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论文编号:1690 
作者编号:1120050705 
上传时间:2009/12/23 17:01:41 
中文题目:谈判经验、立场灵活性与审计人员的谈判判断  
英文题目:Negotiation Experience, Stand Flexibility and Auditor’s Negotiation Judgment  
指导老师: 张继勋 教授 
中文关键字:审计谈判 谈判经验 立场灵活性 谈判判断 
英文关键字:Audit negotiation; Negotiation experience; Stand flexibility; Negotiation judgment 
中文摘要:审计谈判是影响审计质量的重要环节,审计谈判研究无论对促进和改善审计谈判结果,还是对丰富和发展审计谈判理论都具有很重要的意义。在西方,审计谈判研究是目前审计研究领域较为前沿的问题;在中国,审计谈判研究才刚刚起步,尚未形成系统的审计谈判研究体系。本文借鉴社会心理学等领域的谈判研究成果,结合审计谈判特有的环境特征和谈判者特征形成审计谈判的研究框架,并在该框架下通过一项实验具体验证了审计人员谈判经验、客户立场灵活性对审计人员谈判判断的影响。 本文共分六章。第一章为绪论;第二章为文献回顾,简要回顾了一般谈判研究的文献,提出了审计谈判研究框架,沿着框架的脉络对审计谈判研究领域的文献进行了梳理,在分析谈判者因素影响审计谈判研究的不足之后提出了本文的研究问题;第三章运用双重关注理论、审计谈判过程模型和信息加工理论等分析了审计人员谈判经验和客户立场灵活性对审计人员谈判判断的影响,提出了研究假设;第四章介绍了本研究的实验设计方案;第五章对实验数据进行了统计分析,检验了研究假设;第六章是本文的结论,总结了全文的研究结论、局限性及未来的研究方向。 本文得到的主要结论包括: 1. 在本文构建的审计谈判研究框架中,审计谈判是以审计人员和客户的相互依赖为基础,以双方的决策过程为主线,受到静态的情境因素和动态的谈判者因素共同影响的沟通与互动过程。其中,情境因素构成了审计谈判发生的背景,谈判者因素构成了审计谈判的主体,情境因素通过影响谈判者因素影响审计谈判,情境因素和谈判者因素共同决定审计谈判的结果。 2. 理论分析表明,谈判经验的积累有助于审计人员更准确地推断客户的让步,令他们对谈判结果的判断更有利于审计人员;相对于立场坚定的客户,客户立场灵活时审计人员判断的谈判结果更有利于审计人员;客户立场灵活性对审计人员谈判判断的影响随审计人员谈判经验的不同而不同。 3. 实验结果表明,与缺乏谈判经验的审计人员相比,有谈判经验的审计人员对谈判结果的判断更有利于审计人员。审计工作年限、审计人员职位对审计人员谈判判断的影响不显著。 4. 实验结果表明,相对于立场坚定的客户,当客户立场灵活时,审计人员对谈判结果的判断更有利于审计人员。 5. 实验结果表明,客户立场灵活性对审计人员谈判判断的影响取决于审计人员的谈判经验:当审计人员缺乏谈判经验时,与立场灵活的客户相比,对立场坚定的客户审计人员会更加迁就客户,审计人员判断的谈判结果对客户更有利; 当审计人员有谈判经验时,客户立场灵活性对审计人员谈判判断的影响不显著。  
英文摘要:Audit negotiation is a key process to affect audit quality, and audit negotiation research is important not only to improve audit quality, but also to develop audit negotiation theory. In the west, audit negotiation research is a relatively new research direction; in China, audit negotiation research has just started and there is a lack of a comprehensive research framework for it. This study draws upon negotiation research in social psychology and other disciplines to develop a framework of audit negotiation research, and then provides empirical evidence to the framework by investigating the effect of auditor negotiation experience and client stand flexibility on auditor’s negotiation judgment. The dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter one gives an overall introduction; chapter two provides a review of the literature in general negotiation research, develops an audit negotiation research framework and reviews audit negotiation papers in light of the framework, and puts forward the research question for the current study; chapter three draws upon dual concern model, audit negotiation process model, and human information processing theory to develop the hypotheses about the effect of auditor negotiation experience and client stand flexibility on auditor’s negotiation judgment; chapter four explains the experimental design; chapter five analyses the data and tests the hypotheses; chapter six concludes the dissertation with discussions of the research result, limitation and directions for future research. The major conclusions of the dissertation are as follows: 1. On the basis of the inter-dependence of auditor and client, and highlighted by the decision process of the two negotiators, audit negotiation is a communication and interaction process that is affected by static contextual factors and dynamic negotiator factors and the interaction of the two kinds of factors according to the proposed framework of audit negotiation research. Within the proposed framework, contextual factors form the background against which audit negotiation takes place, and negotiator factors are the vehicle through which the contextual factors have their influence. Different factors interact with each other to affect audit negotiation process. 2. The theoretic analysis argues that auditors with more negotiation experience can estimate client’s concession more accurately, and their judgment of the audit negotiation outcome is more favorable to the auditor; compared with clients taking a flexible stand, auditors’ negotiation outcome judgment is more favorable to the client when negotiating with clients taking a firm stand; the effect of client stand flexibility on auditor’s negotiation judgment is contingent on the level of auditor negotiation experience. 3. The experimental results indicate that compared with auditors with less negotiation experience, auditors with more negotiation experience estimate the negotiation outcome to be more favorable to the auditor; auditors’ general audit experience and auditor rank have no significant effect on auditors’ negotiation judgment. 4. The experimental results indicate that compared with clients taking a flexible stand, auditors’ negotiation outcome judgment is more favorable to the client when negotiating with clients taking a firm stand. 5. The experimental results indicate that the effect of client stand flexibility on auditor’s negotiation judgment is contingent on the level of auditor negotiation experience: for auditors with less negotiation experience, their negotiation outcome judgment is more favorable to the client when negotiating with clients taking a firm stand rather than a flexible stand; for auditors with more negotiation experience, client stand flexibility has no significant effect on auditors’ negotiation outcome judgment.  
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