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论文编号：	1872
作者编号：	041827
上传时间：	2010/5/18 10:41:56
中文题目：	我国上市公司审计师自愿变更的实证研究
英文题目：	Auditor changes
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	审计师变更 审计师级差 代理成本
英文关键字：	Auditor changes Auditor differentiation Agency costs
中文摘要：	近十年来，随着我国证券市场的迅速发展，上市公司变更会计师事务所的现象也越来越频繁的出现。审计师变更作为审计师选择行为的特例，在一定程度上反映了审计师与上市公司之间的相互关系和他们的行为特征，对它进行研究有利于分析某些特定审计服务市场的特征，而且可以为证券市场各参与主体，尤其是投资者、监管部门，提供重要的决策帮助。在国内对于审计师变更的研究多数集中于对审计师变更影响因素，审计师变更对审计独立性的影响，审计师变更对审计质量的影响等的研究。而上市公司代理成本的存在使得其产生审计需求，且不同的会计师事务所所提供的审计服务的质量有所不同，因此在理论上，上市公司对审计师的变更也应与其代理成本相关。但是迄今为止，在国内还很少有学者对这两者之间的关系进行研究。因而，本文就在代理成本和审计师级差理论的基础上，以上市公司的代理成本作为研究的切入点，使用实证方法来检验审计师变更与代理成本之间理论上的相关性。 由于本文研究的是上市公司代理成本对其审计师变更决策的影响，因此，选择1999-2003年发生审计师自愿变更的全部的A股上市公司中审计师级别发生变更的作为研究样本。将审计师变更分为变更现任审计师和选择后任审计师这两个阶段，选择了流通股比例、股权集中度、控股权等因素作为代理成本的替代变量，使用Logistic回归等统计分析方法，考察上市公司的代理成本水平及其变化对他们做出变更现任审计师和选择后任审计师的决策的影响。研究结果显示代理成本作为一个整体与审计师变更相关，同时代理成本既影响了是否变更审计师的决策也影响了变更后对于后任审计师选择的决策。代理成本单变量的分析证明：股权集中度越高的上市公司越倾向于从高级别的审计师变更为低级别的审计师，流通股股东持股比例增加越多的上市公司越倾向于从低级别的审计师变更为高级别的审计师，这微弱地支持了代理成本与审计师级别变更理论上的正相关性。最后，文章总结实证研究给予我们的启示，并针对审计师变更的监管提出了建议。
英文摘要：	In recent ten years, as the rapid growth of the security market in China, the phenomenon of changing the auditors in Chinese listed companies becomes more and more frequently. As one special case of the auditor selection, the auditor changes, in a certain extent, reflect the correlation between the auditors and the listed companies and their behavior characteristics, thus the research on it will be good for the analysis of the characteristics of some certain auditing service market and can provide help for various participators in the security market when they make decisions, especially for the investors, supervising section. In domestic, the research on auditor changes mainly focuses on the influencing factors, the influence on the auditors’ independence and the influence on the auditing quality. The demand of the auditing comes from the existence of the agency costs, and different CPA firms may provide quality-differentiated audit service, so in theory, the auditor changes of the listed companies should be related to their agency costs. But till now, the domestic scholar has hardly researched on the relationship between them. Therefore, based on the agency theory and quality differentiation theory, this paper uses the empirical method to prove the theoretical relationship between the agency costs and the auditor changes. Since this thesis wants to research on the influence of the listed companies’ agency costs on the auditor changes, we select the A-share listed companies which initiatively change the auditors and also change the rank of the auditors during the period 1999 through 2003 as the sample. This thesis separates the auditor change into two steps: first, a decision is made to change auditors and, second, a new auditor is chosen. We choose the percentage of the liquid shareholder, the diffusion of ownership and other factors as the agency cost proxies, and use the Logistic Regression Model and other statistic methods to test whether the listed companies’ agency costs have influence on the two processes of the auditor changes. The result of the empirical study shows that the agency costs as a whole has influence on the auditor changes and the agency costs not only influent the decision of changing the auditor but also the decision of choosing the successor. From the analysis of the single variable, we find that as the degree of the ownership concentration increases, more listed companies choose to switch the auditor from the high level to the low level; as the percentage of the liquid shareholders increase more, the listed company more like to switch the auditor from the low level to the high level, which faintly support the positive association between a company’s agency costs and its demand for a quality-differentiated audit. Finally, the thesis summarizes the revelation that the empirical study gives to us, and proposes some suggestions aiming at the supervision of auditor changes.
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