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论文编号：	16119
作者编号：	2120243819
上传时间：	2026/6/8 12:18:46
中文题目：	代理冲突、股权集中度与审计意见购买
英文题目：	Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Audit Opinion Shopping
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	代理冲突；股权集中度；审计意见购买
英文关键字：	Agency Conflicts; Ownership Concentration; Audit Opinion Shopping
中文摘要：	在我国上市公司“一股独大”的股权结构背景下，控股股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突构成了公司治理的核心矛盾。作为缓解信息不对称、保护投资者利益的重要制度安排，独立审计本应发挥外部监督职能。然而，当控股股东为掩盖掏空行为而干预审计过程、购买审计意见时，审计的独立性与公信力将受到严重侵蚀。近年来，审计意见购买行为引发的监管处罚案例频发，这一问题引发了学术界的广泛关注。现有文献虽已从经济动因、实现方式等角度对审计意见购买进行了深入探讨，但鲜有从代理冲突的视角系统考察二者之间的关系，更少有研究关注股权集中度在这一关系中的角色。 本文基于委托代理理论和Lennox（2000）审计意见购买检验框架，以2007—2024年A股非金融类上市公司为研究对象，实证研究代理冲突对审计意见购买的影响及股权集中度的调节作用，结果发现：（1）代理冲突显著加剧了审计意见购买行为，表明控股股东为掩盖掏空行为、规避非标准审计意见引发的负面冲击，有强烈的动机干预审计过程。（2）股权集中度正向调节了代理冲突与审计意见购买的关系，表明只有当控股股东具备足够的控制权时，利益冲突才能转化为实际的审计意见购买行为；（3）信息不对称与融资约束是核心效应的重要传导机制。信息不对称水平越高，控股股东干预审计过程的操作空间越大；融资约束程度越强，企业规避非标准审计意见的动机越为迫切；（4）异质性分析显示，国有企业的政治关联与融资优势、四大会计师事务所的声誉资本，以及高管理层持股的利益趋同效应，能够有效抑制代理冲突对审计意见购买的驱动作用。 本研究将代理冲突、股权集中度与审计意见购买纳入统一的分析框架，揭示了二者在审计意见购买中的互动逻辑。同时，本文识别并验证了信息不对称与融资约束两条传导机制，并考察了产权性质、事务所规模和内部治理的异质性影响，为理解中国制度背景下审计意见购买行为的发生逻辑提供了完整的理论解释。本文的研究结论可为监管部门建立基于“动机—能力”双维度的风险识别框架、实施差异化精准监管提供有益借鉴，也为企业完善内部治理机制、审计师强化执业审慎提供了理论依据。
英文摘要：	Based on the principal-agent theory and Lennox’s (2000) audit opinion shopping framework, this study empirically investigates the impact of agency conflicts on audit opinion shopping using a sample of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2024. It further examines the moderating role of ownership concentration and the contextual effects of information asymmetry and financial constraints. The main findings are as follows: (1) Agency conflicts significantly exacerbate audit opinion shopping. Agency conflict, measured by large shareholders’ fund occupation, is significantly positively correlated with auditor switching decisions. This finding is consistent with the theoretical expectation that controlling shareholders have strong incentives to interfere with the audit process in order to conceal tunneling behaviors and avoid the negative consequences of modified audit opinions. A series of robustness tests, including propensity score matching (PSM), more stringent fixed effects, and alternative variable specifications, further confirm the reliability of this conclusion. (2) Ownership concentration positively moderates the relationship between agency conflict and audit opinion shopping. The promoting effect of agency conflict on audit opinion shopping exists primarily in firms with highly concentrated ownership, suggesting that interest conflicts can translate into actual audit opinion shopping behavior only when controlling shareholders possess sufficient control rights. (3) Heterogeneity analysis reveals that information asymmetry and financial constraints serve as important contextual conditions. The effect of agency conflict on audit opinion shopping is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry and stronger financial constraints, indicating that information asymmetry provides operational space for controlling shareholders to interfere with the audit process, while financial constraints intensify their motivation to avoid modified audit opinions. (4) Further heterogeneity analysis shows that the political connections and financing advantages of state-owned enterprises, the reputation capital of Big Four accounting firms, and the interest alignment effect of high management ownership can effectively mitigate the driving effect of agency conflict on audit opinion shopping. This study incorporates agency conflict, ownership concentration, and audit opinion shopping into a unified analytical framework, revealing their interactive logic in audit opinion shopping. By identifying and verifying the contextual roles of information asymmetry and financial constraints, this study systematically elucidates the boundary conditions under which agency conflict affects audit opinion shopping. It also examines the heterogeneous effects of property rights, auditor size, and internal governance, providing a comprehensive theoretical explanation for the logic of audit opinion shopping behavior in China’s institutional context. The findings offer valuable insights for regulatory authorities to establish a dual-dimensional risk identification framework based on “motivation-capacity” and to implement differentiated and targeted supervision. This study also provide theoretical guidance for firms to improve internal governance mechanisms and for auditors to enhance professional prudence.
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