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论文编号：	1537
作者编号：	2120082096
上传时间：	2010/6/8 20:15:51
中文题目：	可转债对非效率投资治理效应的实证研究
英文题目：	An Empirical Research on Governance Effect that Convertible Bonds have on Non-efficiency Investment
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	可转债，条款，股权制衡，非效率投资
英文关键字：	Convertible Bonds,Term Design,Check-and-balance of stock ownership,Non-efficiency investment
中文摘要：	可转债兼具股性和债性的特征使得其从理论上看具有良好的非效率投资的治理作用。目前中国的上市公司普遍存在非效率投资行为。然而国内学者对制约非效率投资行为的研究还主要集中在公司基本面因素上，对可转债的非效率投资的治理效应的研究极少。因此，本研究利用中国的样本来研究可转债的非效率投资治理作用，希望对理论研究和企业实践提供一些借鉴。 具体来说，本研究做了以下工作。首先，回顾了非效率投资与可转债的相关文献；其次，总结了中国可转债市场的发展概况和现状特点；第三，实证分析中，第一部分对样本公司进行了描述性分析；第二部分，首先通过相关模型得出了所选样本的非效率投资的程度，并对非效率投资和其变化趋势进行了描述性统计，再次，通过面板数据分析，探讨了可转债的发行和转股概率、向下修正条款、赎回条款和票面利率等因素对非效率投资的治理，最后本研究探讨了股权制衡和可转债对非效率投资的综合治理作用。 本研究的结论如下：首先，描述性统计表明可转债发行对非效率投资具有一定的短期治理效应；其次，面板数据回归结果表明：（1）可转债发行对过度投资的治理效应在发行当年有效果，对投资不足的治理效应在当年和发行后第二年有效果；（2）对投资不足样本而言，投资不足的缓解程度与转股概率正相关，与向下修正百分比负相关，与赎回概率正相关；没有发现转股概率、向下修正百分比和赎回概率对过度投资具有治理效应；没有发现票面利率对非效率投资有治理作用；（3）在可转债发行当年，可转债发行对过度投资的制约作用受到股权制衡的影响，且股权制衡越大，其他股东的制衡力量越大，可转债发行对过度投资的制约效应越明显；没有发现可转债发行对投资不足的治理作用受到股权制衡的影响。条款因素上，股权制衡越大，其他股东的制衡力量越大，转股概率对投资不足的治理效应越明显；没有发现向下修正和赎回概率对投资不足的治理作用受到股权制衡的影响。论文最后提出了相关的政策建议。 本论文在研究视角和研究内容上均有一定的创新，并在理论和实证研究上丰富了可转债和非效率投资的关系研究，也对公司实践具有一定的借鉴意义。
英文摘要：	Convertible bonds have the characters of both stock and bonds. In theory, convertible bonds have the excellent nature of improving the efficiency of investment. Now there is severe non-efficiency investment in Chinese public companies. However, most scholars focus on fundamental factors of company to restrict non-efficiency investment. Few scholars research the non-efficiency investment from the point of convertible bonds. Therefore in this thesis I hope to use Chinese manufacturing public companies to research the governance effect convertible bonds has on the non-efficiency investment and give some reference to theory research and business practice. To be more specific, this thesis does the following work. First, it reviews researches on non-efficiency investment and convertible bonds; secondly, it concludes the development and current situation of China Convertible Bonds Market; thirdly, in the first part of empirical analysis, it gives descriptive statistic on sample firms, in the second part of empirical analysis, it gets non-efficiency investment by regressing relevant model and gives descriptive statistic on non-efficiency investment and the trend of it. And then it discusses governance effect of the issuance of convertible bonds and term design (such as delta, downward, buyback and interest) has on non-efficiency investment by regressing panel data with STATA. At last, it studies integrate governance effect of convertible bonds and other large shareholder’ counterbalance. The results are as follows. First, descriptive statistic shows the issuance of convertible bonds has a short governance effect on non-efficiency investment. Secondly, the results of panel data infer (1) the issuance of convertible bonds has a short governance effect on overinvestment in the year of issuance, and for underinvestment samples, the issuance of convertible bonds has a governance effect in the year of issuance and the second year after issuance. (2) For underinvestment samples, delta and buyback are positively related with the degree of easing underinvestment and downward are negatively related with the degree of easing underinvestment; there is no evidence on the governance effect delta, downward and buyback has on overinvestment; there is no evidence on the governance effect interest has on non-efficiency investment. (3) Other large shareholder’ counterbalance influences the governance effect that convertible bonds have on overinvestment in the year of issuance. The greater other large shareholder’ counterbalance is, the better the governance effect that convertible bonds have on overinvestment is. There is no evidence that other large shareholder’ counterbalance influences the governance effect that convertible bonds have on underinvestment. The greater other large shareholder’ counterbalance is, the better the governance effect that Delta have on underinvestment is. There is no evidence that other large shareholder’ counterbalance influences the governance effect that downward and buyback have on underinvestment. The last part of this thesis gives some appropriate policy proposal. There is innovation in research view and content in this thesis. It enriches the research on relationship between convertible bonds and non-efficiency investment and gives some references for business practice.
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