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论文编号：	15773
作者编号：	1120211203
上传时间：	2025/12/9 23:04:12
中文题目：	双重逻辑视角：国有平台企业股东异质性、协同治理与共享价值创造
英文题目：	Dual Logic Perspective: Shareholder Heterogeneity, Collaborative Governance, and Shared Value Creation in State-owned Platform Enterprises
指导老师：	武立东
中文关键字：	股东异质性；协同治理；共享价值；国有平台企业
英文关键字：	shareholder heterogeneity；collaborative Governance ；shared value creation；state-owned platform firms
中文摘要：	在数字经济蓬勃发展的时代背景下，国有平台企业作为衔接"数字中国"和“制造强国”等顶层设计与市场微观运作的制度性枢纽，承担着兼顾行政逻辑与市场逻辑的双重使命。随着数字技术的快速发展，行政逻辑与市场逻辑的实践冲突日益凸显。前者强调公共利益、合规性约束与政策任务，后者追求效率最大化，导致企业在"政策优先"与"效率最优"间艰难权衡，可能引发数据泄露、监管处罚和公信力流失等风险，最终影响国家战略实施的长期效能。因此，如何构建兼容行政逻辑与市场逻辑、维护多元主体利益、实现兼顾公共使命与盈利可持续的共享价值创造的协同治理机制，将成为国有平台企业治理所面对的重要理论与现实问题。 制度逻辑理论视角下公司的股权结构因其是产权配置的制度化表征，得以将宏观制度环境中的多元制度逻辑冲突转化为微观组织内部的治理实践，被视为国有企业应对双重逻辑关系的核心结构性载体。特别是在混合所有制改革深化背景下，国有平台企业股东结构呈现多元化趋势，从"国有独资"转向"国有主导、多元协同"格局。股东不再仅是资本提供者，而是携带差异化资源禀赋的治理行动者，其对制度逻辑的响应会决定公司的战略走向与治理结果。因此，本研究重点关注股东作为的内部法人治理主体与其他核心外部治理主体在国有平台企业共享价值创造过程中的机制作用。本研究的核心问题是国有平台企业如何构建兼容行政逻辑与市场逻辑、维护多元主体利益、实现兼顾公共使命与盈利可持续的共享价值创造的协同治理机制。围绕核心问题，基于案例分析构建的理论模型与提出的命题，本文将从以下问题展开讨论：首先，作为行政逻辑与市场逻辑的治理表征，股东异质性如何影响国有平台企业的共享价值创造？其次，作为连接股东逻辑与企业价值的整合桥梁，董事会协同治理如何实现从股东异质性到共享价值创造的传导？最后，作为参与国有平台企业价值共创的重要外部治理主体，政府协同治理和供应链协同治理是否增强股东异质性对共享价值创造的作用？ 为了回答上述问题，本研究以制度逻辑理论，资源基础理论和资源依赖理论为基础，采用案例研究和实证分析相结合的方法，构建了国有平台企业“双重逻辑→协同治理→共享价值”的整合性理论模型，并选取2013到2023年在沪深两市上市的国有平台企业作为研究样本对上述关系进行检验。 本研究的结果揭示：第一，股东异质性是驱动国有平台企业进行价值创造的关键因素，股东所有权异质性和股东行业异质性都能促进国有平台企业的共享价值创造。股东所有权异质性和股东行业异质性对共享价值创造的促进作用会因国有企业的产权性质，国有股持股比例和区域数字化发展水平存在差异。股东所有权异质性和行业异质性对地方国有平台企业及国有股占比更高的国有平台企业的共享价值创造的促进作用更加明显。股东所有权异质性对数字化发展水平较高地区的国有平台企业共享价值创造的促进作用更为显著；而股东行业异质性则对数字化发展水平相对滞后地区的国有平台企业共享价值创造的促进作用更为突出。第二，股东所有权异质性和股东行业异质性通过董事会的协同治理机制影响共享价值创造。该机制具体表现为企业战略承诺中行政目标和市场目标的双元平衡，连接行政资源和市场资源的跨界董事网络和协作创新。第三，来自政府的数字注意力配置中对行政目标和市场目标的耦合及政府的资源支持会放大股东所有权异质性和股东行业异质性对共享价值创造的促进作用。第四，在供应链网络中处于高网络位置及具有更好的供应链供需协调度的国有平台企业，其股东所有权异质性和股东行业异质性对共享价值创造的促进作用更强。 同已有研究相比，本文的创新点具体表现为：首先，本研究通过整合双重逻辑的内在张力与实现国有平台企业协同治理的相关理论基础，构建了国有平台企业“双重逻辑→协同治理→共享价值”的整合性理论模型，突破了传统研究将平台企业简化为技术中介或中心生态场域的局限。其次，本研究揭示了董事会协同治理在解析制度逻辑冲突与实现资源重构中的核心中介作用，丰富了对董事会连接股东与企业价值创造作用的理解。最后，本研究基于资源依赖理论，构建了由内而外、多层互动的协同治理新模式，揭示了政府与供应链在国有平台企业共享价值创造中的协同治理作用，丰富了传统研究对平台企业治理情境的认知。
英文摘要：	In the context of the rapidly growing digital economy, state-owned platform firms serve as institutional nexuses that connect top-level national strategies such as “Digital China” and “Manufacturing Powerhouse” with micro-level market operations. These firms bear a dual mission that incorporates both administrative logic and market logic. With the rapid advancement of digital technologies, the inherent tension between these two logics has become increasingly evident: whereas administrative logic emphasizes public interests, regulatory compliance, and policy mandates, market logic prioritizes efficiency maximization. This divergence forces firms into difficult trade-offs between “policy precedence” and “operational efficiency,” potentially leading to risks such as data breaches, regulatory penalties, and loss of public trust, which may ultimately impair the long-term effectiveness of national strategic implementation. Therefore, constructing a synergistic governance mechanism that harmonizes administrative and market logics, safeguards the interests of multiple stakeholders, and achieves shared value creation—balancing public mission with financial sustainability—has become a critical theoretical and practical challenge in the governance of state-owned platform firms. From the perspective of institutional logics theory, a firm’s ownership structure-as an institutionalized representation of property rights allocation- transforms conflicts among macro-level institutional logics into governance practices at the micro-organizational level. It is thus regarded as a core structural vehicle through which state-owned firms reconcile dual logics. Against the backdrop of deepening mixed-ownership reform, state-owned platform firms have witnessed increasing diversification in shareholder composition, shifting from wholly state- owned toward a “state-led, multi-stakeholder collaborative” model. Shareholders are no longer mere capital providers; rather, they serve as governance actors endowed with heterogeneous resources and capabilities. Their responses to institutional logics critically shape the strategic direction and governance outcomes of the firm. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the role of shareholders-as both internal corporate governance actors and external governance influencers-in the process of shared value creation in state-owned platform firms. The core research question of this dissertation is how state-owned platform enterprises can construct a collaborative governance mechanism that reconciles administrative and market logics, safeguards the interests of multiple stakeholders, and achieves shared value creation balancing public mission and profitable sustainability. Centering on this core question and building upon the theoretical model and propositions developed through case analysis, this dissertation will unfold the discussion by addressing the following sub-questions: First, as a governance representation of administrative and market logics, how does shareholder heterogeneity influence shared value creation in state-owned platform enterprises?Second, acting as an integrative bridge that connects shareholder logics with enterprise value, how does board-level collaborative governance facilitate the transmission from shareholder heterogeneity to shared value creation?Finally, as crucial external governance actors participating in the value co-creation of state-owned platform enterprises, do government collaborative governance and supply chain collaborative governance enhance the effect of shareholder heterogeneity on shared value creation? To address the aforementioned questions, this study draws on institutional logics theory, the resource-based view, and resource dependence theory as its theoretical foundations. Employing a mixed-method approach that integrates case study analysis and empirical examination, we develop an integrated theoretical model framed as “dual logics → synergistic governance → shared value” in the context of state-owned platform firms. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of such firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2013 and 2023, which enables a robust test of the proposed relationships. The findings of this study reveal several key insights: First, shareholder heterogeneity serves as a critical driver of shared value creation in state-owned platform firms. Both ownership heterogeneity and industrial heterogeneity among shareholders contribute positively to shared value creation. These effects, however, are moderated by the firm’s ownership structure, the proportion of state-owned shares, and the regional level of digital development. Specifically, the positive influence of shareholder ownership heterogeneity and industrial heterogeneity on shared value creation is more pronounced in locally controlled state-owned platform firms and those with a higher proportion of state ownership. Moreover, ownership heterogeneity exerts a stronger effect on shared value creation in regions with more advanced digital development, whereas industrial heterogeneity plays a more substantial role in regions with relatively lower levels of digital advancement. Second, both types of shareholder heterogeneity-ownership and industrial-affect shared value creation through the mediating mechanism of board-level synergistic governance. This mechanism manifests in three concrete forms: the ambidextrous balance between administrative and market objectives in strategic commitment, the establishment of boundary-spanning director networks that integrate administrative and market resources, and collaborative innovation initiatives. Third, the government’s allocation of digital attention-specifically, the coupling of administrative and market goals within policy frameworks, coupled with tangible resource support—amplifies the positive effect of both ownership and industrial heterogeneity on shared value creation. Fourth, the promotive effect of shareholder heterogeneity on shared value creation is stronger in state-owned platform firms that occupy central positions within supply chain networks and exhibit a high degree of supply-demand coordination. Compared to existing research, the innovations of this dissertation are specifically demonstrated as follows: First, by integrating the inherent tension of dual logics and the theoretical foundations for achieving collaborative governance in state-owned platform enterprises, this dissertation constructs an integrated theoretical model of "Dual Logics → Collaborative Governance → Shared Value" for state-owned platform enterprises, overcoming the limitation of traditional studies that simplistically regard platform enterprises as either technological intermediaries or neutral ecosystems. Second, this dissertation reveals the core mediating role of board-level collaborative governance in resolving institutional logic conflicts and facilitating resource reconfiguration, thereby deepening the understanding of how boards connect shareholders with enterprise value creation. Finally, based on resource dependence theory, this dissertation develops a new model of collaborative governance characterized by its inside-out, multi-level interactive nature, uncovering the synergistic governance roles of government and supply chains in the shared value creation of state-owned platform enterprises, which enriches the traditional understanding of governance contexts for platform enterprises.
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