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论文编号：	1850
作者编号：	1120050703
上传时间：	2009/12/22 16:32:16
中文题目：	机构投资者对上市公司委托代理问题的影响研究
英文题目：	The Influence of Institutional Investors to the Listed Companies’s Agency Problem
指导老师：	刘志远教授
中文关键字：	机构投资者 委托代理问题 公司治理对策 公司价值
英文关键字：	institutional investors agency problems governance mechanism corporate value
中文摘要：	第一类委托代理问题即股东和管理者之间的委托代理问题，主要存在于股权分散的企业中，由于所有权和控制权相分离，股东拥有所有权而管理者拥有控制权，两者对待风险的态度不同，目标函数不同，所以管理者并不总以股东利益为行动指针，同时股东又无法完全预测或者了解管理者的行动和投资机会，所以股东和管理者之间的代理冲突无法避免。第二类委托代理问题即大股东和小股东之间的委托代理问题，主要存在于股权集中的企业中，由于现金流权和控制权相分离，拥有控制权的大股东有动机凭借多种手段侵占小股东的利益。我国上市公司特别是国有上市公司，股权集中程度非常高，同时国有产权主体缺位，形成内部人控制，所以我国上市公司，特别是国有上市公司中，两类代理问题都非常严重。那么如何解决上市公司中的委托代理问题，降低代理成本；如何完善现有的公司治理机制，提高上市公司价值，这些都是需要关注和解决的问题。 20世纪80年代以来，西方资本市场上的机构投资者异军突起，成为资本市场中举足轻重的力量，机构投资者介入公司治理也取得了丰硕的成果。我国机构投资者虽然发展历程不长，但也初具规模，机构投资者介入公司治理的案例也逐渐增多。那么机构投资者是否能成为一种新的委托代理问题的治理对策，是否能缓和公司内部存在的这两类代理问题，降低代理成本；是否能完善现有的公司治理机制，提高公司价值，本文主要对这一问题进行理论和实证分析。 本文由四部分构成，主要内容安排如下： 第一部分包括第一章，简要说明了本文的研究动因、研究意义、研究方法、研究结构、研究内容与研究创新。 第二部分是本文的理论分析部分，包括第二章、第三章和第四章。第二章是文献回顾部分，对机构投资者影响委托代理问题的相关文献进行了梳理和分析。第三章是制度背景分析部分，主要分析了机构投资者股东积极主义在全球和在我国的发展，分析了我国资本市场上主要机构投资者的发展历程和现状，分析了我国资本市场改革和国有企业改革的历程及经济后果。第四章首先分析了公司内部两类代理问题及代理成本，接着分析了原有委托代理问题的公司治理对策存在的问题，最后分析了机构投资者作为一种新的公司治理对策在解决委托代理问题上的作用并提出了机构投资者影响委托代理问题的理论框架。 第三部分是本文的实证分析部分，包括第五章、第六章和第七章。第五章主要基于机构投资者对管理者薪酬激励机制的影响来考察机构投资者对第一类代理问题的影响。第六章主要基于机构投资者对大股东占款的影响来考察机构投资者对第二类代理问题的影响。第七章主要基于机构投资者对公司价值的影响来考察机构投资者对两类代理问题的总的影响效果。 第四部分是本文的结论和政策建议，包括第八章。 本文的基本结论如下： 首先，经理薪酬政策是解决第一类代理问题的主要治理对策。我们研究发现，机构投资者持股水平越高，经理现金薪酬水平、薪酬绩效敏感度就越高，薪酬结构也得到改善（股权薪酬水平提高），这有助于改善经理薪酬激励中薪酬水平低，结构不合理，与绩效脱钩的问题。同时我们发现，在国有上市公司，随着机构投资者持股水平提高，经理现金薪酬水平提高幅度和薪酬结构改善程度（股权薪酬水平提高幅度）要小于非国有上市公司两者提高和改善的幅度。我们认为这是以大股东为首的治理力量和机构投资者两股治理力量相互作用的结果。在国有上市公司，以大股东为首的治理力量重视现金薪酬激励，表现为国有上市公司现金薪酬水平高于非国有上市公司，这一治理方向和机构投资者治理方向相同，在这一背景下，机构投资者可以选择较低成本的行动方式，同时分享大股东的治理收益，所以我们从外界观察到国有上市公司机构投资者的治理效果不如非国有上市公司机构投资者的治理效果，我们认为这是国有上市公司中大股东的治理行动对机构投资者的治理行动发生了“替代效应”。在国有上市公司以大股东为首的治理力量轻视股权薪酬激励，表现是国有上市公司经理股权薪酬要小于非国有上市公司，在这种背景下，虽然机构投资者同样发挥积极的作用，但是机构投资者的力量与以大股东为首的治理力量相差悬殊，治理效果被削弱，所以我们从外界观察到的机构投资者在国有上市公司对薪酬结构（股权薪酬水平）的治理效果要小于在非国有上市公司的治理效果，我们认为这是国有上市公司中大股东的治理行动对机构投资者的治理行动发生了“阻滞效应”。 其次，大股东占款是大股东和小股东之间代理问题的主要表现形式之一，我们研究发现，机构投资者持股和大股东占款之间呈现显著的负相关关系，机构投资者持股比例上升，有利于降低大股东占款金额。同时我们也发现，在国有上市公司，随着机构投资者持股比例的上升，大股东占款下降的幅度要小于在非国有公司大股东占款下降的幅度，我们认为这是机构投资者与国有上市公司中以政府（大股东）为首的治理力量发生相互作用的结果。政府出于宏观经济管理的需要发布了清理大股东占款的规章，政府既是规章的制定者、执行者也是规章的遵守者，这种身份上的重合使得国有上市公司大股东占款的清理效果要好于非国有上市公司，也就是说在降低大股东占款上，政府（大股东）和机构投资者的治理方向相同，在这种背景下，机构投资者可以选择较低成本的行动方式，同时分享政府的治理收益（较低的大股东占款，较高的企业价值），所以我们从外界观察到国有上市公司机构投资者的治理效果不如非国有上市公司机构投资者的治理效果强，我们认为这是国有上市公司中政府（大股东）的治理行动对机构投资者的治理行动发生了“替代效应”。 最后，机构投资者对委托代理问题的治理效果受很多因素的影响：一方面与被投资单位的经济依存度会影响机构投资者的治理效果，与被投资单位不存在经济依存关系的压力不敏感型机构投资者相对于与被投资单位存在经济依存关系的压力敏感型机构投资者而言治理效果更好；另一方面，投资期限长短会影响机构投资者的治理效果，投资期限短的机构投资者相对于投资期限长的机构投资者治理效果更好，这与西方机构投资者的实践结果存在差异，是由我国特殊的制度背景造成的；再有，持股规模的大小会影响机构投资者的治理效果，证券投资基金在我国资本市场主要机构投资者中持股规模最大，治理效果最好。
英文摘要：	The first sort of agency problem, which is between stock holders and managers, mainly exists in the enterprises of dispersed ownership. Because of the separation of the ownership and control, the stockholders have the ownership and the managers have the control. Each of the two sides holds different attitude upon the risks and the objective functions are also different, so the managers do not always strive for the stockholders’ benefit. Meanwhile, the stockholders can not thoroughly estimate and grasp the managers’ actions and their investment opportunities. Therefore the conflicts between stockholders and managers are not avoidable. The second sort of agency problem, which is the conflicts between big and small stockholders, mainly exists in the concentrated ownership of enterprises. Because of the separation of the cash current and control, big stockholders have motivations to invade the profit of the small ones using many kinds of methods. In Chinese listed companies, especially state-owned listed companies, stock concentration is very high. Meanwhile, the main state-owned property right is absent. Insider control is universal. So the two types of agency problems are very serious in Chinese listed companies, especially state-owned listed companies. Therefore, in the companies, the problems of how to solve the agency problems, how to reduce agency costs; how to improve the existing corporate governance mechanisms, and how to enhance the value of companies, are the key problems to resolve. Since the 1980s, in the western capital market, institutional investors are a new force. They have become one of the most important ones in the capital market. Institutional investors have achieved much production by participation the corporate governance. The history of institutional investors in China mainland is not quite long, but institutional investors are beginning to take shape. Cases in which the institutional investors are taking part in the corporate governance are growing more and more popular. Whether institutional investors’ participation into corporate governance can effectively settle the two sorts of agency problems deep in the companies and thus reduce agency cost and increase the value of the companies is the main topic which is going to be concerned both theoretically and empirically analyze. This paper can be divided into 4 parts, which are arranged below: The first part includes Chapter 1, which briefly represents the cause, the significance, the methods, the structure and the contents of the investigation associated in this paper. The main innovation of this research is also mentioned in this part. The second part includes Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. This is a part of theoretical analysis. Chapter 2 is a review of former literatures. A rough analysis upon the theory and practice of the institutional investors’ participation into corporate governance is carried out. Chapter 3 is about institutional context. The development of activism of institutional investors in the world and also in China is analyzed. On the other hand, the history and current situation of the main institutional investors of China is also analyzed according to reformation of capital market and of state-owned companies. Chapter 4 is about the cause and the solution of the two sorts agency problem. Firstly, we analyze the two types of agency problems and agency costs in the companies. Secondly, we analyze the limitations of the original treatments to the agency problems. Finally, we analyze the effects of the institutional investors as a new corporate governance measures in solving the agency problems and put forward a theoretical framework. The third part includes Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. This is the part of empirical analysis of this paper. Chapter 5 analyzes the effect of institutional investors upon the first sort of agency problems based on manager incentive mechanism. Chapter 6 analyzes the effect of institutional investors upon the second sort of agency problems based on the condition to the big stockholders. Chapter 7 analyzes the overall effect of institutional investor upon both the first and the second sort of agency problems based on the value of companies. The fourth part includes Chapter 8, which concludes the paper and proposes theoretical advice. The basic conclusion of this paper is mentioned below: First, the executive compensation policy is the main treatment to solve the first sort of agency problems. Our study find that the bigger percent of stocks the institutional hold，the higher the managers’ salary level and the sensibility of their compensation to performance and the improvement of the structure of the compensation(the level of stock compensation) will be. This will help to improve the problems exist in the executive compensation. We also find that in state-owned listed enerpries, as the level of the stock of the institutional investors rises, the salary level of the executives does not grow that much as the non-state-owned listed enterprises, and the improvement of the executives’ compensation structure does not grow that much, either. We believe that this is the interaction of the big stockholders and the institutions in the state-owned listed enterprises. Other governance forces, especially the big stockholders, lay more stress on cash compensation in the state-owned listed enterprises. So the cash compensation in state-owned listed enterprises is much higher than that in the non-state-owned listed enterprises. This is also preferred by the institutional investors. In this context, Institutional investors can choose lower-cost mode of operation, while sharing the governance benefits of the big shareholders. As seen from outside, we find that the influence of institutional investors upon state-owned enterprises is not as effective as that upon non-state-owned enterprises. We think that a "substitution effect" takes place, that is the effects of the big stockholders in the state-owned listed enterprises substitutes that of the Institutional investors. Other governance forces, especially the big stockholders, lay less stress on stock compensation in the state-owned listed enterprises. So the stock compensation in state-owned listed enterprises is much lower than that in the non-state-owned listed enterprises. In this context, even though institutional investors play an active role in the same, but the strength of the big stockholders is so strong that the institution investors’ effect is weakened. As seen from outside, we find that the influence of institutional investors upon state-owned enterprises is not as effective as that upon non-state-owned enterprises in the executives’ compensation structure(the level of stock compensation). We think that a "block effect" takes place, that is the effects of the big stockholders in the state-owned listed enterprises blocks that of the institutional investors. Second, capital occupying is one of the form of the second sort of agency problem. We find that the higher level of stocks the institutional investors hold, the less capital occupying by the big stockholder. Meanwhile, we find in the state-owned listed enterprises, as the level of stocks the institutional investors hold rises, the degree of the decrease of the capital occupying by the big stockholders is lower than that of non-state-owned listed enterprises. We believe that this is the interaction of the big stockholders and the institutional investors in the state-owned listed enterprises. The government issued clean-up rules and regulations for the need of macroeconomic management. The government is both regulatory makers and regulatory implementers. The government is the big stockholders in the state-owned enterprises and has to comply with regulations, too. Such status coincidence makes the clean-up effect in the state-owned listed enterprises better than the non-state-owned listed enterprises. In other words, the government(the big stockholders)’s directions and institutional investors’ directions are the same in decrease the capital occupying, and institutional investors can choose lower-cost mode of operation, while sharing the governance benefits of the big shareholders(less capital occupying and high enterprise’ value). So we find that the influence of institutional investors upon state-owned enterprises is not as effective as that upon non-state-owned enterprises as seen from outside. We think that a "substitution effect" takes place, that is the effects of the big stockholders in the state-owned listed enterprises substitutes that of the Institutional investors. Third, the governance effect of the institutional investors is influenced by many factors. On the on hand, their dependence upon the invested corporations will influence their governance effect. Those pressure insensitive institutional investors will show stronger governance effect upon pressure sensitive corporations? On the other hand, institutional investors’ insight will influence their governance effects. Because of the special institutional context of China, institutional investors with shorter investing eyesight will show stronger governance effects than those with longer investing eyesight. Another factor should be mentioned that the stock shares will also influence the institutional investors’ governance effect and the fund which holds stocks with much superiority, makes a good example in the capital market in China.
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