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论文编号：	16081
作者编号：	2120243815
上传时间：	2026/6/5 16:27:01
中文题目：	创新信息披露、研发操纵与股价暴跌风险
英文题目：	Innovative information disclosure, R&D manipulation and Stock Price Crash Risk
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	创新信息披露；股价暴跌风险；研发操纵；信息不对称
英文关键字：	innovation information disclosure；R&D manipulation；stock price crash risk；information asymmetry
中文摘要：	“十五五”时期是全面建设社会主义现代化国家筑牢根基、全面发力的关键阶段，在推进现代化建设进程中具有承前启后的战略地位。高质量发展作为全面建设社会主义现代化国家的核心使命，其实现关键在于科技自主可控能力的显著提升。市场主体作为技术创新的核心载体，在培育新质生产力、驱动产业结构优化升级中扮演着关键角色。企业技术革新离不开外部资本的注入，而市场和外部投资者获取信息的渠道主要来源于企业对外披露的相关信息，高质量的信息披露能够优化投资者的决策效能，从而对资本市场的定价功能产生正向影响，进而有效降低股价暴跌风险。鉴于企业内部与外部之间针对技术革新等创新活动存在严重信息不对称性，且企业技术活动呈现多元化、复杂化态势，管理层出于自身利益，有可能进行选择性地披露相关信息，如充分披露利好信息，隐藏负面信息。也就是说，其披露的相关财务信息和文本信息不足以反映公司创新活动全貌。此外，鉴于我国对描述性创新信息披露的管理制度尚不完善，多依靠企业自愿自发披露，具有更大的操纵空间。基于此，本文以我国沪深 A 股上市的公司主体作为研究对象，实证分析企业创新信息的披露情况对其股价暴跌风险的影响，以及研发操纵的中介效应。实证结果表明，企业披露的描述性创新信息显著降低了股价暴跌风险，且其影响路径为描述性创新信息披露增多——研发操纵行为受到抑制——股价暴跌风险降低。本文还对上述影响进行了异质性检验，发现在企业盈利能力较弱、数字化转型程度高或是分析师关注度低的情况下，其披露的创新信息与股价暴跌风险的负相关关系更显著，表明盈利能力较弱、数字化转型程度高、分析师关注度低的企业在披露创新信息时向外部投资者传递的增量信息更多，有利于信息及时体现在资本市场中，降低股价波动性。综上，本文揭示了管理层通过提升创新文本的清晰度与信息含量，有效抑制研发操纵行为，降低负面信息隐藏程度，最终缓解股价暴跌风险的传导机制，为完善创新信息披露监管、保护投资者权益提供了理论与实证依据。
英文摘要：	The "15th Five-Year Plan" period is a crucial stage for laying a solid foundation and making comprehensive efforts to build a modern socialist country in an all-round way. It holds a strategic position in the process of advancing modernization, serving as a link between the past and the future. High-quality development, as the core mission of comprehensively building a modern socialist country, hinges on significantly enhancing the capability of independent and controllable technology. As the core carrier of technological innovation, market entities play a pivotal role in cultivating new productive forces and driving the optimization and upgrading of industrial structures. Corporate technological innovation cannot be achieved without the injection of external capital, and the main channels for markets and external investors to obtain information are primarily from relevant information disclosed by enterprises. High-quality information disclosure can optimize investors' decision-making efficiency, thereby positively impacting the pricing function of the capital market and effectively reducing the risk of stock price crashes. Given the severe information asymmetry between the internal and external parties of enterprises regarding innovative activities such as technological innovation, coupled with the diversification and complexity of corporate technological activities, management may, for their own interests, selectively disclose relevant information, such as fully disclosing positive information while concealing negative information. In other words, the disclosed financial and textual information may not fully reflect the full picture of the company's innovative activities. Furthermore, considering that China's regulatory system for descriptive innovation information disclosure is still imperfect, relying heavily on voluntary and spontaneous disclosure by enterprises, there is greater room for manipulation. Based on this, this paper takes companies listed on China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets as the research subjects, empirically analyzing the impact of corporate innovation information disclosure on the risk of stock price collapse, as well as the mediating effect of R&D manipulation. The empirical results show that the descriptive innovation information disclosed by enterprises significantly reduces the risk of stock price collapse, and the impact path is as follows: increased disclosure of descriptive innovation information — suppressed R&D manipulation behavior — reduced risk of stock price collapse. This paper also conducts a heterogeneity test on the above-mentioned effects and finds that in the cases of weaker corporate profitability, higher degree of digital transformation, or lower analyst attention, the negative correlation between the disclosed innovation information and the risk of stock price collapse is more significant. This indicates that enterprises with weaker profitability, higher degree of digital transformation, and lower analyst attention convey more incremental information to external investors when disclosing innovation information, which is conducive to timely reflecting information in the capital market and reducing stock price volatility. In summary, this paper reveals the transmission mechanism through which management effectively suppresses R&D manipulation behavior, reduces the degree of negative information concealment, and ultimately mitigates the risk of stock price collapse by enhancing the clarity and information content of innovation texts. This provides theoretical and empirical evidence for improving the supervision of innovation information disclosure and protecting investors' rights and interests.
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