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论文编号:1601 
作者编号:2220080808 
上传时间:2010/6/10 10:44:47 
中文题目:并购后子公司治理与管控  
英文题目:Research on Corporate Governance and Manage & Control  
指导老师:李维安 
中文关键字:关键词:并购后子公司治理 公司治理 管控 
英文关键字:Key words: Corporate Governance of Merger subsidiary; Corporate Governance; Control 
中文摘要:并购是企业通过资本运作手段,迅速扩大企业规模、实现企业跨跃式发展的主要方式,对并购后的子公司治理与管控将最终决定企业并购成功与否。随着我国改革开放的深入,特别是中小国企改制的推行,越来越多的境内外上市公司、民营企业通过企业并购迅速扩大规模、进行战略布局、抢占市场份额,但并购后的企业如何管控?如何治理? 本文共分五章,第一章是导论部分,主要讲述选题背景及其意义、研究方法和内容,并提出有关结论和创新点;第二章是理论综述,从公司治理理论、委托代理理论、公司管控理论、高管约束及激励理论,以及并购与公司治理的关系等方面进行相关理论引用和阐述;第三章是并购后子公司管控中面临的风险分析及治理结构状况;第四章结合中海集团并购沈阳皇姑热电有限公司进行实际案例分析;第五章对并购后的子公司治理与管控进行深入分析,从如何建立与子公司治理相匹配的管控模式、职业经理人的选聘、子公司内部管控措施及高管约束与激励机制等方面进行阐述;最后一部分为本文的结论。 本文通过对并购后的子公司治理与管控之问题的分析与研究并结合中海集团并购沈阳皇姑热电有限公司的案例分析可以看出,并购后的子公司治理与一般意义上的上市公司或集团公司治理有着很大的区别,并购后的子公司治理的主要目的是有利于上级公司或母公司对其进行有效的管控,而有效管控的根本在于并购后子公司与上级公司(母公司)企业文化认同、管理制度融合,建立适当的高管激励与约束机制,以最大限度地降低并购后子公司经营中的委托代理风险  
英文摘要:Enterprise's mergers and acquisitions(M&A),the main way to expand enterprise scale rapidly and carry out leaping development , which by means of capital operation; Also the Corporate Governance of Merger subsidiary and control will ultimately determine success or failure of mergers and acquisitions. Along with the deepening of China's reform and opening up, especially the restructuring of small and medium enterprise, more and more domestic and foreign listed companies, private enterprises rapidly expand their scale, make the strategic layout, and maximize market share, but how to control the enterprise and how to manage the corporate governance after the mergers and acquisitions? The whole essay comprises of five parts as below, the first chapter is the summary, which include the background and meaning of choosing the topic, the way and content to research, related conclusion and creative views; The second chapter is a theoretical overview, which excerpt and expatiate from the corporate governance theory, principal-agent theory, the corporate control measures theory, executives restraint and motivation theory, as well as the relation between M&A and Companies management; The third chapter analyze the risk of the Corporate Governance of Merger subsidiary and control after M&A; The fourth chapter is the analysis of actual case, which combined with the case of China Overseas Holdings Limited (COHL) merged Shenyang Thermoelectric (Huang gu) Co. Ltd. The fifth Chapter make an in-depth analyze the Corporate Governance of Merger subsidiary and actual control of merger subsidiaries, make an expatiation on how to set up suitable agency relationship match with the governance mode of subsidiaries, professional managers selection, internal control measures, executive constraints and incentives mechanisms; The last part is the conclusion of this paper. In this paper, after the normative analyze and research the Corporate Governance of Merger subsidiary and control after M&A , combined with the case of COHL merger Shenyang Thermoelectric (Huang gu) Co., Ltd., It has big difference between the Corporate Governance of Merger subsidiary and parent company Corporate Governance, the main purpose of a M&A subsidiary is propitious to manage and control from higher-level parent company , and the base of effective control is the enterprise culture and management system integration between M&A subsidiaries and parent companies (the parent company ), the establishment of appropriate executive incentive and restraint mechanisms, in order to minimize the Principal-agent risk of M&A subsidiaries during the operating.  
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