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论文编号：	16086
作者编号：	2120243805
上传时间：	2026/6/5 20:36:41
中文题目：	年报问询函与审计质量的溢出效应研究——来自同行业共享审计师的证据
英文题目：	Spillover Effects of Annual Report Inquiry Letters on Audit Quality: Evidence from Industry-Shared Auditors
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	年报问询函；共享审计师；审计质量；溢出效应
英文关键字：	Annual Report Inquiry Letter; Shared Auditor; Audit Quality; Spillover Effect
中文摘要：	近年来，沪深证券交易所在监管实践层面持续推进制度优化。问询机制逐渐成为常态化监管工具，并在监管体系转型中发挥了关键作用。学术界围绕该制度的监督功能以及对财务报告质量与资本市场运行的影响，均展开了广泛探讨。众多监管方式之中，针对企业发布的年报问询函具有较强代表性。当上市公司披露的年度财务报告存在信息披露不充分或不符合规范情形时，交易所会以问询函形式要求公司作出解释与补充说明。相关问题通常覆盖会计估计合理性、盈利状况分析、关联交易披露等重点领域，从而强化对财务信息真实性和准确性的约束。与此同时，这类问询并非仅限于公司层面回应，还会要求审计机构对涉及事项进行专项核查并发表专业意见，使监管压力同步传导至中介机构环节。本文以2015-2024年中国A股上市公司为研究对象，实证考察了证券交易所发布的年报问询函，如何通过共享审计师渠道，对同行业内未被问询公司的审计师的审计质量产生溢出效应，随后文章又进一步探究了该溢出效应的作用机制、情境差异及经济后果。 本文研究发现：（1）同行业共享审计师存在客户收到年报问询函，显著提升了其审计的未收函企业的审计质量；（2）溢出效应主要通过两条路径实现：一是风险感知强化机制，监管问询释放的风险信号促使审计师增加审计资源投入；二是风险学习机制，问询函所揭示的监管关注重点增强了审计师的职业判断能力，该能力提升表现为关键审计事项识别与披露的优化，包括披露数量增加、风险导向增强以及文本同质化程度降低；（3）同行业共享审计师的客户收到年报问询函的溢出效应，在非“十大”会计师事务所中的提升作用更强。（4）同行业共享审计师的客户收到年报问询函的溢出效应，在内部控制质量较低的客户中的提升作用更强。（5）同行业共享审计师的客户收到年报问询函的溢出效应，在分析师关注度较低的客户中的提升作用更强。（6）审计质量提升能够有效降低公司未来财务重述发生概率且有长期效应，说明监管溢出效应具有实质性治理价值。上述研究结果在更换解释变量和被解释变量、进行替代性检验、安慰剂检验、倾向得分匹配-双重差分法、使用Heckman两阶段模型后，依然是稳健的。 本研究从审计师行为调整视角揭示年报问询函的风险传导机制，丰富了非处罚性监管溢出效应与共享审计师治理功能的研究文献，可为监管优化、事务所质控提升与上市公司治理完善提供经验启示。图1幅，表22个，参考文献141篇。
英文摘要：	In recent years, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges have continued to promote institutional optimization at the regulatory practice level. The inquiry mechanism has gradually become a normalized regulatory tool and played a key role in the transformation of the regulatory system. Academic circles have carried out extensive discussions on the supervision function of the system and its impact on the quality of financial reporting and the operation of capital markets. Among the many regulatory methods, the annual report inquiry letter issued for enterprises is highly representative. When the annual financial report disclosed by listed companies has insufficient information disclosure or non-compliance, the exchange will ask the company to explain and supplement the information in the form of an inquiry letter. Relevant issues usually cover key areas such as the rationality of accounting estimates, profitability analysis, and disclosure of related party transactions, thereby strengthening the constraints on the authenticity and accuracy of financial information. At the same time, such inquiries are not limited to company-level responses, but also require auditors to conduct special verifications and issue professional opinions on the matters involved, so that regulatory pressures are transmitted simultaneously to intermediaries. This paper takes China 's A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2024 as the research object, and empirically examines how the annual report inquiry letter issued by the stock exchange has a spillover effect on the audit quality of auditors who have not been questioned in the same industry through the shared auditor channel. Then the article further explores the mechanism, situational differences and economic consequences of the spillover effect. This paper finds that : (1) Shared auditors in the same industry have customers receiving annual report inquiry letters, which significantly improves the audit quality of uncollected enterprises audited by them. (2) The spillover effect is mainly realized through two paths : one is the risk perception strengthening mechanism, and the risk signal released by the regulatory inquiry prompts the auditor to increase the investment of audit resources ; the second is the risk learning mechanism. The regulatory focus revealed by the inquiry letter enhances the auditor 's professional judgment ability, which is manifested in the optimization of the identification and disclosure of key audit matters, including the increase in the number of disclosures, the enhancement of risk orientation and the reduction of text homogeneity. (3) The spillover effect of the annual report inquiry letter received by customers sharing auditors in the same industry is stronger in non- ' top ten ' accounting firms. (4) The spillover effect of the annual report inquiry letter received by the customers of the same industry sharing auditors is stronger in the customers with lower internal control quality. (5) The spillover effect of the annual report inquiry letter received by customers sharing auditors in the same industry is stronger in customers with lower analyst attention. (6) The improvement of audit quality can effectively reduce the probability of future financial restatements and has a long-term effect, indicating that the regulatory spillover effect has substantial governance value. The above research results are still robust after replacing the explanatory and explained variables, conducting the substitution test and the placebo test, the propensity score matching-difference-in-differences method, and using the Heckman two-stage model. This study reveals the risk transmission mechanism of annual report inquiry letters from the perspective of auditor behavior adjustment, enriches the research literature on non-punitive regulatory spillover effects and shared auditor governance functions, and provides empirical enlightenment for regulatory optimization, firm quality control improvement and listed company governance improvement. Figure 1, Table 22, Reference 141.
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