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论文编号：	16044
作者编号：	1120211199
上传时间：	2026/6/3 20:04:45
中文题目：	监管问询信息公开对银行信贷决策的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Regulatory Inquiry Information Disclosure on Bank Credit Decisions
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	问询函监管；信息公开；银行信贷决策；债权人保护；风险信息
英文关键字：	Inquiry Letter Supervision; Information Disclosure; Bank Credit Decisions; Creditor Protection; Risk Information
中文摘要：	当前，银行债务融资仍是我国企业最核心的资金来源，债权人权益能否得到有效保护，直接关系到企业的生存发展与市场的稳定运行。然而，随着我国经济发展进入新阶段，企业作为信息优势方损害债权人利益的现象日益凸显。从财务造假、通过关联交易转移资产，到债务违约后恶意逃废债，这些行为不仅导致银行不良贷款率攀升，更严重侵蚀了市场信用体系根基，对我国市场经济健康运行及司法公信力造成负面影响。在此背景下，探讨有效的债权人保护机制具有重要的现实意义。信息不对称是引发借贷双方矛盾冲突的核心诱因，而交易所问询函制度恰好通过公开披露企业潜在风险信息，为债权人评估企业价值、制定理性信贷决策提供了关键依据。交易所出于保护投资者、维护市场优胜劣汰机制的考虑，通过发放问询函并公开披露的方式，对上市公司的潜在风险进行监督。这一制度安排不仅是资本市场监管手段的重要创新，也为研究监管信息披露如何影响债务市场主体决策，提供了独特且珍贵的研究场景。 本研究以监管问询释放的风险信号为逻辑起点，整合委托代理理论、不完全契约理论、信息不对称理论、信号理论及声誉理论，构建了借贷关系中三类核心主体（债务人、监管方、债权人）的风险信息流动模型。这一分析框架既为理解监管信息与债务市场的内在关联提供了理论支撑，也为后续实证检验清晰锚定了逻辑路径。本研究选取2015-2023年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，聚焦监管问询信息公开对银行信贷决策的影响，通过固定效应模型系统剖析了问询函作为风险信号在信贷市场中的作用逻辑。主要研究结论如下： 第一，监管问询信息公开对银行信贷决策具有显著影响。企业收到问询函、问询频次增加以及风险指向强度提升，会显著降低银行信贷规模、提高信贷成本。这一效应通过两条路径传导：一是风险传递路径，即交易所作为信源揭示企业潜在问题，媒体作为信道放大风险信号，银行作为信宿基于风险信号调整信贷策略；二是风险加剧路径，即问询函触发融资端、监管端、声誉端三重次生风险，直接加剧企业违约风险，强化银行的防御性信贷决策。异质性分析进一步显示，过度负债程度越高、到期债务压力越大的企业，监管问询信息公开对银行信贷规模的负向影响与信贷成本的正向影响越显著，呈现出风险共振与叠加效应。 第二，监管问询涉及交易所问询与企业回函全过程，二者的文本细化特征同样影响银行信贷决策。交易所问询函的强度（篇幅长度、问题数量）越高，向市场传递的风险预警信号越强烈，银行信贷收缩与成本上升的倾向越显著；问询函可读性（平均句长、常用字密度）越强，风险信号的传递效率越高，银行对企业信用风险的认知更清晰，进一步强化信贷收缩决策。同时，企业回函的积极语调可有效缓解银行风险担忧，提升信贷规模并降低成本；而回函“答非所问”程度越高，越会被银行解读为风险未解决的信号，最终导致信贷条件趋紧。 第三，监管问询风险信息会通过社会网络渠道形成跨主体溢出效应。被问询企业的风险信息通过地域关联、审计联结、系族成员三大渠道传导至未被问询企业。同地区企业因“地域同质性”面临信贷收缩，共享审计师的企业因“系统性偏差传染”被风险重估，集团其他成员企业因“治理同构性”受到风险传导影响。这种溢出效应将企业局部风险转化为市场共享的公共信息，最终重塑银行对关联企业的信贷决策逻辑。 本研究立足我国经济社会发展中债权人利益保护的现实需求，结合交易所问询函的监管实践，在梳理领域研究现状与不足的基础上，从实践引领和理论破解两方面出发，探讨债权人利益保护视角下监管问询信息公开对银行信贷决策的影响，创新点主要体现在以下三方面： 第一，深化了分析框架。突破传统“监管-市场”二元分析局限，将风险信息深度嵌入“信用-信息-信任”理论框架，量化债权人从信息获取、风险评估到决策调整的完整自我保护过程，推动形成“监管-市场-主体”三方协同治理格局，打破传统单向传导假设。第二，拓展了研究视角。聚焦问询函这一监管机制，通过文本内容分析揭示第三方监管信息在缓解债务契约代理问题中的独特价值，验证其作为债权人决策辅助工具的有效性，为构建“企业自主披露+监管他律披露”的立体化信息治理体系提供理论依据。第三，提供了增量贡献。拓展问询函监管经济后果的研究边界，聚焦债权人利益保护视角，证实监管信息对债务契约决策的有用性；突破传统制度设计局限，从风险揭示功能切入，丰富影响银行信贷决策的信息维度因素，为构建新型债权人保护机制提供经验支持。
英文摘要：	Currently, bank debt financing remains the core source of funds for Chinese enterprises. The effective protection of creditors' rights is directly related to the survival and development of enterprises and the stable operation of the market. However, as China's economic development enters a new stage, the phenomenon of enterprises exploiting their information advantages to harm creditors' interests has become increasingly prominent. From financial fraud, through related-party transactions to transfer assets, to debt default and maliciously evading debts, these behaviors not only lead to an increase in the non-performing loan rate of banks, but also seriously erode the foundation of the market credit system, having a negative impact on the healthy operation of China's market economy and the credibility of the judiciary. Against this backdrop, exploring effective creditor protection mechanisms holds significant practical significance. Information asymmetry is the core cause of conflicts between the lending and borrowing parties, and the exchange inquiry letter system precisely provides a key basis for creditors to assess the value of enterprises and make rational credit decisions by publicly disclosing potential risks of enterprises. The exchange, considering the protection of investors and the maintenance of the market's survival and elimination mechanism, issues inquiry letters and discloses them to supervise the potential risks of listed companies. This institutional arrangement is not only an important innovation in capital market supervision methods, but also provides a unique and valuable research scenario for studying how regulatory information disclosure affects the decision-making of debt market participants. This study takes the risk signals released by regulatory inquiries as the logical starting point, integrates the theories of agency, incomplete contract, information asymmetry, signaling, and reputation, and constructs a risk information flow model for the three core entities (debtor, regulator, creditor) in the lending relationship. This analytical framework not only provides theoretical support for understanding the intrinsic relationship between regulatory information and the debt market, but also clearly anchors the logical path for subsequent empirical tests. This study selects A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2015 to 2023 as samples, focusing on the impact of regulatory inquiry information disclosure on bank credit decisions. Through a fixed effects model, it systematically analyzes the logic of the role of inquiry letters as risk signals in the credit market. The main research conclusions are as follows: First, the disclosure of regulatory inquiry information has a significant impact on bank credit decisions. When enterprises receive inquiry letters, the frequency of inquiries increases, and the intensity of risk indication rises, which significantly reduces the bank's credit scale and increases credit costs. This effect is transmitted through two paths: the risk transmission path, where the exchange acts as the source of information, media as the channel to amplify the risk signal, and the bank as the recipient adjusts its credit strategy based on the risk signal; the risk intensification path, where the inquiry letter triggers secondary risks at the financing end, regulatory end, and reputation end, directly increasing the default risk of the enterprise and strengthening the bank's defensive credit decision. Heterogeneity analysis further shows that enterprises with higher levels of over-indebtedness and greater debt maturity pressure have a more significant negative impact of regulatory inquiry information disclosure on bank credit scale and a more significant positive impact on credit costs, presenting a risk resonance and superposition effect. Second, regulatory inquiries involve the entire process of exchange inquiries and enterprise responses. The text-specific characteristics of exchange inquiry letters also affect bank credit decisions. The higher the intensity (length of the letter, number of questions) of the inquiry letter, the stronger the risk warning signal it conveys to the market, and the more significant the tendency of bank credit contraction and cost increase; the stronger the readability (average sentence length, density of common words) of the inquiry letter, the higher the efficiency of risk signal transmission, and the clearer the bank's understanding of the enterprise's credit risk, further strengthening the credit contraction decision. At the same time, the positive tone of the enterprise's response can effectively alleviate the bank's risk concerns, increase the credit scale and reduce costs; while the higher the degree of "non-relevant answers" in the response, the more it will be interpreted by the bank as a signal of unresolved risks, ultimately leading to tighter credit conditions. Third, regulatory inquiry risk information will form cross-entity spillover effects through social network channels. The risk information of the questioned enterprises is transmitted to the un-questioned enterprises through three channels: geographical association, audit connection, and family member members. Enterprises in the same region face credit contraction due to "geographical homogeneity", while enterprises sharing auditors are re-evaluated for risks due to "systemic deviation contagion", and other member enterprises of the group are affected by risk transmission due to "governance homology". This spillover effect transforms the local risks of enterprises into shared public information in the market, ultimately reshaping the credit decision-making logic of banks for related enterprises. This study is based on the practical needs of creditor protection in China's economic and social development, combined with the regulatory practice of exchange inquiries. By reviewing the current research status and shortcomings in the field, and starting from both practical guidance and theoretical breakthroughs, it explores the impact of regulatory inquiry information disclosure on bank credit decision-making from the perspective of creditor protection. The main innovations are as follows: First, it deepens the analytical framework. Breaking through the traditional "regulation - market" binary analysis limitation, it embeds risk information deeply into the "credit - information - trust" theoretical framework, quantifies the complete self-protection process of creditors from information acquisition, risk assessment to decision adjustment, and promotes the formation of a "regulation - market - subject" tripartite collaborative governance pattern, breaking the traditional one-way transmission assumption. Second, it expands the research perspective. Focusing on the inquiry letter as the regulatory mechanism, it reveals the unique value of third-party regulatory information in alleviating the agency problem of debt contracts through text content analysis, verifies its effectiveness as an auxiliary tool for creditor decision-making, and provides a theoretical basis for constructing a three-dimensional information governance system of "enterprise autonomous disclosure + regulatory external disclosure". Third, it provides incremental contributions. Expanding the research boundary of regulatory economic consequences of inquiry letters, focusing on the perspective of creditor protection, it confirms the usefulness of regulatory information for debt contract decisions; breaking through the limitations of traditional institutional design, it starts from the risk disclosure function, enriches the information dimension factors affecting bank credit decision-making, and provides empirical support for the construction of a new creditor protection mechanism.
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