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论文编号：	1641
作者编号：	2120082220
上传时间：	2010/6/13 16:24:42
中文题目：	上市公司股权激励设计与市场反应
英文题目：	Incentive Plan Design in Listed Companies and the Market Reaction
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	股权激励; 股票期权; 限制性股票; 事件研究; 激励效应
英文关键字：	Equity Incentive; Stock Options; Restricted Stock; Event Study; Incentive Effects
中文摘要：	本文通过相关文献回顾及剖析《上市公司股权激励管理办法》颁布后的股权激励董事会预案，对我国上市公司对股权激励董事会预案的选择偏好、激励效应、市场反应进行研究。本文得出终极控制人、企业特征与公司治理对股权激励设计的选择偏好与激励效应有着重大影响，并运用市场反应验证了激励效应划分的合理性。 首先，本文对我国上市公司股权激励进行时期划分，并总结萌芽期、导入期、规范期与发展期等阶段的股权激励计划的特点与问题。然后，系统性的总结影响股权激励方式选择的上市公司企业特征，并计量其与方式选择之间的关系。得到企业成长性、企业规模等企业特征影响着上市公司选择激励方式的偏好，且成长性越大的上市公司，更愿意选择股票期权；企业规模越大的上市公司，更愿意选择限制性股票。不同终极控制人之间，无论国有或民营控股，抑或国有控股中的中央国有控股与地方国有控股，选择激励方式的偏好并没有明显的差异。 根据激励有效期，把占股权激励方案多数的股票期权方案划分为激励型与福利型，并计量相关影响因素间的关系。得到终极控制人、企业特征与公司治理因素共同影响着上市公司以激励有效期为划分的激励效应。股权激励方案体现的激励效应随着企业成长性高、企业盈利能力强而更强；董事会独立性越强、董监高平均年龄越小，体现的激励效应就越大。高新技术行业公司的股权激励方案体现的激励效应可能比较高。民营控股企业更偏向于激励有效期较短的方案。而较大的企业规模往往使得股权激励的有效期变得更长。接着以事件研究法在事件窗口期,考察市场对股权激励草案推出的超额累计收益，并验证了按激励有效期划分股权激励一定的合理性。
英文摘要：	Through literature review and analysis of board of directors announcement for the equity incentive program of listed companies after "Regulations of Equity Incentive for Listed Company", this article researches the selection bias, incentive effect and the market reaction of equity incentive plan. This article reaches the conclusion that the ultimate controller, enterprise features and corporate governance have a major impact on selection bias and the incentive effects of equity incentive, and demonstrates that using market reaction to differ the incentive effects is reasonable. First, this paper partition the period for equity incentive of listed companies in China as infancy, introduction, standard and development, and summarize characteristics and problems during these phases. Then, systematicly summarize the characteristics which would effect equity incentive in listed companies, and measurement the relationship between them and choices. This paper reaches that firm growth, firm size and other firm characteristics affect the way companies choose incentive preferences, and the greater the growth of listed companies, prefer to stock options; enterprise larger listed companies prefer restricted stock. Difference between the ultimate control, whether state or privately controlled or state-controlled state-owned holding in the central and local state-controlled, select the excitation mode and no significant difference in preference. According to the incentive period, this paper divides stock options that account for the majority equity incentive plan into incentive type or welfare type, and measuring the relationship between the relevant factors. Be the ultimate controller, corporate characteristics and corporate governance factors affect the incentive is valid for listed companies to divide the incentive effects. Equity Incentive Plan as reflected in the incentive effects of high corporate growth, corporate profitability strong and stronger; stronger board independence, directors of high average age of the smaller, reflecting the greater the incentive effect. High-tech industry reflects the company's equity incentive program incentive effects may be higher. More biased in favor of the private holding company incentive programs with shorter validity periods. The larger companies tend to make equity incentive scale becomes longer valid. Then in the event study method in the event window to study the market launch of the excess equity incentive cumulative gain the draft, and verify the validity of division equity incentive by encouraging certain rationality.
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