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论文编号：	1610
作者编号：	031785
上传时间：	2010/5/20 15:16:23
中文题目：	中国上市公司股权融资的代理问题研究
英文题目：	Listed Company, Equity Financing, Agency Problem
指导老师：	肖沂
中文关键字：	上市公司、股权融资、代理问题
英文关键字：	Listed Company, Equity Financing, Agency Problem
中文摘要：	控股股东的代理问题是中国上市公司治理的重大课题，本文的研究的题目是中国上市公司的股权融资中的代理问题，是从融资的方面对代理问题进行展开研究，分析了控股股东代理问题和股权融资偏好问题之间的联系，并提出改进的建议。基本的内容如下，中国的股票市场存在着审批制度和股权分置，上市公司的股票分为流通股和非流通股。流通股股东以公司的市场价值最大化为目标，而非流通股股东则以每股净资产和控制权收益的最大化为目标，利益目标的分歧造成了两类股东的利益冲突。“一股独大”的股权结构决定了非流通股股东拥有上市公司的控制权，控制了上市公司重大的投资融资和分配决策。在一定融资规模之内，为净现值小于零的项目进行股权融资符合非流通股股东的利益最大化目标，因此，中国股票市场的融资问题和代理问题紧密的联系在一起了。本文在股权分置的前提下，重点分析了在股权融资中控股股东的利益实现方式，得出了控股股东为追求自身利益最大化是上市公司过度股权融资现象的主要原因，并指出了上市公司代理问题产生的制度因素。 过度的股权融资导致了上市公司的质量下降，投资者的利益损失，降低了资本市场资源配置的效率。由于控股股东并不是以公司的价值最大化为目标，因此，外部投资者用脚投票的被动监督方式失灵；由于控制权市场的不够完善，因此，外部投资者无法通过接管实现主动监管。因此，股权分置改革对于中国的资本市场的健康发展具有重要的意义。但是，应该可以看到股权高度集中的现象将在很长的一段时期内存在，控股股东的代理问题也将长期存在。最后，本文基于公司治理的外部市场机制的视角，对解决上市公司控股股东的代理问题提出了若干建议。
英文摘要：	The controlling shareholders' agency problem is of great importance to corporate governance in china listed companies. The purpose of this paper is to study the controlling shareholders' agency problem from financing instruments and to analyze the relationship between the controlling shareholders' agency problem and equity financing preference. It is the main cause underlying the fact that there is special situation of separated shares in stock market and equity capital is composed of circulating shares and Non-circulating shares. The circulating shareholders concern of the market value of company while the Non-circulating stockholders have much interest in the net assets per share and benefit from corporate control. There are interest conflicts between the two types of shareholders. For that the Non-circulating shareholders have the control of listed companies is determined by the special equity structure of separated shares, and almost important financing and investment strategy and dividend policy of listed companies represent interest of the controlling shareholders. However, in pursuit of more assets per share and control advantages, the controlling shareholders prefer to equity financing without little consideration on whether investment projects have plus Net Present Value. This kind of issue suggests that the equity financing preference correlates with the controlling shareholders' agency problem. Under the precondition of special situation of separated shares, we focus on the methods of the controlling shareholders in equity financing and draw the conclusion that it is the controlling shareholders that should be largely responsible for the equity financing preference and that legislation also contributes for the controlling shareholders' agency problem. Equity financing preference results in the decreasing of company finance quality and losses of investors and the deficiency of efficiency in capital market. Intendance from outside investors is inefficient for the controlling shareholders' little interest in stock price and it is impossible for outside investors to take over the corporate because of the imperfect market for corporate control. And thereby the reform of separated shares policy is of great significance. It can be conceived that the controlling shareholders' agency problem would exist in the capital market for a long time. Finally, based on external mechanism of corporate governance, good advices are given to solve the controlling shareholders' agency problem and equity financing preference in China listed companies.
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