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论文编号：	1554
作者编号：	1120060719
上传时间：	2009/6/18 11:28:00
中文题目：	投资者关系管理对权益资本成本的
英文题目：	Research on Mechanism of Inves
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	投资者关系管理;信息不对称;权益
英文关键字：	investor relations;information
中文摘要：	进入2008年后，股权分置改革引起的“大小非”解禁使得资本市场的竞争更加激烈和复杂。如何赢得资本市场的认同成为上市公司亟需解决的问题。投资者关系管理的实施能够在一定程度上满足公司内外对信息的这种互动需求，帮助公司树立资本市场形象。然而中国上市公司普遍存在实施动力不足的现象。为此，本研究选取权益资本成本作为公司价值效应的替代变量，分析和检验投资者关系管理对权益资本成本的作用过程以及效果，试图为投资者关系管理在中国依然有效提供证据，推动和促使相关部门和上市公司进一步加强投资者关系管理的实施。 目前为止，国内外相关研究多从投资者关系管理提高资本市场相对估价水平，进而降低权益资本成本的角度分析二者之间的关系。而在中国的制度背景下，以控股股东为代表的内部人存在着非效率决策以及操纵信息掩盖行为的动机，这会影响到公司的未来盈利能力和资本市场的反应。因此，本研究以信息不对称作为分析变量，同时考虑投资者关系管理影响公司内部决策和外部市场预期，进而影响权益资本成本的双重路径，并以此为基础，提出了投资者关系管理影响权益资本成本的理论模型。在对主要研究变量可靠性检验的基础上，按照理论模型依次检验了投资者关系管理的实施能否制约控股股东的盈余管理行为，提高信息质量；能否降低信息不对称程度和权益资本成本。根据实证分析结果，本研究主要得出以下结论： （1）投资者关系管理水平越高，越能抑制控股股东的盈余管理行为。投资者关系管理实施后，由于加大了对外沟通的方式和次数，内部人信息操纵行为被发现的概率增加，在一定程度上能够迫使公司提高信息质量。由此，控制盈余管理行为、降低控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占，除了考虑完善内部治理和外部监管外，还可以考虑加强投资者关系管理的实施。这将有利于公司的健康发展以及证券市场效率的提高。 （2）投资者关系管理水平越高，公司的权益资本成本越低。分组T检验结果显示，IRMI水平较低的一组上市公司至少要多支付2.6350%的权益资本成本，投资者才会考虑承担更多的风险，将资金出借给上市公司（按GOSTDIV方法计算）。多元回归分析结果也支持了投资者关系管理实施后的价值效应。在融资环境日益复杂的中国资本市场，为了获得良好的融资基础，上市公司应当主动提高投资者关系管理水平。 （3）投资者关系管理能够降低信息不对称程度，进而降低权益资本成本。投资者关系管理的实施能够降低资本市场的信息不对称程度，不仅限于信息刚刚发布之后（以自查报告发布日为例）。联合结论（1），本研究认为投资者关系管理能够在降低“道德风险”的基础上降低“逆向选择”，利于提高公司治理效率，从而支持了投资者关系管理对公司治理的优化作用。 综上所述，本研究以信息不对称为分析变量，从公司内部决策和外部市场预期两种路径分析了投资者关系管理对权益资本的作用机制；不仅分析和支持了投资者关系管理的价值效应，还考查了投资者关系管理对控股股东利己行为的约束能力，支持其对公司治理的优化作用。本研究的主要创新有： （1）构建了投资者关系管理影响权益资本成本的双重传导模型。区别于以往只关注外部市场表现的研究，本研究以信息不对称为分析桥梁，借鉴已有模型和数学推导，同时分析了投资者关系管理影响内部决策和外部市场表现的双重路径，构建了投资者关系管理影响权益资本成本的理论模型。 （2）基于投资者关系管理制约控股股东利己行为的视角分析了投资者关系管理对公司治理的优化。国内外研究多分析公司治理水平或某些因素与投资者关系管理的关系，并不能较好地回应投资者关系管理成为治理创新活动的现实。基于中国的制度背景，分析投资者关系管理对控股股东追求控制权私人收益行为的约束，并通过投资者关系管理对控股股东盈余管理行为的制约检验，支持了其降低“道德风险”的理论假设。 （3）建立了以互动沟通指标为主的投资者关系管理评价指标。本研究强调以互动沟通指标为主的公司自主活动，将投资者关系管理的评价研究从“合规”的、单向披露延展到“创新”的、互动沟通评价，进一步完善了投资者关系管理评价指标体系，同时以2007年公司治理自查报告作为主要数据来源，保障了信息的可信度。
英文摘要：	Entering 2008, because of non-floating stock be allowed to enter capital marketing, capital market had becoming more and more complicated. So how to establish company image had became an urgent problem. The implementation of investor relations could meet the greater information demands, and help company to establish image. But the majority of listed companies did not have incentive to do it. So, we selected the cost of equity capital as value variance to analyze the effect and process between investor relations and cost of equity capital, attempted to support that investor relations in Chinese capital marketing was still effective, and to promote and encourage the relevant departments and listed companies to further strengthen the implementation of investor relations. So far, both the domestic and international researches analyzed the relations between investor relations and the cost of equity capital from the perspective of increasing the relative valuation level of company security. Under Chinese institutional background, blockholders had the incentive to make non-efficiency decision and to manipulate information, which would affect the company's future profitability and the capital market response. Therefore, this dissertation used information asymmetry as the analysis variable to analyze the dual path of investor relations affecting the cost of equity capital, taking into consideration of both the company's internal decision-making and external market expectations, and on this basis, we established the theoretical model of investor relations impacting the cost of equity capital. After reliability testing of the main variables, in accordance with the theoretical model, we examined whether the implementation of investor relations could constraint the earnings management behavior of inners and improve the quality of the information; whether the implementation of investor relations could reduce the information asymmetry and cost of equity capital. According to the results of empirical analysis, the dissertation made the following conclusions: (1) The higher the level of investor relations, the lower level of earnings management. The implementation of investor relations increased external communication, so the probability of discovering manipulation information became greater. This could be able to force the company to improve the information quality. So, besides improving the level of internal and external supervision, we could consider implementing investor relations to control earnings management and lower encroachment of small and medium shareholders.It would also be beneficial to the healthy development of company and securities markets, as well as efficiency. (2) The higher the level of investor relations, the lower the company's cost of equity capital. T test results showed that, a lower level group of IRMI at least paid more than 2.6350 percent of the cost of equity capital, investors would consider to bear risk and loan funds (according to the calculation of GOSTDIV method). The multiple regression analysis results also supported the value effect of investor relations. In an increasingly complex Chinese capital market, listed companies should self-improve the level of investor relations, and lay a good foundation for the future financing. (3) Investor relations could reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and then the cost of equity capital. Investor relations indeed were able to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, not only just after the information released (the data of disclose self-corporate governance report). Combined with the Conclusion (1) of investor relations could constrain earnings management behavior of blockholders, this dissertation holded that investor relations could lower “adverse selection” based on reducing “moral hazard”, and be helpful to promote governance efficiency. This supported that investor relations could optimize corporate governance. To sum up, this dissertation used information asymmetry as the analysis variable to analyze the dual path of investor relations affecting the cost of equity capital, taking into consideration of both the company's internal decision-making and external market expectations. We not only analyzed and supported the value effect of investor relations, also the restriction power to earning management to support the optimization of corporate governance. The main innovation of this dissertation was as followed: (1) Established the theoretical mode of investor relations affect the cost of capital. Differed from the previous research, this dissertation drawing on existing models and mathematical derivation,uesed information asymmetry to analyze the dual path of investor relations affecting the cost of equity capital, taking into consideration of both the company's internal decision-making and external market expectations, and established the theoretical mode of investor relations affect the cost of capital. (2) Analyzed optimization of corporate governance from the perspective of constraintment of investor relations to self-interest behavior controlling shareholders. Most domestic and international researches investigated the relationship between the level of corporate governance or some factors and investor relations, and could not better respond to the reality of investor relations had become governance innovation activities. Under Chinese institutional background, we analyzed the constraintment of investor relations to the behavior of controlling shareholders pursuing private benefits; through testing optimization effect of corporate governance by earnings management to support the theoretical assumptions of investor relations could reduce the “moral hazard”. (3) Establishment of investor relations index based on interactive communications indicators. This dissertation stressed the interactive communications indicators, made the investor relations index develope from the “compliance” and the a one-way disclosure index extended to the “innovation” and interactive communication index, and further improved investor relations index evaluation system, at the same time, using 2007 self-corporate governance report as a major source of data to measure investor relations, which assured the credibility of the information.
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