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论文编号：	1907
作者编号：	200002
上传时间：	2010/4/30 11:34:12
中文题目：	中国国有上市公司控制权、负债融资与公司价值
英文题目：	State-owned Listed Company Control Right of Corporate
指导老师：	齐寅峰
中文关键字：	国有上市公司 公司控制权 负债融资 公司价值
英文关键字：	State-owned Listed Company Control Right of Corporate
中文摘要：	政府是我国国有上市公司的终极所有者。由于政府是特殊股东，使得国有上市公司比其他公司存在着诸多更复杂的问题。国有上市公司出现的各种理性和非理性融资行为，对经营与发展形成很大的影响。因此，对我国国有上市公司的融资决策和融资行为进行深入的研究，为解决其融资及其相关问题提供理论支持，成为我国财务学界亟需研究的重要课题。与此相关，国有上市公司的治理问题也受到高度重视。人们普遍关注的诸如一股独大、大股东侵害中小股东利益、委托者与代理者之间缺乏有效的制衡机制、控制权市场的外部治理机制难以发挥作用和政府部门对公司的行政性干预等问题，均与国有上市公司的控制权问题相关。控制权成为国有上市公司的核心问题之一。 融资决策和控制权成为我国国有上市公司同时面临的两个重要问题。由于这两个问题相互之间存在着内生的互动关系，将两个问题联系起来展开研究更有利于揭示内在规律。此外，近几年对上市公司股权融资的研究颇多，而对上市公司负债融资的研究较少，而且国有上市公司的负债融资又具有独特的效应。所以，对国有上市公司的控制权、负债融资及其对公司价值的影响联系起来进行研究，具有重要的理论意义和应用价值。 本文根据融资决策和控制权相互影响的内在逻辑机理，对我国国有上市公司的负债融资方式和控制权特征进行研究，并对国有上市公司负债融资和控制权的关系及对公司价值的影响进行理论和实证分析，力图对丰富国有上市公司融资决策和控股股东的相关研究,提高负债融资决策的科学性，提高公司价值做出一点努力和推进。 本文主要研究目的是：（1）研究我国国有上市公司不同的融资方式带来的利益冲突和经济主体的行为特征；（2）同时，研究国有上市公司控制权的配置状况；（3）在前两项研究的基础上，研究国有上市公司控制权和现金流权偏离的特征；（4）进而，从多个角度研究国有上市公司负债融资方式和控制权的关系；（5）综合分析国有上市公司负债融资、控制权对公司价值的影响，（6）提出优化国有上市公司负债融资决策和改善控制权机制的建议。 本文主要采用规范研究和实证分析相结合的研究方法。通过规范研究考察国有上市公司的融资方式与利益相关者的冲突和控制权特征。通过实证分析揭示国有上市公司的控制权和现金流权的分布特征、控制权对负债融资决策的影响、负债融资对控制权治理效率的影响、控制权对公司价值的影响等研究结论。 本文共分七章。第一章是绪论，第二章是相关理论回顾，第三章研究融资方式和利益相关者的利益冲突，第四章分析国有上市公司控制权配置，第五章是控制权和负债融资关系的关系研究，第六章以理论和实证分析来研究控制权、负债融资对公司价值的影响，揭示出控制权和现金流权偏离造成控股股东代理问题的经济后果。第七章是结论和未来研究方向。 本研究得出以下关于我国国有上市公司的主要结论：（1）第一大股东的实际控制权大于持股比例；（2）股权分置改革没有根本改变第一大股东的控制权状况；（3）控制权和现金流权的偏离度增强了控股股东谋取私人利益的动机；（4）控制权、控制层级、股权集中度影响负债融资；（5）终极控制权和现金流权的偏离影响负债融资的期限结构；（6）控股股东的持股比例影响负债融资的期限结构；（7）控制权和现金流权偏离程度与公司价值的关系证明国有上市公司存在控制权的私人利益；（8）负债融资率、终极控制层级与公司价值呈负相关关系；（9）股权集中度与公司价值呈正相关关系；（10）控股股东的终极控制权、持股比例对公司价值的影响为非线性关系，表明存在积极和消极双重影响。 本文的主要创新点如下： 1．本文以公司控制权与负债融资相互影响的内在机理对国有上市公司展开研究。本文设计了控股股东持股权、终极控制权及与现金流权的偏离、董事会和总经理的人事控制权等多组控制权变量来揭示控制权对负债融资决策的影响关系，从而揭示出国有上市公司控股股东控制权对负债融资的深层影响。较新的研究路线既有益于丰富国有上市公司融资问题的研究成果，也有益于从控制权效率和委托代理理论来认识国有上市公司的融资问题。 2．采用了追溯终极所有者纵向控制权和第一大股东（即控股股东）横向控制权相结合的新方法对控制权进行研究，从而揭示出我国国有上市公司控制权和现金流权偏离呈现纵向和横向偏离交织的特征，以及控制权和现金流权的实际偏离度大于名义持股权的偏离系数。本文通过创新的研究方法，揭示出关于国有上市公司控制权和现金流权偏离的本质特征，在一定程度上推进了我国国有上市公司控股股东的控制权和代理问题的研究。 3．本文通过实证研究发现了一系列关于控制权与负债融资的关系、控制权和负债融资对公司价值影响的创新结论。率先揭示了我国国有上市公司控股股东利用控制权获得私人利益的内在根源；控制权影响负债融资选择和负债期限结构的形成；控股股东对公司价值存在积极和消极双重影响等具有创新性的研究发现。
英文摘要：	As the government is the ultimate owner of the state-owned listed companies, it makes the state-owned listed companies exist more complicated problems than other type enterprises. The various rational and irrational financing activities put on large impacts on the operation and development in state-owned listed companies. It is necessary for us to explore the nature of financing decision and activities thoroughly, and supply the theoretical support of financing decision. On the meanwhile, the corporate governance of the state-owned listed companies is more and more important. The people pay more attention on a series of the special phenomena in the state-owned listed companies, such as: The shareholder solely dominates. Minority shareholders’ interest is expropriated by controlling shareholder in listed companies. Between the principal and agent lacks the constraint mechanism. The outside controlling right market is out of use. Above the problems all involve the control right of listed companies, and control right of shareholder becomes the core and important problem in the listed companies. Financing decision and control right of shareholder both are important aspects in the state-owned listed companies, and there is an inner relationship of mutual interaction between the financing and control right. It’s beneficial for us to combine these two sides to explore the true rule. In addition, the scholars contribute a lot of academic results of the equity financing. And it’s lack of the researches on debt financing of Chinese listed companies. The debt financing has the unique constraint effect on the state-owned listed companies. So it’s urgent to strength the research of the debt financing of the state-owned listed companies. This dissertation examines the theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between the debt financing and control right. And explore the effect of this relationship putting on the value of the company based on the financing and control rights’ logic mutual mechanism. This dissertation tries to enrich the study results on financing decisions and controlling shareholder, in order to improve of the efficiency of debt financing and enhance the values of the state-owned listed companies. The main research goals are as following: (1) Examining the interest conflicts of related stakeholder and the activity features of related stakeholder. (2) Exploring the control right allocation status in the state-owned listed companies. (3) Analyzing the divergence between control right and cash flow right. (4) Overall analyze the impact of debt financing and control right on the state-owned listed companies’ values. (5) Putting forward the suggestions on improving the efficiency of financing decisions and control mechanism. The research methodology of this dissertation is combination of the positive analysis and empirical study. The author uses the positive research to examine: (1) The mutual interaction of debt financing and control right. (2) The control right and cash flow right put the effects on the corporate value. Through the empirical study, this dissertation shows: (1) The allocation characteristic of control right and cash flow right in the state-owned listed companies. (2)The impact which control right puts on debt financing. (3) The governance effect of debt financing acts on control right. (4) The effect of control right run on the value of state-owned listed companies. This dissertation is composed of seven parts. The first chapter is introduction. The second chapter is about the literature review and comments. The third chapter is about the interest conflicts under different financing ways. Chapter 4 is analysis of control right allocation in the state-owned listed companies. Chapter 5 explores the effect of control right on the debt financing by positive and empirical study methods. Chapter 6 examines the impact of control right and debt financing on the value of corporate, presents the economic results of agent problem of controlling shareholder caused by the divergence between the control right s and cash flow right. The main results and conclusions follow as below: (1) The true control right of the largest shareholder is bigger than the holding share ratio. (2) The largest shareholders’ controlling status in state-owned listed companies doesn’t be changed thoroughly in the dual-class equity structure reform. (3) The divergence between the control right and cash flow right intensifies the motive of pursing the private benefit of control right for the controlling shareholder. (4) Debt financing is influenced by some factors, which are ultimate control right, the layer number of the control chain and the ownership concentration. (5) The divergence between the ultimate control right and cash flow right puts an action on the maturity structure of debt. (6) The share holding ratio of controlling shareholder has nonlinear influence on the maturity structure of debt. (8) The debt financing ratio and ultimate control layer number are negative to the corporate value. (9) The ownership concentration is positive to the corporate value. (10) The ultimate control right and share holding ratio of controlling shareholder has a nonlinear impact on the corporate value respectively, which is the evidence that the controlling shareholder put on two sides effects of the positive and passive on the corporate value. The main new features of this dissertation lie in: 1. This dissertation deeply explores the relationship between the control right and debt financing of the state-owned listed companies through designing several kinds of control right variables, such as the share holding ratio of controlling shareholder, the divergence between ultimate control right and cash flow right, the personnel control right of the board of director and the general manager to examine the multiple effects of the control right on the debt financing. This new research way enriches the results of the financing research, and supplies a useful view to analyze the financing decision of state-owned listed companies by the agent theory. 2. This dissertation adopts a new research way which combines vertical ultimate control right s and horizontal controlling shareholder’s control right to analyze the divergence between control right and cash flow right and discovers that the characteristic of true divergence between the control right and cash flow right is bigger than nominal divergence coefficient. This new research method is helpful for us to study the control right and agent problem of state-owned listed companies. 3. This dissertation discovers a serial of new empirical study conclusions about the relationship of control right and debt financing, the effect of control right and debt financing on the corporate value. This dissertation keeps ahead to present the following new empirical findings: the inner cause of controlling shareholder pursing the private benefit of control right , the effect of control right on debt financing selection and the maturity structure of debt, the dual effects of controlling shareholder on the corporate value of state-owned listed companies.
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