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论文编号：	15477
作者编号：	1120201072
上传时间：	2025/6/12 16:01:21
中文题目：	供应链中零售企业策略性信息共享及运营决策研究
英文题目：	Research on Strategic Information Sharing and Operational Decisions of the Retail Enterprise in the Supply Chain
指导老师：	李勇建教授
中文关键字：	供应链管理；需求信息不对称；策略性信息共享；渠道竞争；质量决策
英文关键字：	Supply Chain Management; Demand Information Asymmetry; Strategic Information Sharing; Channel Competition; Quality Decision
中文摘要：	需求信息的不确定性向来都是企业运营管理中面临的最大挑战之一。如今，随着企业竞争的不断加剧和消费者需求的多样化，市场需求信息在供应链中的作用越发突出。需求信息不仅可以使供应链参与者制定更好的运营战略，还可可以形成自身的“信息力量”，通过策略性的信息共享，影响供应链中其他参与者的行为。通常，下游零售企业更接近终端销售市场，更了解市场需求，相较于上游的制造商具有明显的需求信息优势，这也就造成了供应链中的需求信息不对称。信息共享是克服供应链中信息不对称问题，实现供应链协调的有效方式。然而，糟糕的是，并不是所有的零售商都会选择共享信息，一些零售商担心共享信息后，上游企业可能会策略性的应用信息从而损害自身的收益，因而不愿意选择共享。那么，如何有效的共享所获得的需求信息是企业亟需解决的问题。此外，现有的研究聚焦于事前的信息共享机制，而对实践中广泛存在的事后信息共享行为缺乏系统性探讨。在这种情形下，零售商该如何设计信息共享机制，也是学术界亟需解决的一个问题。鉴于此，本文将以需求信息共享为背景，探讨不同结构下供应链企业的事后信息共享机制及运营决策，为信息不对称下企业的信息管理和决策提供参考。 基于企业面临的现实问题和学术研究的理论空白，本文对现有的文献进行梳理，明晰当前供应链中信息管理研究的不足，采用博弈论、贝叶斯理论以及数值仿真等研究方法，分析不同结构下供应链企业策略性的需求信息共享机制和运营策略。本文分为以下四个研究问题：考虑获取透明化的零售商策略性信息共享研究、考虑不同决策顺序的零售商策略性信息共享与制造商质量决策研究、考虑内部竞争的零售商策略性信息共享和制造商质量决策研究以及考虑外部竞争和公开批发价格的零售商策略性信息共享研究。 首先，本文讨论了垄断情境下，零售商在获取透明和不透明两种模式下，零售商的信息获取和共享策略，以及供应链成员对两种模式的偏好机制。研究表明：首先，两种模式都存在一个信息获取的成本阈值，当低于该阈值时才会选择获取信息。在不透明模型下，若零售商获得信息，则其选择共享低需求信息而隐藏高需求信息。其次，就中间收益而言(获取成本实现后)，制造商、零售商和供应链系统对两种模式的偏好取决于信息获取成本；就事前收益而言(获取成本实现前)，制造商和供应链总是倾向选择不透明模式，而零售商对模式的偏好仍然取决于获取成本。最后，不透明模式总是产生一个更高的消费者剩余。 其次，本文引入了制造商的质量决策，讨论质量决策与零售商信息共享的交互机制。聚焦于前质量决策和后质量决策两种次序下，分析零售商的信息共享机制、制造商的质量决策、期望信息成本对均衡收益的影响以及供应链参与者对两类交互模式的偏好策略。研究表明：在后质量决策中，当消费者对质量的敏感度较高(低)，零售商会选择共享(隐藏)高需求信息，而隐藏(共享)低需求信息。相比之下，在前质量决策中，零售商总是选择共享低需求信息，而隐藏高需求信息。前质量决策和后质量决策两种决策时机所产生的质量水平由零售商的信息获取状态和消费者的质量敏感度共同决定。有趣的是，在一定的条件下，随着期望信息获取成本的增加，零售商的收益反而会得到提升。制造商可能会偏好前质量决策也能偏好后质量决策，而零售商总是偏好后质量决策。 再次，本文引入供应链内部竞争机制，考察获取透明和不透明两种模式下，制造商的入侵行为、质量策略、零售商的信息共享机制、期望信息成本对均衡收益的影响以及供应链参与者对两类交互模式的偏好策略。研究表明：首先，不入侵时，若零售商获取信息，其会选择共享低需求信息，而隐藏高需求信息。然而，当制造商入侵时，会存在一个竞争阈值，使得低于该阈值，零售商选择共享高需求的信息，而隐藏低需求信息，高于该阈值，共享策略呈现出完全相反的趋势。其次，期望信息获取成本的提升不总是对零售商有害，在一些条件下，反而可能会提升零售商的收益。透明模式和不透明模式产生的质量水平，由制造商的入侵成本、竞争水平和需求状态共同决定。有趣的是，受到制造商入侵和竞争水平的影响，零售商并不总是偏好不透明模式，在一些条件下，可能偏好透明模式，而制造商总是偏好透明化模式。 最后，本文又引入供应链外部竞争机制，在公开批发价格的背景下，考察新进企业存在时，在位供应链中零售商的信息共享策略、制造商和新进企业的信息偏好策略以及零售商共享信息时，制造商的信息泄露策略。研究表明：首先，对于零售商而言，其信息共享策略呈现出一种动态变化的情形，即当市场不确定较大时，偏好不共享信息；当市场不确定较低时，若竞争水平较强，偏好共享信息，若竞争水平较弱，偏好不共享需求信息。对于制造商来说，当零售商共享信息时，制造商有可能采用分离均衡也有可能采用混同均衡，且当市场不确定性较大时，制造商偏好共享信息，当市场不确定较低时，若竞争水平较强，偏好不共享信息，若竞争水平较弱时，偏好共享需求信息。对于新进企业来说，当市场不确定较大时，偏好共享信息；当市场不确定较低时，若竞争水平较强，偏好不共享信息，若竞争水平较弱，偏好共享需求信息。 综上所述，本文首先研究了需求信息获取透明与不透明两种情境下零售商的事后信息获取与共享机制，填补了现有文献的空白。随后，通过引入制造商的质量决策，分析了其与零售商信息共享的交互机制，揭示了诱导质量效应和诱导批发价格效应对决策的影响路径。进一步，本文结合制造商的渠道入侵行为，探讨了内部竞争、质量决策与批发价格三者之间的互动关系对零售商信息共享的影响机理，更深入地揭示了竞争效应对诱导批发价格效应和诱导质量效应的调节作用。最后，本文首次从外部竞争和公开批发价格的视角，分析了在位零售商的信息共享策略以及制造商的需求信号传递机制。
英文摘要：	The uncertainty of demand information has always been one of the greatest challenges in the operation and management of enterprises. Today, with the intensification of corporate competition and the diversification of consumer demands, the role of market demand information in the supply chain has become increasingly prominent. Demand information not only enables supply chain participants to formulate better operational strategies but also creates their own "information power," influencing the behavior of other participants in the supply chain through strategic information sharing. Typically, retail enterprises are closer to the end sales market and have a better understanding of market demand, thus possessing a significant advantage in demand information compared to other supply chain enterprises. This leads to information asymmetry in the supply chain. Information sharing is an effective way to overcome the problem of information asymmetry in the supply chain and achieve supply chain coordination. However, the issue is that not all retailers choose to share information; some retailers fear that upstream enterprises may strategically use the information to their detriment; thus, they are reluctant to share. Therefore, how to share the obtained information effectively is a pressing problem for enterprises to solve. Furthermore, existing research mainly focuses on ex-ante information sharing; there remains a significant lack of systematic investigation into ex-post information sharing behaviors that are widely observed in practice. In reality, many enterprises opt for ex-post information sharing. In such cases, how retailers should design information sharing mechanisms is also an urgent issue for the academic community to address. In light of this, this dissertation will explore the ex-post information sharing of enterprises under different supply chain structures, providing a reference for information management and operation of enterprises under information asymmetry. In response to the practical challenges faced by the business community and the theoretical gaps in academic research, this dissertation will review the relevant literature of previous studies to clarify the shortcomings in current research on information management within supply chains. Utilizing research methodologies such as game theory, Bayesian theory, and numerical simulation, the dissertation analyzes the strategic information sharing mechanisms and operational strategies of supply chain enterprises under different structures. This dissertation is divided into the following four research questions: the research on strategic information sharing of the retailer considering acquisition transparency; the research on the retailer’s strategic information sharing and the manufacturer’s quality decision considering different decision sequences; the research on the retailer's strategic information sharing and the manufacturer's quality decision considering internal competition; and the research on strategic information sharing of the retailer considering external competition and public wholesale pricing. Firstly, this dissertation discusses the information acquisition and sharing strategies of retailers under both acquisition transparent and non-transparent modes in a non-competitive environment, as well as the preference mechanisms of supply chain members for the two modes. The research results indicate that there is a cost threshold for information acquisition in both modes; information is only acquired when the cost is below these thresholds. Under the non-transparent mode, if the retailer acquires information, he chooses to share low-demand information while concealing high-demand information. Interestingly, in terms of interim profits (after the acquisition cost is realized), the preferences of the manufacturer, retailer, and supply chain system for the two modes depend on the information acquisition cost; in terms of ex-ante profits (before the acquisition cost is realized), the manufacturer and the supply chain always prefer the non-transparent mode, while the retailer's preference for the mode still depends on the acquisition cost. Finally, the non-transparent mode always generates a higher consumer surplus compared to the full transparent mode. Secondly, we introduce the manufacturer's quality decision to discuss the interplay mechanism between the manufacturer’s quality decision and the retailer's information sharing. Focusing on the two sequences of pre-quality decision and post-quality decision, we examine the retailer's information sharing mechanism, the manufacturer's quality decision, the impact of expected information cost on equilibrium profits, and the preference strategies of supply chain participants for the two types of interplay modes. The research results show that in the post-quality decision, when consumers are more (less) sensitive to quality, the retailer will choose to share (conceal) high-demand information and conceal (share) low-demand information. In contrast, in the pre-quality decision, the retailer always chooses to share low-demand information and conceal high-demand information. The quality levels resulting from pre- and post-quality decisions are determined by both the status of the information obtained and consumers' sensitivity to quality. Interestingly, under certain conditions, as the expected information acquisition cost increases, the retailer's profit may actually improve. The manufacturer may prefer either the pre- or post-quality decision, while the retailer always prefers the post-quality decision. Thirdly, we consider the manufacturer's encroachment, examine the manufacturer's encroachment behavior, quality decision, the retailer's information sharing mechanism, the impact of expected information cost on equilibrium profits, and the preferences of supply chain participants under both transparent and non-transparent modes, considering internal competition. The research results indicate that, firstly, when there is no encroachment, if the retailer acquires information, he chooses to share low-demand information and conceal high-demand information. However, when the manufacturer encroaches, there exists a competition threshold below which the retailer chooses to share high-demand information and conceal low-demand information, and above which the sharing strategy is completely opposite. Secondly, an increase in the expected information cost is not always detrimental to the retailer; under certain conditions, it may enhance the retailer's profit. The quality levels resulting from the transparent and non-transparent modes are determined by both the encroachment cost and the level of competition. Interestingly, influenced by the manufacturer's encroachment and the level of competition, the retailer does not always prefer the non-transparent mode; under certain conditions, she may prefer the transparent modes, while the manufacturer always prefers the transparent mode. Finally, we consider the presence of a new monopolistic enterprise and, in the context of public wholesale prices, explore the demand information sharing strategies of the retailer under downstream competition, whether the manufacturer should use wholesale prices to signal demand to the new enterprise if the retailer shares information, and the preference mechanisms of supply chain participants for information sharing. The results show that, firstly, for the retailer, his strategies of sharing or not sharing information present a dynamic situation. When demand uncertainty is high, he prefers not to share information; when demand uncertainty is low, if the competition level is strong, he prefers to share information, and if the level of competition is soft, he prefers not to share information. For the manufacturer, when the retailer shares information, the manufacturer may adopt either a separating equilibrium or a pooling equilibrium, and when demand uncertainty is high, the manufacturer prefers to share information; when market uncertainty is low, if the level of competition is strong, she prefers not to share information, and if the level of competition is soft, she prefers to share information. For the new enterprise, when demand uncertainty is high, it prefers to share information; when demand uncertainty is low, if the level of competition is strong, it prefers not to share information, and if the level of competition is soft, it prefers to share demand information. In summary, this dissertation first investigates the retailer’s information acquisition and ex-post information sharing mechanisms under two scenarios—information acquisition transparent and non-transparent—thereby addressing a gap in the existing literature. It then introduces the manufacturer’s quality decision to analyze the interaction between the quality decision and the retailer’s information sharing, uncovering the influence pathways of the induced quality effect and wholesale price effect. Furthermore, incorporating the manufacturer’s encroachment behavior, the dissertation explores how the interplay among internal competition, quality decision, and wholesale pricing affects the retailer’s information sharing. This analysis reveals the moderating role of competitive effect on both the induced wholesale price effect and quality effect. Finally, this dissertation examines the incumbent retailer’s information sharing strategies and the manufacturer’s demand signal transmission mechanism, considering external competition and publicly wholesale prices.
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