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论文编号：	15351
作者编号：	1120201105
上传时间：	2025/6/6 15:43:01
中文题目：	机构投资者网络团体与企业数字化转型信息披露——基于夸大披露视角的研究
英文题目：	Institutional Investor Network Cliques and Enterprise Digital Transformation Information Disclosure: Research Based on the Perspective of Exaggerated Disclosure
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	机构投资者网络团体；数字化转型信息夸大披露；战略激进度；盈余管理；机构投资者异质性
英文关键字：	Institutional Investor Network Cliques; Exaggerated Disclosure of Digital Transformation Information; Strategic Aggressiveness; Earnings Management; Institutional Investor Heterogeneity
中文摘要：	当前，在数字经济背景下，面对数字化转型进程中的重重阻力，不少企业选择以夸大披露数字化转型信息的方式维持股价和声誉稳定，以使企业在激烈的市场竞争中赢得各方利益相关者的承诺和支持。这种策略性披露数字化转型信息的机会主义行为虽然能在短期内起到股价提升作用，却降低了企业风险承担水平，加剧了企业破产风险和股票回报的波动性，长此以往势必对企业价值造成严重损害。在这种情形下，被奉为理性投资者代表的机构投资者本应成为规范公司治理和信息披露的有效外部力量，对企业夸大披露数字化转型信息的行为起到抑制效果。然而，越来越多的证据表明，看似理性的机构投资者实际上并不理性，且普遍缺乏公司治理的能力与意愿，加之中国资本市场对机构投资者持股比例存在法律层面的固有限制，机构投资者能否对企业夸大披露数字化转型信息的机会主义行为起到有效规制作用，尚需在理论层面予以谨慎论证和充分释疑。 考虑到机构投资者无法发挥治理作用的根源在于其信息能力和控制权优势的缺失，而社会网络中的机构投资者恰能通过团体行动获取增量信息，在抵消投资风险的同时获得控制权优势。因此，本研究尝试以2012-2021年A股上市公司为样本研究了机构投资者网络团体对企业数字化转型信息夸大披露的影响，并对该影响过程中可能产生作用的情境因素和潜在机制进行了初步探索。经稳健性检验后的研究结果表明，机构投资者网络团体持股比例（包括机构投资者网络团体总持股比例、持股比例最高的机构投资者网络团体的持股比例和机构投资者网络团体持股比例的赫芬达尔指数）显著提升了企业数字化转型信息夸大披露水平，表明当前A股市场中的机构投资者网络团体仍然保持着“投机者”身份特征，并未按照理论预期成为耐心资本或战略投资者。后续检验表明，信息不对称水平越高，机构投资者网络团体对企业数字化转型信息夸大披露的加剧作用越强；而数字金融水平越高，网络媒体负面舆情越强，机构投资者网络团体对企业数字化转型信息夸大披露的加剧作用越弱。在此基础上，本研究进一步检验了机构投资者网络团体对公司战略激进度和企业盈余管理水平的影响，以明晰机构投资者网络团体加剧企业数字化转型信息夸大披露的可能潜在机制。 在探究机构投资者网络团体对公司战略选择的影响时，本研究发现，随着机构投资者网络团体持股比例增加，公司战略激进度显著增加，表明机构投资者网络团体能够通过向管理层施加压力，使公司战略朝着激进化的方向发展。进一步研究表明，在国有企业或经济政策不确定性感知水平越高的企业中，机构投资者网络团体对公司战略激进度的加剧作用中受到明显削弱。此外，基于公司战略激进度的分组回归结果显示，公司战略激进度水平越低，机构投资者网络团体对企业数字化转型信息夸大披露的加剧作用越强，表明机构投资者网络团体能够以提升公司战略激进度的方式对企业数字化转型信息夸大披露行为产生加剧作用。 在探究机构投资者网络团体对企业盈余管理水平的影响时，本研究发现，随着机构投资者网络团体持股比例增加，企业盈余管理水平显著增加，表明机构投资者网络团体能够通过与管理层合谋舞弊，提升企业财务信息操纵水平。进一步研究表明，机构投资者网络团体对企业盈余管理水平的加剧作用随融资约束的增加而显著增加，但随分析师关注度的增加而显著减小。同理，基于企业盈余管理水平的分组回归显示，企业盈余管理水平越低，机构投资者网络团体对企业数字化转型信息夸大披露的加剧作用越强，表明由机构投资者网络团体引起的企业盈余管理水平增加是企业夸大披露数字化转型信息的潜在诱因和关键路径。 最后，按照异质性机构投资者分类，将机构投资者网络团体内部的压力抵抗型机构投资者和压力敏感型机构投资者进行单独拆分，并对二者持股比例进行分类计算，发现无论是压力抵抗型机构投资者网络团体成员还是压力敏感型机构投资者网络团体成员均对企业数字化转型信息夸大披露产生了显著加剧作用。 本研究创新点如下：第一，揭示了机构投资者网络团体在企业数字化转型信息披露决策方面的负面角色定位，为研究数字化转型信息披露行为提供了经验参考，并为企业战略投资者选择提供了警示；第二，对机构投资者网络团体加剧企业数字化转型信息夸大披露的潜在机制进行了初步探索，在厘清变量之间内部逻辑关系的同时为中小股东识别企业数字化转型信息夸大披露行为提供了参考依据；第三，基于机构投资者网络团体成员异质性验证了机构投资者网络团体成员的决策一致性，表明机构投资者网络团体有助于实现异质性机构投资者成员立场的重构，使不同类型的机构投资者产生相似甚至相同的决策表现。
英文摘要：	Currently, in the background of digital economy, faced with numerous obstacles in the process of digital transformation, numerous enterprises choose to maintain the stability of stock price and reputation by exaggerating the disclosure of digital transformation information, so as to win the commitment and support of all stakeholders in the fierce market competition. Although such opportunistic behavior of strategic disclosure of digital transformation information can improve stock prices in the short term, it reduces corporate risk level, aggravates corporate bankruptcy risk and stock return volatility. If this trend continues, it will inevitably cause severe damage to corporate value. In this situation, institutional investors, regarded as representatives of rational investors, should have become an effective external force to regulate corporate governance and information disclosure, and inhibit the behavior of exaggerating the disclosure of digital transformation information. However, increasing evidence suggests that seemingly rational institutional investors are actually not rational, and generally lack the ability and willingness of corporate governance. Coupled with the inherent legal restrictions on institutional investors’ shareholding ratios in China's capital market, whether institutional investors can effectively regulate the opportunistic behavior of enterprises that exaggerate the disclosure of digital transformation information remains to be carefully argued and fully clarified at the theoretical level. Recognizing the fundamental reason for institutional investors’ inability to play governance roles stems from their lack of information capabilities and control advantages, institutional investors in social networks can precisely obtain incremental information through collective actions, and obtain control advantages while offsetting investment risks. Therefore, this study aims to take A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2021 as a sample to study the impact of institutional investor network cliques on exaggerating disclosure of digital transformation information, and intends to conduct a preliminary exploration of possible situational factors and potential mechanisms in the impact process. After robustness test, the results show the shareholding ratio of institutional investor network cliques (including the total shareholding ratio of institutional investor network cliques, the shareholding ratio of institutional investor network clique with the highest shareholding ratio and the Herfindahl index of institutional investor network cliques’ shareholding ratio) significantly improves exaggerated disclosure of corporate digital transformation information. It shows the institutional investor network cliques in current A-share market still maintains the identity of speculator, and does not become patient capital or strategic investors according to theoretical expectation. The subsequent test shows the higher the information asymmetry level, the stronger the exacerbating effect of institutional investor network cliques on exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information; The higher the digital finance level, the stronger the negative public opinion in online media, the weaker the exacerbating effect of institutional investor network cliques on exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information. On this basis, this study continues to investigate the impact of institutional investor network cliques on corporate strategic aggressiveness and earnings management, in order to clarify the potential mechanisms by which institutional investor network cliques exacerbate exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information. When exploring the impact of institutional investor network cliques on corporate strategic choices, this study finds strategic aggressiveness increases significantly with the increase of institutional investor network cliques’ shareholding ratio, indicating institutional investor network cliques can exert pressure on management to direct corporate strategy towards a more aggressive path. Further research shows the intensifying effect of institutional investor network cliques on strategic aggressiveness is significantly weakened in state-owned enterprises or enterprises with higher perceived level for economic policy uncertainty. In addition, the grouped regression results based on strategic aggressiveness show the lower the strategic aggressiveness, the stronger the exacerbating effect of institutional investor network cliques on exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information, indicating institutional investor network cliques can intensify exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information by enhancing corporate strategic aggressiveness. When exploring the impact of institutional investor network cliques on corporate earnings management, this study finds corporate earnings management level increases significantly with the increase of shareholding ratio of institutional investor network cliques, indicating institutional investor network cliques can improve corporate financial information manipulation level through collusion and fraud with management. Further research shows that the intensifying effect of institutional investor network cliques on corporate earnings management significantly increases with the increase of financing constraints, but significantly decreases with the increase of analyst attention. Similarly, the group regression based on corporate earnings management level shows that the lower the corporate earnings management level, the stronger the exacerbating effect of institutional investor network cliques on exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information, indicating the increase of corporate earnings management level caused by institutional investor network groups is the potential incentive and key path for enterprises to exaggerate disclosure of digital transformation information. Finally, according to the classification of heterogeneous institutional investors, the pressure-resistant institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors within the institutional investor network cliques are separately separated and the shareholding ratio of the two is classified and calculated. It is found that whether the pressure-resistant institutional investors network clique members or the pressure sensitive-institutional investors network clique members, both have significantly intensified the exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information. The innovations of this study are as follows: First, it reveals the negative role positioning of institutional investor network cliques in the corporate information disclosure decision-making in digital transformation, provides an empirical reference for the study of information disclosure behavior in digital transformation, and provides a warning for the strategic investors choice of enterprises; Second, the potential mechanism of institutional investor network cliques to intensify the exaggerated disclosure of corporate digital transformation information is initially explored, which provides a reference for minority shareholders to identify the behavior of corporate digital transformation information exaggeration disclosure while clarifying the internal logical relationship between variables. Thirdly, based on the heterogeneity of institutional investor network clique members, the coherence of institutional investor network clique members' decision-making is verified, which indicates that institutional investor network cliques help to realize the reconstruction of the positions of heterogeneous institutional investors, and make different types of institutional investors produce similar or even the same decision-making performance.
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