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论文编号：	15314
作者编号：	2120233669
上传时间：	2025/6/5 9:31:14
中文题目：	企业战略联盟与审计收费研究
英文题目：	Research on Enterprise Strategic Alliance and Audit Fees
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	战略联盟；审计收费；公司治理；研发联盟
英文关键字：	strategic alliance; audit fee; corporate governance; R&D alliance
中文摘要：	随着国内外经济形势的不断变化，企业面临的竞争不断加剧，战略联盟成为企业发展的重要战略选择之一。但同时，建立和维持战略联盟，需要企业耗费大量资源。战略联盟也会给企业带来业务复杂度、组织复杂性、协调成本和治理风险等方面的挑战。学术界对于战略联盟经济后果的研究主要集中在联盟绩效、创新行为等方面的积极影响，针对战略联盟对审计收费的影响及作用机制的研究尚未形成完整的研究体系。 本研究在理论分析的基础上，基于2016年到2023年的我国上市公司面板数据，通过多元回归的方法进行实证分析，研究发现：（1）企业战略联盟与审计收费呈显著正相关关系，且相比于国有企业，战略联盟对民营企业提高审计收费的影响更明显。本文采用PSM检验、动态检验、双重聚类检验和分样本回归等稳健性检验来保证结论有效性。（2）就作用机制的检验而言，在治理风险方面，战略联盟会加剧组织的复杂性、业务复杂度和信息不透明，潜在增加企业大股东的机会主义行为，增加审计收费；在控制风险方面，企业参与战略联盟增加了内部控制流程的设计和执行难度，导致更多的内部控制缺陷，增加审计收费。（3）在异质性分析方面，从联盟双方合作方式和联盟治理结构两个角度进行研究。联盟双方合作方式对于战略联盟对审计收费的影响具有调节作用，即相比于营销联盟，研发联盟会产生更多的审计收费。契约式联盟和股权式联盟都会增加审计收费。本研究从公司治理角度研究了战略联盟的负面影响，探讨了在公司治理和内部控制视角下战略联盟对审计收费的影响机制，还创新性地研究了联盟合作形式的调节作用。
英文摘要：	With the continuous evolution of domestic and international economic landscapes, enterprises face intensifying competition, making strategic alliances a critical strategic option for corporate development. However, the establishment and maintenance of strategic alliances demand substantial resource commitments while simultaneously exposing firms to challenges such as increased business complexity, organizational complexity, coordination costs, and governance risks. Academic research on the economic consequences of strategic alliances has predominantly focused on their positive impacts, such as alliance performance and innovation outcomes, whereas studies examining the influence of strategic alliances on audit fees and their underlying mechanisms remain fragmented in the literature. This study empirically examines the relationship between corporate strategic alliances and audit fees using panel data from Chinese listed firms (2016–2023) and multivariate regression analysis. Key findings include: (1) Strategic alliances exhibit a significant positive correlation with audit fees, with a more pronounced effect in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) compared to SOEs. Robustness checks—Propensity Score Matching (PSM), dynamic tests, double-clustering adjustments, and subsample regressions—validate the results. (2) Mechanism tests reveal two pathways: regarding governance risk, strategic alliances exacerbate organizational complexity, business complexity, and information opacity, potentially increasing opportunistic behavior by major shareholders and thereby raising audit fees; concerning control risk, participation in strategic alliances increases the difficulty of designing and executing internal control processes, resulting in more internal control deficiencies and higher audit fees. (3) In terms of heterogeneity analysis, this study examines two dimensions: cooperative modes between alliance partners and alliance governance structures. The cooperation mode demonstrates a moderating effect on strategic alliances' impact on audit fees, where R&D alliances incur higher audit fees compared to marketing alliances. Both contractual and equity-based alliances exhibit positive associations with increased audit fees. This study contributes to the field by investigating the adverse effects of strategic alliances from a corporate governance perspective. It explores the mechanisms through which strategic alliances affect audit fees under governance and control risks, while innovatively examining the moderating effects of different alliance types.
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