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论文编号：	1608
作者编号：	031767
上传时间：	2010/5/20 14:50:44
中文题目：	中国上市公司高管变更投资行为研究
英文题目：	listed company; top manager turnover; corporate value; investment behavior
指导老师：	黄福广
中文关键字：	上市公司 高管变更 企业价值 投资行为
英文关键字：	listed company; top manager turnover; corporate value; investment behavior
中文摘要：	企业高级管理人员的变更一直是国外学术界研究的一项重要课题，因为它是股东或董事会做出的重要决策之一，并作为一种约束代理人行为的极端手段。目前，西方学者对企业高管人员变更的研究主要集中于两个方面，一方面是研究企业高管更换的原因从而判断公司控制机制的效率；另一方面是研究高管变更后的结果，但多局限于研究高管变更后企业会计指标及企业价值的变化，而对高管变更后企业行为尤其是企业行为变化的研究较少。 近几年，中国上市公司频繁出现高管人员更换的现象，引起了国内学者的广泛关注。公司高层管理变更表现出的是一种企业代理权的竞争，这不仅需要有健全的能发挥积极作用的公司内部法人治理结构，而且还要有通过产品市场和要素市场发挥作用的公司外部治理机制，而中国上市公司这两方面均尚不完善，在这一背景下使得中国企业高管变更问题呈现出独特的属性。尽管国内学者对这一领域已经进行了一些研究，但其研究的焦点主要是利用高管变更与变更前企业绩效的关系来分析中国上市公司内部控制机制的有效性，而对中国上市公司高级管理人员变更后的行为没有深入地分析。在所有权与经营权分离的现代企业制度下，管理者与股东形成一种委托代理关系，根据委托代理理论，管理者经常是以个人利益最大化为目标进行企业的决策。当企业高管发生更换后，继任者与股东形成新的委托代理关系，由于继任者与离任者之间的个人特征存在着差异，从而企业的行为将会发生变化以满足其特有的个人利益最大化条件。本文在分析了中国企业高管变更现状的基础上，首先利用财务学中传统的“事件研究”方法检验了中国上市公司高管变更后企业价值的变化，在此基础上结合投资决策在企业价值变化中的地位，研究了高管变更对企业投资行为的影响，以期得到高管变更后企业价值变化的原因。 本文的研究结果表明无论是董事长变更还是总经理变更均降低了企业价值，损害了股东的利益，与国外相关的研究结果存在着一定的差异。在此基础上，结合中国上市公司投资行为的特点，通过OLS方法发现高管变更后企业的过度投资行为更加严重，同时利用LMP方法表明，高管变更后上市公司发生多样化投资行为与投资变更行为的概率显著上升，这一结果与“管理者防御”行为一致。论文最后根据实证的研究结果提出了一些完善中国上市公司高管变更制度以及解决高管变更后企业投资行为“扭曲”的政策与建议。
英文摘要：	Corporate’s top manager turnover has been especially concerned for a long time in abroad academic field, because it is the important decision made by shareholders and boards of directors and the extreme measure in restricting the agent’s behaviors. Nowadays, the research on the top manager turnover in the western country focus mainly on two faces as follows: on the one hand, many researchers explore the cause of management turnover, namely look into the factors that affect the management turnover. On the other hand, there are some researches on the consequence of management turnover, however, the method of which are mainly to look into the changes of account performance or the change of corporate value after top manager turnover. But, there are few studies on the corporate behaviors after top manager turnover. Recent years, listed company’s top manager turnover phenomenon frequently happens in China, which gives rise to the attention of some scholars.Corporate top manager turnover is the competence of angent right, which needs not only efficient internal governance structure but also external governance mechanism realized by market of product and factor. In fact both the conditions are not perfect in China, which make the listed company’s top manager turnover unique. Although there are some studies in this field, the object is mainly to test the efficiency of internal governance mechanism, depending on the relationship between the possibility of management and the deteriorating corporate performance, in China listed company. However, the behavior of corportate after the management turnover is not deeply studied. The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporate generates the principal-agency relationship. According to the agency theory, manager often maximizes the private benefits including pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits at the cost of shareholders’ benefits. When the manager is replaced by successor whose characteristic is different from former, the new principal will make the decisions, which cater to his preference, leading to change the corporate behaviors made by pre-manger. Based on the characteristic of corporate’s top manager turnover in China, this dissertation firstly makes use of the “event study” that is the traditional method in financial field to test the effect of top manager turnover on the corporate value. Combined with status of coporate investment in deciding the corporate value, this dissertation studies the change of investment decision after corporate top management turnover, which can help us find the cause of the change of corporate value after top management turnover. The result indicates that the listed company’s top manager turnover decreases the corporate value and hurts the shareholder’s benefit, which is different from the study in other country. And combined with the characteristic of investment behavior of China’s listed company, using OLS and LMP method, the author finds after top manager turnover the over-investment behavior is serious, and the listed companies are apt to diversify and change the investment project made by predecessor. These results are consistent with the "managerial entrenchment" behavior. In the last, on the ground of these empirical tests and corporate’s manager turnover phenomenon in China, this dissertation puts forward some suggestions and policies so as to reduce the distorted investment behaviors that harm shareholders’ benefit.
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