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论文编号：	15856
作者编号：	2320234046
上传时间：	2025/12/11 10:46:02
中文题目：	G国企集团提升内部审计工作质量的研究
英文题目：	Research on Improving the Quality of Internal Audit Work in G State-owned Enterprise Group
指导老师：	郝臣
中文关键字：	国有企业；内部审计；风险防控；优化对策
英文关键字：	State-owned Enterprises; Internal Auditing; Risk Prevention and Control; Optimization Strategies
中文摘要：	在全球经济数字化转型与地缘政治冲突交织、我国国有企业改革步入“深 水区”的背景下，国家政策推动内部审计从“形式覆盖”向“实质有效”转型， 要求构建“集中统一、全面覆盖、权威高效”的监督体系。尽管政策导向明确， 但国企内审仍面临独立性不足、技术赋能不充分、新兴风险应对乏力等挑战，且 随着制度演进，内审职能需进一步适配“政治性与经济性双重属性、监管协同性、 战略导向性”的核心定位。 本研究以天津市国有资产监督管理委员会监管的 G 国有企业集团为案例， 结合政策驱动、现实需求与技术赋能逻辑，运用文献研究法与案例研究法，旨在 探讨国有企业内部审计质量提升路径，兼具理论与实践价值。研究首先梳理委托 代理理论、公司治理理论、信息不对称理论、风险导向审计理论及 PDCA 循环 理论等基础理论，明确国企内审的核心特征与制度支撑；其次系统分析 G 国有 企业集团内审现状，并结合审计实践数据，识别出四大核心问题：一是审计监督 覆盖失衡；二是内审队伍结构性短板；三是审计整改闭环失效；四是审计数字化 滞后。针对上述问题，本研究结合多学科理论提出四大优化路径：一是基于协同 治理理论构建“地域-风险”双维度网格化监督机制；二是基于人力资本理论健 全内审队伍建设体系；三是基于 PDCA 循环构建审计整改全流程闭环；四是基 于数字治理理论推进审计数字化建设。 通过上述研究，希望可有效解决 G 国有企业集团内部审计现存问题，完善 国有企业内部审计理论体系，为国企风险防控与高质量发展提供实证支持。除此 之外，也希望为同类地方国企优化审计实践、应对不确定性环境提供可复制的参 考范式。
英文摘要：	Against the backdrop of the global economic digital transformation and the interwoven geopolitical conflicts, as well as the deepening reform of China's state?owned enterprises (SOEs) into the "deep water zone", the national policy is promoting the transformation of internal auditing in SOEs from "formal coverage" to "substantive effectiveness", and demands the establishment of a "concentrated and unified, comprehensively covered, authoritative and efficient" supervision system. Despite the clear policy orientation, internal auditing in SOEs still faces challenges such as insufficient independence, inadequate technological empowerment, and weak response to emerging risks. Moreover, with the evolution of the system, the internal auditing function needs to further adapt to the core positioning of "dual political and economic attributes, regulatory synergy, and strategic orientation". This thesis takes the G state-owned enterprise group under the supervision of the Tianjin State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission as a case. By integrating the logic of policy-driven, practical needs, and technological empowerment, and employing the methods of literature review and case study, it aims to explore the path to improving the quality of internal auditing in SOEs, which is of both theoretical and practical significance. The thesis first reviews the basic theories such as the principal-agent theory, corporate governance theory, information asymmetry theory, risk-oriented auditing theory, and PDCA cycle theory to clarify the core characteristics and institutional support of internal auditing in SOEs. Then, it systematically analyzes the current situation of internal auditing in the G group and, based on the audit practice data, identifies four core issues: first, the imbalance in the coverage of audit supervision; second, the structural shortcomings of the internal audit team; third, the failure of the audit rectification closed loop; and fourth, the lag in audit digitalization. In response to these issues, this thesis proposes four optimization paths based on multi-disciplinary theories: first, to build a "region-risk" dual-dimensional grid supervision mechanism based on the theory of collaborative governance; second, to improve the internal audit II Abstract team building system based on human capital theory; third, to establish a full-process closed loop for audit rectification based on the PDCA cycle; and fourth, to promote the digitalization of auditing based on digital governance theory. Through the above research, it is hoped that the existing problems in the internal auditing of the G state-owned enterprise group can be effectively solved, the theoretical system of internal auditing in SOEs can be improved, and empirical support can be provided for the risk prevention and control and high-quality development of SOEs. In addition, it is also hoped that it can provide a replicable reference model for similar local SOEs to optimize their auditing practices and respond to uncertain environments.
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