of private enterprises is much higher comparing to that of state owned enterprise. Furthermore, in the process of pushing actively the strategy of State Retreating vs. Private Advancing, the appropriate concentration of state ownership and the mutual checking and balancing between big stakeholders would help to improve the level of SBG progressively. Thirdly, the institutional construction of SBG is a systematic project, and whose institutional regime should be built from the dimensions of SB, enterprise and market, conforming to norms as rule, and accountability as benchmarks. Then, it points out that we should pay close attention to the legalization of ISB institution, normalization of SB structure and behaviors, clarification of SB jurisdiction, perfection of market system, and optimization of stockownership structure and timely introduction of SB association in order to elevate the effectiveness of China’s SBG. Lastly, both specific environmental transformation and people’s idea change in a period would influence the evolution of ISI denotation as the maintaining system of shared belief, and so is china SBI today when the environmental changes leads to traditional idea of stockowner value maximization processing, we have to scan the possible evolving path in the future. Correspondently, we could introduce new governance subject to innovate SBI, and further to drive the integral optimization of governance structure of China listed companies as the starting point of the future construction of ISI.
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