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论文编号：	15386
作者编号：	2120233670
上传时间：	2025/6/9 13:49:56
中文题目：	分析师关注、融资约束与股权激励模式选择
英文题目：	Analysts'' Coverage, Financing Constraints and the Choice of Equity Incentive Models
指导老师：	程新生教授
中文关键字：	股权激励模式，分析师关注，融资约束
英文关键字：	Equity Incentive Model, Analyst Coverage, Financing Constraint
中文摘要：	股权激励是一种长期激励制度，是为缓解现代企业制度下所有权与经营权分离造成的代理成本和利益冲突问题而产生的。2006年，我国上市公司基本上完成了股权分置改革，证券市场进入了一个新阶段，股权激励制度开始被广泛运用并不断发展。在经济转型需求、国企深化改革以及资本市场完善的背景下，股权激励得到了更深入的发展。资本市场是企业资金的重要来源，对企业长期稳定发展至关重要。作为资本市场的重要参与者，证券分析师能够通过对企业信息的挖掘及基于自身专业知识与经验积累对信息的解读，形成研究报告，进而成为投资者决策参考的重要依据。 本文回顾和总结了国内外分析师关注、股权激励以及二者关系的相关文献，以委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和激励理论为基础，以我国2014—2023年A股上市公司作为样本，探究了分析师关注对于企业股权激励模式选择的影响，以及分析师关注的影响机制，即融资约束的中介作用。此外，为保证研究结果的稳健性，本文还通过替换变量、滞后变量、替换模型及工具变量法等方法，展开了一系列稳健性检验。最后，探究了产权性质、企业规模和企业成长性等异质性因素的影响差异。实证研究发现，分析师关注对股票期权激励模式选择具有显著的促进作用，融资约束能够在二者关系中起到中介作用。具体而言，分析师关注能够通过提升信息透明度，发挥信息中介的作用，从而缓解融资约束，进而推动企业选择股票期权激励。此外，本文进一步按照产权性质、企业规模、企业成长性等异质性因素进行了划分，发现在国有企业和成长性高的企业中，分析师关注对于股票期权激励模式的正向影响更为显著。 最后，基于研究结果对有关部门和企业提出相应建议，并总结了研究不足与未来展望。本文通过实证研究，探索了分析师关注与企业股权激励模式选择的关系，为企业制定股权激励计划提供借鉴。
英文摘要：	Equity incentive is a long-term incentive system, which was created to alleviate the agency cost and conflict of interest problems caused by the separation of ownership and operation rights under the modern enterprise system. In 2006, China's listed companies basically completed the reform of equity separation, and the securities market entered into a new stage, where the equity incentive system began to be widely used and continuously developed. Against the background of the demand for economic transformation, deepening reform of state-owned enterprises and improvement of the capital market, equity incentives have been developed more deeply. The capital market is an important source of corporate capital, which is crucial to the long-term stable development of enterprises. As an important participant in the capital market, securities analysts are able to form research reports through mining corporate information and interpreting the information based on their own professional knowledge and experience, which in turn become an important basis for investors' decision-making. This paper reviews and summarizes the relevant literature on analysts' coverage, equity incentives and the relationship between the two at home and abroad, and based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and incentive theory, and using China's A-share listed companies in the period of 2014-2023 as a sample, it explores the impact of analysts' coverage on the choice of corporate equity incentive model and the mechanism of analysts' coverage, which is the mediating role of financing constraints. In addition, in order to ensure the robustness of the research results, this paper also launched a series of robustness tests through the methods of replacement variables, lagged variables, replacement models and instrumental variables method. Finally, the differences in the impact of heterogeneous factors such as the nature of ownership, firm size and firm growth are explored. The empirical study finds that analysts' coverage has a significant contribution to the choice of stock option incentive model, and financing constraints can play a mediating role in the relationship. Specifically, analysts' coverage can play the role of information intermediary by enhancing information transparency, thus alleviating financing constraints, and then promoting firms' choice of stock option incentives. In addition, this paper is further divided according to the heterogeneous factors such as the nature of property rights, enterprise size, enterprise growth, and finds that the positive impact of analysts' coverage on the stock option incentive model is more significant in state-owned enterprises and enterprises with high growth. Finally, based on the results of the study, corresponding recommendations are made to the relevant departments and enterprises, and research deficiencies and future prospects are summarized. Through empirical research, this paper explores the relationship between analysts’ coverage and the choice of corporate equity incentive model, which provides a reference for enterprises to formulate equity incentive plans.
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