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论文编号：	1908
作者编号：	2003013
上传时间：	2010/5/5 16:44:30
中文题目：	民营上市公司治理有效性基于经营者更替视角
英文题目：	Nonstate-owned listed corporate
指导老师：	程秀生
中文关键字：	民营上市公司　经营者更替　公司治理有效性　绩效
英文关键字：	Nonstate-owned listed corporate. Manager turnover．Efficiency of Corporate Governance．Performance
中文摘要：	随着中国市场经济的不断深化，民营经济的力量迅速壮大，一些民营企业经过买壳、借壳或者直接上市，成为我国证券市场的一股新生力量。由于民营上市公司所有权性质与非民营上市公司不同，该类公司的治理问题必然表现出与非民营上市公司不同的特征，因此，对民营上市公司治理问题的研究就显得特别有意义。而关于民营上市公司治理成效的讨论不曾间断过。对经营者进行有效的控制、监督和激励，更换低绩效的经营者，保障经营者和股东利益目标的一致性，是公司治理有效性的直接、重要的表象。而公司治理对绩效的作用也正是通过强化对经营者的监督、激励，促使经营者提高努力水平改善企业管理状况，从而提高企业的价值。因此，通过对民营上市公司经营者更替与绩效相关关系以及更替后绩效变化情况的分析，能够判断民营企业公司治理是否有效，识别公司治理机制对更替与绩效相关关系的影响。因此，本论文主要回答两个问题：第一，民营上市公司治理是否是有效的，即确认低绩效的CEO是否更有可能离开公司，更替后绩效是否有提高；第二，公司治理有效性是否与公司治理结构有关，即内部治理机制和外部治理机制如何影响经营者更替与绩效的相关关系，从而对民营上市公司目前所经常面临的公司治理问题（或称委托代理问题）和常用的公司治理机制进行总结。 为了回答以上两个问答，本文应用实证研究方法，首先从绩效对更替的影响和更替对绩效的影响两个角度，对民营上市公司治理是否是有效的做出判断，进而规范与实证分析相结合，分析民营上市公司股东控制机制、董事会监督机制以及控制权市场机制对更替与绩效的相关关系的影响，说明各种公司治理机制的合理性与不合理之处，并进一步讨论了大股东监督与控制权市场约束之间的关系。更替事件包括低绩效的经营者离开，新的经营者任职，继任来源对更替后的绩效产生影响。本研究的基本结论包括如下几点内容。 第一，民营上市公司治理是有效的。民营上市公司更换低绩效的经营者与企业的绩效之间存在负相关关系，经营者绩效越差，被更换的可能性越大；更替后企业绩效有改善，说明更换低绩效的经营者是企业改善和提高企业的绩效的一种途径。绩效对更替的影响和更替对绩效的影响均说明民营上市公司治理发挥了作用.当然现行的民营上市公司治理机制仍存在许多不足之处。 第二，对各种公司治理机制的研究说明，存在较优的股权结构。在制衡型股权结构下，第一大股东行为体现为“有效监督效应”，而不是“过度监督”，多个大股东的存在有效地约束了第一大股东为获得控制权私人收益而损害其他股东利益的行为，制衡型股权结构是较优的一种形式。在存在控制性股东的企业中，控股股东行为具有明显的外部性，但是随着现金流权的增加，更替与绩效的相关关性得以强化，控股股东倾向于对经营者实行有效监督，与其他股东共享收益，控股股东行为外部性减弱。 第三，独立董事的作用并不显著。其原因在于上市公司独立董事的提名由大股东控制。董事会激励方面，持有公司股票的董事比例越高，更替与绩效的敏感度就越高，这反应出当前民营上市公司对董事的激励不应只关注激励数量，同时更应当使更多的董事获得有效的激励，从而提高董事会整体的效率。在董事长与总经理两职完全合一、部分合一、完全分离三种领导结构中，两职部分合一时，绩效对更替的作用最为显著，是相对较优的董事会领导结构。控制权市场也发挥了公司治理功效，与制衡型股权结构之间具有互补效应，产品市场竞争也显示出了提高经营者努力水平的功效。总之，民营上市公司经营者更替表现出了明显的大股东主导的特征。 第四，公司绩效与继任来源有显著的相关关系，更替前绩效越差，选择外部人继任的可能性就越大。大股东继任选择与现金流权有关，现金流权越大，大股东越倾向于从母公司或关联公司中选择继任者。现金流权越小，从上市公司内部晋升的可能性就越大。不同继任来源在更替后的绩效变化率方面存在差异，外部继任优于内部继任。
英文摘要：	The power of nonstate-owned corporats strengthen dramatically along with the deepening of open and reform of China economy. Many nonstate-owned corporate become new force of securities business through buying shell、borrowing shell、IPO. The problems of corporate governance of nonstate-owned corporate have unique character because there has difference in ownership between nonstate-owned corporate and state-owned corporate. So studying the problems of corporate governance of nonstate-owned firm is very important. Following this, the argument about the corporate governance efficiency of nonstate-owned corporate never be interrupted. Controlling,supervising and prompting manager and turnover low-performance manager are the direct and important token of efficient corporate governance. So we can estimate the corporate governance efficiency level of nonstate-owned corporate through analyzing the sensitivity of manager turnover and corporate performance and the effect of some kinds of corporate governance mechanicsm to the sensitivity. So this paper try to answer the following questions :first ,if the corporate governance is efficient, namely ,whether there exist negative relationship between turnover and corporate performance, second whether the efficiency come from the corporate governance mechanicsms, namely several governance mechanicsms have strength the negative relationship. First this paper analyse these corporate governance mechanism of US model and Japan model and get the two chains that corporate governance mechanicsm act on sensitivity of manger turnover and corporate performance. These two chains are shareholders -board function-manager turnover, controlling market-manager turnover, there exist substitution between shareholders function and controlling market the by comparative analysis way. On this base，from the angle of view manager turnover, we think that the corporate governance is efficient if there exit negative relationship between corporate performance and manager turnover and positive relationship between manager turnover and performance after turnover. And then we will continue to analyse the action of governance mechanicsm on performance and turnover sensitiveity. In this paper we get the following main conclusions. First, the nonstate-owned corporate governance is unefficient If the performance of manager is bad, the probability of manager turnover is higher and after manager turnover the corporate performance have been increased in nonstate-owned corporate. Second, some governance mechanicsms are rational and others are irrational. We testify that multiple shareholders sharing the right of control is better among multiple-shareholders ownership structure extreme-concentration ownership structure and relative-concentration ownership structure. In multiple-shareholders ownership structure supervising of shareholders result in efficient supervising. shareholders engaged in improving the firm value through controlling and stimulanting manager. But in extreme-concentration and relative concentration ownership structure action of shareholders results in excess supervising .In these firm exist controlling shareholders, the action of controlling shareholders are unefficient. when controlling shareholders have lower cash-flow, they will trend to get personal income, so they must seek to cahoot with manager, with this context even if the manager have low performance, he will not leave corporate until he choose to not cooperate with shareholder. When controlling shareholders have higher cash-flow, they will trend to share corporate value with other investors through supervising manager efficiently. Third, the effect of independent directors are not significant, independent directors don’t develop the role of supervising the manager.Higher the rate of directors who hold the shares of the firm, greater the relationship between performance and turnover.The structure of board leadership that manager serve as director is excellen.tControl market has corporate governance function，Control market and multiple-shareholder ownership structure have complementary effection. At last there exist relationship between firm performance and resource of new manager.Lower the firm performance is before turnover, more higher the possibility of manager turnover is. nonstate-owned firms have preference in different cash-flow. higher the controlling shareholders have, more higher new manager come from parent firm or affiliate companies outside of firm. There are difference between rate of performance change of outsiders and insiders, outsiders has the grab on insiders
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