联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	15382
作者编号：	1120201096
上传时间：	2025/6/9 11:58:47
中文题目：	风险投资业绩承诺下标的企业创新行为及其治理研究
英文题目：	Research on the Innovation Behaviors of the Target Enterprises and Their Governance under the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism of Venture Capital
指导老师：	黄福广
中文关键字：	风险投资、业绩承诺、企业创新、决策短视、参与治理
英文关键字：	Venture Capital; Valuation Adjustment Mechanism; Enterprise Innovation; Short-term Decision-making; Governance Participation
中文摘要：	当前我国经济发展格局呈现出以国内大循环为主体、国内国际双循环相互促进的新特征。传统增长动能逐渐减弱，而新质生产力尚未充分形成。在此背景下，创新是推动经济增长、优化供给结构的关键力量，同时也是稳定经济运行促进就业的重要抓手。有效激励微观主体的创新活动，不仅关系到经济增长的内生动力，更关系到经济高质量发展，对激发新质生产力、实现经济结构优化升级具有重要意义。 初创企业具有高成长性与高不确定性特征，估值问题十分复杂。为缓解估值分歧，推动交易达成，风险资本在部分投资交易中引入业绩承诺条款。通过设定明确的业绩目标并辅以相应的奖惩机制，构成了风险资本对初创企业的契约治理。业绩承诺的签订期限通常为3～5年，着重关注企业的短期业绩表现，并呈现出“高溢价”与“高承诺”特征。在实践层面，业绩承诺协议的影响具有两面性：一方面，“高溢价”特征为企业注入了发展所需的资金，为其快速成长提供了必要条件；另一方面，“短周期”与“高承诺”特征给企业带来了短期业绩压力和潜在的业绩不达标风险，可能对企业经营造成冲击，影响其长期发展。在风险投资背景下，业绩承诺条款所引发的短期业绩压力如何影响企业创新行为？是否会导致企业创新投入和创新产出下降？其作用机理是什么？不同类型的企业在业绩承诺签订后是否存在差异化创新决策？风险资本该如何优化其治理方式？这些问题构成了本文的核心研究问题。 鉴于此，本文以风险投资业绩承诺与初创企业创新行为之间关系为研究主线，整理2013～2021年风险资本在新三板市场的投资事件并利用2013～2023年的公司财务数据，基于短期业绩压力角度，研究业绩承诺协议签订对企业创新行为的影响。研究发现：第一，业绩承诺下的短期业绩目标会对企业创始人产生扭曲激励，导致其决策短视，企业创新投入下降，且业绩承诺完成难度越大，完成的时间越紧迫，企业创新投入下降程度越高。第二，业绩承诺下企业创新投入削减本质上是企业创始人为了完成短期业绩的机会主义行为，受到企业内部公司治理与外部经营环境的影响，企业内部权力制衡、存在独立董事监督的情况下，业绩承诺对企业创新投入削减效应更弱；外部环境不确定性高，市场竞争激烈的情况下，业绩承诺对企业创新投入削减效应更强。第三，基于经济后果检验发现，业绩承诺下企业削减创新投入能够提升企业短期业绩，但是对企业长期绩效无显著影响。与此同时业绩承诺签订后企业创新投入下降会导致企业破产风险上升。第四，业绩承诺签订会导致企业创新产出下降，具体而言，企业的突破式创新及渐进式创新在业绩承诺签订后均显著降低。第五，业绩承诺下，企业创新产出降低在不同类型的企业中存在结构性差异，反映了不同类型企业在签订业绩承诺协议后不同创新策略。其中高科技企业和成长期企业更多的削减渐进式创新，更少的削减突破式创新；非高科技企业和成熟期企业则更多的削减突破式创新，更少的削减渐进式创新。第六，基于风险资本参与治理的研究表明，风险资本参与治理能够发挥监督效应和信息效应，缓解业绩承诺下企业创新投入削减及创新产出下降。风险资本参与治理的监督效应主要体现在对于企业创始人行为的监督，提升公司治理水平，缓解其决策短视；风险资本参与治理的信息效应体现为通过派驻董事，风险资本方与企业方能够进行面对面沟通，有助于风险资本方了解企业经营过程中的有关经营环境、企业内部发展状况的软信息。软信息的充分获取有助于风险资本对未达标企业进行“状态识别”，提升企业失败后被豁免赔偿的概率，从而激励企业创新。 本文主要贡献如下：第一，本文从企业创新行为视角，量化分析了业绩承诺契约治理对标的企业创新投入和创新产出的影响，揭示了业绩承诺下短期业绩压力对标的企业的扭曲激励效应，丰富了业绩承诺契约治理与企业创新之间关系的相关研究。第二，针对业绩承诺契约治理可能导致企业决策短视问题，本文提出将业绩承诺契约治理与风险资本参与治理相结合的解决对策，通过派驻董事获取企业软信息并进行“状态识别”，提升风险资本对失败的容忍度，从而缓解业绩承诺对企业创新的损害，丰富了失败容忍与企业创新激励的相关研究。第三，本文揭示了中国风险投资契约与美国的显著差异。由于新创企业高度依赖创始人及其团队，传统的控制权转移条款并不完全适用。在中国市场中，业绩承诺条款与风险资本参与治理相结合更具灵活性，更契合初创企业特点。在信息充分交流的情况下，合理运用业绩承诺条款，可以有效激励企业创新，实现风险资本与初创企业的合作共赢。
英文摘要：	At present, the pattern of China’s economic development is characterised by a new domestic macro cycle and a mutually reinforcing domestic and international double cycle. From the perspective of economic growth momentum, the traditional growth momentum is gradually weakening, while new quality productive forces have yet to be fully formed. In this context, innovation is a key force in promoting economic growth and optimising the supply structure, as well as an important hand in stabilising economic operation and promoting employment. Effectively stimulating the innovation activities of micro-entrepreneurs is not only related to the endogenous dynamics of economic growth, but also to the high-quality development of the economy. This is of great significance in stimulating new quality productivity and realising the optimisation and upgrading of the economic structure. Startups, characterized by their high-growth potential and inherent uncertainties, face particularly complex valuation challenges. To mitigate valuation disputes and facilitate transactions, venture capitalists often incorporate valuation adjustment mechanisms in investment agreements. These contractual governance tools establish clear short-term performance targets coupled with reward-penalty systems, typically spanning 3-5 years. Such arrangements demonstrate dual characteristics of “high premium” valuations and “high commitment” requirements. Practically, these mechanisms present a paradox: while the premium valuation injects crucial growth capital that fuels rapid expansion, the short-term pressure from high-commitment obligations risks operational disruptions and potential underperformance, potentially compromising long-term development. Within this context, critical questions emerge: How do these valuation-linked performance pressures influence corporate innovation behaviors? Might they suppress both innovation investment and output? What underlying mechanisms drive these effects? Do different enterprise types exhibit divergent innovation strategies post-implementation? How should venture capitalists refine their governance approaches? These interconnected inquiries form the core investigation of this study. In view of this, taking the relationship between venture capital and the innovation behavior of startups as the main line of research, based on the perspective of short-term performance pressure, taking the investment events of venture capital in the Nation Equities Exchange And Quotations (NEEQ) market from 2013 to 2021 as a sample, we study the impact of signing valuation adjustment mechanism agreements on the innovation behavior of enterprises. The study finds that: first, short-term performance targets under valuation adjustment mechanisms may create distorted incentives for enterprise founders, leading to short-sighted decision-making and a decline in enterprise innovation investment, and the more difficult it is to fulfill valuation adjustment mechanisms and the more urgent the time for fulfillment, the greater the degree of decline in enterprise innovation investment. Second, the decline in corporate innovation investment under valuation adjustment mechanism is basically the opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneurs to achieve short-term performance, which is affected by the internal corporate governance and external operating environment. In the case of high uncertainty in the external environment and intense market competition, the effect of valuation adjustment mechanism on the reduction of firm innovation investment is stronger. Third, based on the economic consequences test, it is found that firms’ innovation investment reduction under valuation adjustment mechanism can improve short-term performance, but has no significant effect on long-term performance. At the same time, the reduction of innovation investment after signing the valuation adjustment mechanism will lead to the increase of bankruptcy risk of firms. Fourth, the signing of valuation adjustment mechanism leads to the decline of innovation output of enterprises, in particular, the breakthrough and incremental innovation of enterprises are significantly reduced after the signing of valuation adjustment mechanism. Fifth, there are structural differences in the reduction of firms’ innovation output under valuation adjustment mechanisms among different types of firms, reflecting the different innovation strategies of different types of firms after entering into valuation adjustment mechanism agreements. Among them, high-tech firms and growth-stage firms cut more incremental innovations and less breakthrough innovations, while non-high-tech firms and mature firms cut more breakthrough innovations and less incremental innovations. Sixth, research based on the participation of venture capital in governance shows that the participation of venture capital in governance can play the monitoring effect and information effect to mitigate the cuts in firms’ innovation inputs and the decline in innovation outputs under valuation adjustment mechanisms. The monitoring effect of venture capital participation in governance is mainly reflected in the monitoring of the behavior of enterprise founders, which improves the level of corporate governance and mitigates their decision-making shortsightedness; the information effect of venture capital participation in governance is reflected in the fact that through the stationing of directors, venture capitalists and enterprises can have face-to-face communication, which is helpful for venture capitalists to understand the soft information about the business environment and the development status of the enterprise in the course of enterprise operation. Adequate access to soft information helps venture capitalists to “recognize the status” of enterprises that fail to meet the standards, and increases the probability of being exempted from compensation for failure, thus stimulating enterprise innovation. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: First, from the perspective of corporate innovation behavior, this paper quantitatively analyzes the impact of valuation adjustment mechanism contract governance on the innovation input and output of the target firm, reveals the distorting incentive effect of short-term performance pressure on the target firm under valuation adjustment mechanism, and enriches the related research on the relationship between valuation adjustment mechanism contract governance and corporate innovation. Second, to address the short-sightedness of corporate decision making caused by valuation adjustment mechanism contract governance, this paper proposes a solution that combines valuation adjustment mechanism contract governance with venture capital participation in governance, which improves venture capital’s tolerance for failure by assigning directors to obtain soft information about the firm and perform “state identification”, thus mitigating the damage of valuation adjustment mechanism on corporate innovation and enriching the tolerance for failure. This paper enriches the research on failure tolerance and corporate innovation incentives. Third, this paper reveals the significant differences between China’s venture capital covenants and those of the United States. Because startups are highly dependent on founders and their teams, traditional control transfer clauses are not fully applicable. In the Chinese market, the combination of valuation adjustment mechanism clauses and venture capital participation in management is more flexible and better suited to the characteristics of startups. With sufficient information exchange, the rational use of valuation adjustment mechanism clauses not only provides protection for founders and investors, but also promotes a win-win situation for both investment and financing parties.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)