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论文编号：	16067
作者编号：	2120243800
上传时间：	2026/6/4 21:50:57
中文题目：	“制造链＋平台”双模式企业并购策略及政府监管机制研究
英文题目：	M&A Strategies and Government Regulation of Enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain and Platform Business
指导老师：	李勇建
中文关键字：	“制造链＋平台”双模式企业；企业并购；网络效应；政府监管；社会福利
英文关键字：	enterprises in the fusion mode of manufacturing chain and platform business;mergers and acquisitions; network effects; government regulation; social welfare
中文摘要：	随着数字经济发展和制造业转型升级持续推进，平台经济与实体制造深度融合，兼具平台属性与制造属性的“制造链＋平台”双模式企业逐渐成为产业竞争中的重要主体。与传统制造企业相比，此类企业不仅通过产品销售获利，还能够依托平台网络、用户规模、数据资源和生态协同形成更强的市场影响力。在此背景下，双模式企业并购传统制造企业案例日益增多，其经济后果已超出传统横向并购中规模扩张和成本协同的分析范畴，进一步涉及网络效应强化、消费者锁定、市场结构重塑及社会福利变化等问题。与此同时，平台领域反垄断监管与经营者集中审查也持续强化。基于此，研究双模式企业并购传统制造企业的行为逻辑及政府监管机制，具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。 本研究以双模式企业并购传统制造企业为研究对象，围绕并购动因、市场均衡、福利效应和政府监管等问题展开分析。在产业组织理论、平台经济理论和政府规制理论基础上，构建双模式企业并购传统制造企业的基准分析框架，依次考察独立竞争与不同并购结构下的企业行为及市场结果，并进一步引入消费者异质性、网络效应和政府监管因素，分析其对并购选择、市场结构演化及社会福利变化的影响。 研究表明，双模式企业实施并购的激励不仅来自制造协同，更来自平台生态扩展和网络收益提升；消费者异质性与网络效应强度是影响并购均衡形成的重要因素。当忠诚消费者基础较强、网络效应较高时，双模式企业更容易形成稳定并购激励并取得竞争优势；双模式企业并购传统制造企业的福利后果具有明显的条件依赖性，并购在提高配置效率的同时，也可能因市场势力扩张和消费者锁定加价而压缩消费者剩余；政府监管会通过影响企业并购收益进而改变双模式企业的并购策略选择，因此监管机制应着眼于并购行为的激励约束及市场影响。本研究有助于拓展数字经济背景下企业并购研究的分析视角，也为平台与制造融合背景下的并购监管提供了相应的理论参考。
英文摘要：	With the sustained development of the digital economy and the continued upgrading of manufacturing, the deep integration of the platform economy and real-sector manufacturing has given rise to enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain and Platform Business as an important force in industrial competition. Compared with traditional manufacturing firms, such enterprises not only generate profits through product sales, but also build stronger market influence by relying on platform networks, user scale, data resources, and ecosystem synergies. Against this background, mergers and acquisitions undertaken by enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain and Platform Business targeting traditional manufacturing firms have become increasingly common.Their economic consequences have gone beyond the traditional analytical framework of horizontal mergers centered on scale expansion and cost synergies, and increasingly involve issues such as the strengthening of network effects,consumer lock-in, market structure reshaping, and changes in social welfare.At the same time, antitrust regulation and merger review in platform-related markets have been continuously strengthened. Therefore, studying the behavioral logic of mergers and acquisitions by enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain And Platform Business and the corresponding government regulatory mechanisms is of important theoretical and practical significance. Taking the mergers and acquisitions of traditional manufacturing firms by enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain And Platform Business as the research object, this study examines merger incentives, market equilibrium, welfare effects, and government regulation. On the basis of industrial organization theory, platform economy theory, and government regulation theory, it constructs a benchmark analytical framework for such mergers and acquisitions, and successively investigates firm behavior and market outcomes under independent competition and different merger structures. It further introduces consumer heterogeneity, network effects, and government regulation to analyze their impacts on merger choices, market structure evolution, and changes in social welfare. The results show that the incentives for enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain And Platform Business to undertake mergers and acquisitions stem not only from manufacturing synergies, but also from platform ecosystem expansion and the enhancement of network-based returns. Consumer heterogeneity and network effects are important factors shaping merger equilibrium. When the loyal consumer base is stronger and network effects are more pronounced, enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain And Platform Business are more likely to develop stable merger incentives and gain competitive advantages. The welfare effects of mergers and acquisitions between enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain And Platform Business and traditional manufacturing firms are highly conditional. While such mergers may improve resource allocation efficiency, they may also reduce consumer surplus by expanding market power and strengthening consumer lock-in. Government regulation can influence firms’merger payoffs, market structure, thereby reshaping the merger strategy choices of enterprises in the Fusion Mode of Manufacturing Chain And Platform Business. Accordingly, regulatory mechanisms should focus on the incentive and constraint effects of merger behavior and its market impact. This study helps extend the analytical perspective of enterprise M&A research in the context of the digital economy, and also provides theoretical reference for merger regulation policies in the context of platform-manufacturing integration.
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