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论文编号：	1773
作者编号：	1120050713
上传时间：	2009/12/14 12:31:29
中文题目：	我国公司债券融资的公司治理效应研究
英文题目：	Study on of Corporate Governance Effect of China''s corporate bond financing
指导老师：	陈超
中文关键字：	公司治理、公司债券、债券评级
英文关键字：	Corporate governance, corporate bonds, bond rating
中文摘要：	近年来，我国经济高速发展，但公司债券市场的发展却非常迟缓，导致企业长期依赖银行贷款与外部权益融资。中国证监会在2007年8月14日正式颁布实施《公司债券发行试点办法》（以下简称“试点办法”），这使我国公司债券市场的健全发展踏出了重大的一步。本文以此为契机，从公司债券融资的角度，利用理论归纳和实证检验的研究方法，对我国公司治理问题进行了探讨。 文章首先综述了国内外关于公司债券融资与公司治理的研究文献。其次系统地描述了我国公司治理和债券市场的现状，并在此基础上对公司债券融资的治理效应进行了理论分析，从金融生态环境的角度分析了影响债券融资治理效应的主要因素，主要包括债券市场化程度、政府的干预程度、债券市场的法律规范程度以及金融中介的发展状况等，着重分析了公司债券融资的重要环节--债券评级。规范的债券评级制度，可以降低债权人和债务人之间的信息不对称，能够起到监督和约束经理行为的外部治理作用。 之后，文章对影响我国债券评级的因素进行了实证检验。实证结果发现影响债券评级最关键的因素是发债公司所处行业景气度、发债公司第一大股东的类型是否国有、公司规模、发债主体是否为上市公司以及债券发行的时间。除公司规模之外的其他财务指标包括净资产收益率、现金收入比、资产负债率、流动比率、已获利息倍数、总资产周转率和长期债务比等财务指标对债券主体级别均无显著影响。对发债主体级别有显著影响的因素更多的是发债主体控股股东的类型（国有还是非国有）、发债公司的类型（上市与否）以及发债的时间等外部因素，而企业自身经营状况等内部因素对发债主体级别影响甚微，这与欧美债券评级有着显著不同。在评级影响因素主要是公司规模和外部因素的情况下，经理们即使改善了资产管理能力、盈利能力或负债比率等财务指标也难以影响评级的变化，即使他们改善资产管理能力、盈利能力或负债比率等财务指标可也不会提高其债券评级。因此，从债券评级影响因素来看，我国债券评级制度还需要进一步加以规范，当前我国的债券评级还难以起到降低信息不对称的外部治理的作用。 接着，以1998年以来发行公司债券的上市公司为样本（以同行业、规模近似的上市公司为配比样本），文章对公司债券融资的治理效应进行了实证分析。我们构建了公司治理指数用来衡量公司治理结构，用自由现金流来衡量债券融资对经理过度消费等行为的约束，用主营业务利润率来衡量公司经营绩效，用管理费用率和资产周转率来衡量公司代理成本，结果显示公司债券融资对公司治理结构、自由现金流和公司绩效影响不显著，但与公司的代理成本为显著正相关，也就是说目前我国公司债券融资还不能发挥债权治理的功能。从根本上讲这与我国公司债券市场的缺陷有关，如当前我国公司债券市场行政色彩严重、政府干预较多、风险承担机制不合理、债券评级制度不完善、破产机制不健全等。 此外，我们以中国长江电力股份有限公司为研究对象，对公司债券融资的治理功能进行案例研究，系统的分析了债券条款的内容以及公司债券融资的两种基本治理措施，即债券持有人会议制度和债券受托管理人制度。我们对公司债券融资的市场反应进行检验，结果表明股票市场对公司债券融资的反应是不显著的，作者认为这是由于我国公司债券市场固有的缺陷导致的，因其惯性，即所谓“路径依赖”，并没有因《公司债券发行试点办法》的实施而立刻从根本上有所改观所致。 最后，就如何完善公司债券融资的治理功能作者提出了建议，即：公司债券的市场化、债券市场的法制化和债券评级制度的完善。
英文摘要：	Recently, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) formally promulgated and implemented the "Corporate Bond Issuance Regulation" on August 14, 2007. This regulatory change indicates that China's corporate bond market finally moves an important step. It offers a unique opportunity for this research to empirically investigate the relationship between the corporate governance and corporate bond financing in China. This study surveys the existing literature on the relation between corporate bond financing and corporate governance. Further, we present a framework of the interaction between corporate governance and the bond market and how does bond financing affect corporate governance. The advantages of the impact of corporate bonds relative to bank loans on corporate governance are compared and the influence of the corporate bond rating on corporate governance is studied. Theoretically, we conclude that the perfect bond rating system can reduce the information asymmetry between creditors and debtors, and play an external governance role on monitoring managers’ behavior. Empirically, we examine the determinants of Chinese bond rating and discover that the size of the bond issuer ，the issue of bonds in which the industry's boom degrees, bond type of the company's largest shareholder is state-owned, company size, the main issue of bonds whether listed companies as well as the bonds of time.while the fundamentals including total include net capital gains rate, cash income ratio, asset-liability ratio, liquidity ratio, interest earned multiple, total asset turnover, and long-term debt ratio etc. are insignificant. The empirical results show that the bond rating system in China is different from that in well eveloped markets. Our findings suggest that the existing bond rating system in China can’t reduce the information asymmetry between creditors and debtors and can’t achieve external governance function effectively. Then, using the data of corporate bond issued after 1998 and the control samples matched by the industry and firm size, we investigate the effect of corporate bond financing on corporate governance. In thi study, we design a corporate governance index to denote the corporate governance structure. Further, we use return on equity to measure corporate performance and the management expense ratio and the asset turnover ratio to measure agency costs. The empirical results show that bond financing does not significantly affect corporate governance and free cash flow, but significantly decreases firm performance and increases agency costs. The findings seem to be inconsistent with existing literature in developed markets. Our findings suggest that the imperfection of China bond market maybe bring about invalidation of bond governance function, for instance, the government intervention in corporate bond market, imperfect mechanism of risk prevention and imperfect bond rating system. Furthermore, we use a field study, the first corporate bond financing by China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd, to analyze the above empirical issues. We summarize the bond clauses of China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd related to corporate governance. Then, we test the stock market reaction on the announcement of corporate bond financing. The finding reveals an insignificant market reaction. We conclude that the "Corporate Bond Issuance Regulation" doesn’t change the condition of China corporate bond market immediately. Finally, we put forward our proposals on how to realize the governance function of corporate bond, namely, corporate bond market-oriented, bond market legalization and perfecting bond rating system.
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