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论文编号：	16096
作者编号：	2120243830
上传时间：	2026/6/6 20:20:24
中文题目：	信息透明度、融资约束与企业创新投入——基于高管持股的调节效应分析
英文题目：	Information Transparency, Financing Constraints, and Corporate Innovation Investment: A Moderating Effect Analysis Based on Executive Shareholding
指导老师：	齐岳
中文关键字：	信息透明度；融资约束；企业创新投入；高管持股
英文关键字：	Information Transparency; Financing Constraints; Enterprise Innovation Investment; Executive Shareholding
中文摘要：	创新是引领发展的第一动力，企业作为创新的主体，其创新投入水平直接关系到国家整体创新实力的提升。然而，融资约束是制约企业创新的关键因素之一。信息透明度作为缓解信息不对称的重要机制，其对企业创新的影响及作用路径尚待深入探究。与此同时，高管持股作为重要的内部治理机制，在信息透明度影响企业创新的过程中可能发挥差异化调节作用。基于此，本文以2016-2024年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，构建“信息透明度→融资约束→创新投入”的中介效应模型，并引入高管持股作为调节变量，探究其在两条路径中的差异化作用。研究发现：第一，信息透明度显著促进企业创新投入，融资约束在其中发挥部分中介作用，信息透明度通过缓解融资约束进而促进企业创新。第二，高管持股在两条路径中呈现出“双刃剑”治理特征：在“信息透明度→融资约束”路径中，高管持股负向调节二者关系，即高管持股削弱了透明度对融资约束的缓解效果，体现了“壕沟效应”；在“融资约束→创新投入”路径中，高管持股正向调节二者关系，即高管持股缓解了融资约束对创新的抑制，体现了“利益趋同效应”。第三，上述核心结论存在显著的异质性：信息透明度的创新促进效应、融资约束的中介作用以及高管持股的调节效应主要存在于高科技企业、高竞争行业和高独立董事比例的企业中，而在非高科技企业、低竞争行业和低独立董事比例的企业中则不显著或效应较弱。 本文的研究贡献在于：将信息透明度、融资约束与企业创新纳入统一分析框架，揭示了融资约束的中介传导机制；发现并验证了高管持股在同一企业不同决策环节中的差异化调节作用，揭示了高管持股的“双刃剑”治理特征。研究结论为理解信息透明度影响企业创新的内在机制提供了新的理论视角，也为企业优化信息披露策略、设计高管激励方案以及政府部门完善金融市场环境提供了实践参考。
英文摘要：	Innovation serves as the primary driving force for development and a strategic pillar for building a modernized economic system. As the main agents of innovation, enterprises' investment in innovation directly affects the enhancement of a nation's overall innovative capacity. However, financing constraints remain a critical factor restricting corporate innovation. As an important mechanism for alleviating information asymmetry, information transparency requires further exploration regarding its impact on corporate innovation and the underlying transmission mechanisms. Meanwhile, executive shareholding, as a key internal governance mechanism, may play differentiated moderating roles in the process through which information transparency influences corporate innovation. Based on this, this study takes A-share listed companies in China from 2016 to 2024 as the research sample, constructs a mediating effect model of "information transparency → financing constraints → innovation investment", and introduces executive shareholding as a moderating variable to examine its differentiated roles in two pathways. The findings reveal that: First, information transparency significantly promotes corporate innovation investment, with financing constraints playing a partial mediating role. Information transparency facilitates corporate innovation by alleviating financing constraints. Second, executive shareholding exhibits a "double-edged sword" governance characteristic across the two pathways: in the "information transparency → financing constraints" pathway, executive shareholding negatively moderates the relationship, indicating that high shareholding weakens the mitigating effect of transparency on financing constraints, reflecting the "entrenchment effect"; in the "financing constraints → innovation investment" pathway, executive shareholding positively moderates the relationship, indicating that high shareholding alleviates the inhibitory effect of financing constraints on innovation, reflecting the "interest alignment effect". Third, the above core findings exhibit significant heterogeneity: the innovation-promoting effect of information transparency, the mediating role of financing constraints, and the moderating effect of executive shareholding are primarily observed in high-tech enterprises, highly competitive industries, and firms with a high proportion of independent directors, whereas these effects are either insignificant or considerably weaker in non-high-tech enterprises, less competitive industries, and firms with a low proportion of independent directors. This study contributes to the literature by integrating information transparency, financing constraints, and corporate innovation into a unified analytical framework, revealing the mediating transmission mechanism of financing constraints. It further identifies and validates the differentiated moderating roles of executive shareholding across different corporate decision-making contexts, uncovering the "double-edged sword" governance characteristics of executive shareholding. The findings provide a new theoretical perspective for understanding the intrinsic mechanisms through which information transparency influences corporate innovation, and offer practical implications for enterprises to optimize information disclosure strategies, design executive incentive schemes, and for government departments to improve the financial market environment.
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