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论文编号：	15309
作者编号：	2120233655
上传时间：	2025/6/4 21:01:10
中文题目：	供应链创新中的合作策略优化研究
英文题目：	Research on the Optimization of Collaborative Strategies in Supply Chain Innovation
指导老师：	方磊
中文关键字：	供应链创新；收益共享；成本共担；博弈论
英文关键字：	Supply Chain Innovation; Revenue Sharing; Cost - Sharing; Game Theory
中文摘要：	摘要 在全球化竞争加剧的背景下，创新已成为供应链构建核心竞争力的战略路径。以人工智能、区块链和物联网为代表的数字技术深度重构传统供应链体系，其应用范式与价值创造机制成为学界与业界共同关注的焦点。研究表明，人工智能驱动的智能系统通过工艺参数优化、质量智能监控和能耗动态管理等技术路径，显著提升制造端的运营效率与成本控制能力，形成流程与产品等创新驱动的创新模式。创新效应通过信息流、物流与资金流的交互作用向供应链全环节渗透。实践层面，制造商承担主要创新成本与零售商“搭便车”行为形成的成本收益错配，导致双重边际效应加剧与供应链整体效率损失。 现有研究虽已关注创新对供应链的影响，但对创新行为的成本与收益协调机制仍缺乏系统性分析。构建有效的成本协调机制以激励创新投入，成为提升供应链整体效益的关键。文章聚焦供应链合作创新模式选择这一核心问题，旨在探究不同契约安排对创新意愿与收益分配的调节作用。构建制造商－零售商二级供应链博弈模型，引入创新需求弹性系数、成本分摊比例等参数，运用Stackelberg博弈与逆向归纳法解析需求不确定环境下创新投入的决策机理。借助Matlab对新能源汽车的不同发展时期下的创新发展案例进行数值仿真与分析检验，揭示成本共担、收益共享契约等合作模式对供应链创新利润的差异化影响，最终提出兼顾创新激励与效益优化的管理策略。 研究证实，供应链创新水平、产品销量与供应链内协作（成本共担、收益共享）程度成正相关。供应链内协作中收益共享的方式能提升供应链整体的利润水平。研究发现，供应链内协调合作时存在创新成本系数的阈值，当创新成本系数大于该阈值，即创新能力小于该值时，采用供应链内资金协调进行合作创新才有意义。供应链中制造商的利润水平与供应链内协作程度成正相关，但零售商存在一个利润极值点，零售商有协作商定最优比例的动机。成本共担时当制造商与零售商创新成本承担比例为2:1时，供应链总体利润水平能取到极大值。供应链为流程创新时，在成本共担或收益共享中，当协作比例在合适取值范围内时，供应链的创新水平、产品销量和制造商、零售商、供应链的整体利润水平与供应链协同程度正相关。研究为数字化转型背景下供应链协同创新机制设计提供了新的理论视角与实践启示。
英文摘要：	Abstract Under the intensifying global competition, innovation has emerged as a strategic pathway for supply chains to build core competitiveness. Digital technologies represented by artificial intelligence, blockchain, and the Internet of Things are fundamentally reconstructing traditional supply chain systems, with their application paradigms and value creation mechanisms becoming a focal point for both academia and industry. Research indicates that AI-driven intelligent systems significantly enhance operational efficiency and cost control capabilities in manufacturing through technological pathways such as process parameter optimization, intelligent quality monitoring, and dynamic energy consumption management, thereby establishing innovation-driven models encompassing process and product innovations. These innovation effects permeate all supply chain segments through the interaction of information flow, logistics, and capital flow. At the practical level, the cost-benefit mismatch arising from manufacturers bearing primary innovation costs and retailers’ free-riding behavior exacerbates double marginalization effects and leads to systemic efficiency losses in supply chains. While existing studies have examined the impact of innovation on supply chains， systematic analysis of cost-benefit coordination mechanisms for innovative behaviors remains inadequate. Establishing effective cost coordination mechanisms to incentivize innovation investment has become crucial for enhancing overall supply chain performance. This study focuses on the core issue of collaborative innovation model selection in supply chains， aiming to investigate how different contractual arrangements moderate innovation willingness and benefit distribution. We construct a manufacturer-retailer two-tier supply chain game-theoretic model， incorporating parameters such as innovation demand elasticity coefficients and cost-sharing ratios， and employ Stackelberg game theory with backward induction to analyze decision-making mechanisms for innovation investment under demand uncertainty. Through MATLAB-based numerical simulations and case analyses of innovation development across different phases in the new energy vehicle industry， we reveal the differential impacts of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts on supply chain innovation profits， ultimately proposing management strategies that balance innovation incentives and efficiency optimization. The findings demonstrate positive correlations among supply chain innovation levels, product sales volumes, and the degree of collaborative mechanisms (cost-sharing and revenue-sharing). Revenue-sharing mechanisms particularly enhance overall supply chain profitability. The study identifies an innovation cost coefficient threshold in collaborative innovation: only when the coefficient exceeds this threshold (indicating lower innovation capability) does financial coordination become meaningful. While manufacturers’ profits show a positive correlation with collaboration intensity, retailers exhibit an optimal profit extremum point, motivating them to pursue optimal coordination ratios. Specifically, a 2:1 manufacturer-retailer cost-sharing ratio maximizes total supply chain profits. For process innovation, within appropriate coordination ratio ranges, supply chain innovation levels, product sales, and overall profits for all stakeholders maintain positive correlations with collaboration intensity. This research provides new theoretical perspectives and practical implications for designing collaborative innovation mechanisms in supply chains undergoing digital transformation.
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