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论文编号：	16165
作者编号：	2120243803
上传时间：	2026/6/10 20:13:25
中文题目：	高管团队稳定性对国有企业非效率投资的影响研究
英文题目：	Top Management Team Stability and Investment Inefficiency in State-Owned Enterprises
指导老师：	王志红
中文关键字：	高管团队稳定性；非效率投资；内部控制；股权制衡；融资约束
英文关键字：	Top Management Team Stability; Investment Inefficiency; Internal Control; Equity Balance; Financing Constraints
中文摘要：	高管团队作为企业经营决策的核心主体，其稳定性对保障国有企业战略连 续性与治理效能至关重要。近年来，随着国有企业改革的纵深推进，管理层市 场化选聘与任期制契约化管理全面推开，高管团队流动性显著上升、稳定性持 续趋降。在此背景下，高管团队稳定性是否影响企业的非效率投资，成为亟待 回答的重要命题。本文基于高阶梯队理论、委托代理理论及专用化人力资本理 论，以 2013—2024 年中国沪深 A 股国有上市公司为样本，采用双向固定效应模 型实证考察高管团队稳定性对国有企业非效率投资的影响。 研究发现，高管团队稳定性与国有企业非效率投资呈显著负相关关系，即 稳定的高管团队能够抑制国有企业的非效率投资行为。调节效应检验结果表明， 内部控制与股权制衡度均正向调节高管团队稳定性对非效率投资的抑制作用， 即内部控制越完善、股权制衡度越高，稳定团队的治理效应越强。本文经过替 换核心变量衡量方式、工具变量法及倾向得分匹配等多种稳健性检验，核心结 论保持稳健。在进一步分析中发现，该影响在中央国有企业、东部地区与融资 约束较高的国有企业中表现更为突出；高管团队整体稳定性的治理效应独立于 关键高管个人变更，且在强制变更情境下更为突出；以 2016 年混合所有制改革 落地为分界点的分时段研究发现，改革后高管团队稳定性的治理效能显著增强。 本文的理论贡献在于：第一，区别于高管个体变更，本文从高管团队整体 稳定性视角拓展了国有企业非效率投资影响因素的研究；第二，揭示了内部控 制与股权制衡度在稳定性治理效应中的调节作用，明确了稳定团队发挥效能的 关键制度条件；第三，结合制度变迁背景，发现改革后高管团队稳定性的治理 效能显著增强。研究结论为优化国有企业治理结构、提升资本配置效率提供了 重要的政策启示与实践参考。
英文摘要：	The stability of the top management team (TMT) is crucial for ensuring strategic continuity and governance effectiveness in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). With the deepening of SOE reforms, market-based managerial appointments and term-based contractual management have led to a sustained decline in TMT stability, raising concerns about its impact on Investment efficiency. Drawing on Upper Echelons Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, and Firm-Specific Human Capital Theory, this study examines the effect of TMT stability on inefficient Investment using a sample of Chinese A-share SOEs from 2013 to 2024. The results show a significant negative relationship between TMT stability and inefficient Investment. Moderation analysis reveals that both internal control quality and equity balance positively moderate this relationship—the stronger the internal control and the higher the degree of equity balance, the stronger the governance effect of stable teams. Heterogeneity analysis shows that this effect is more pronounced in central SOEs, in the eastern region, and among firms with higher financing constraints. Further analysis indicates that the governance effect of TMT stability is independent of key executive turnover and is particularly strong in cases of forced executive changes. A temporal analysis centered on the 2016 mixed-ownership reform shows that the governance effect of TMT stability strengthened significantly after the reform. The main findings remain robust after a series of tests. This study contributes to the literature by extending research on Investment efficiency in SOEs from the perspective of TMT stability, revealing the moderating roles of internal control and equity balance, and advancing understanding of how institutional change shapes the governance role of TMT stability. The findings offer practical implications for optimizing corporate governance structures and improving capital allocation efficiency in SOEs.
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