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论文编号：	15304
作者编号：	1120201102
上传时间：	2025/6/4 18:10:50
中文题目：	行政—经济董事对国有企业双元绿色治理的影响研究
英文题目：	The Impact of Administrative-Economic Directors on Ambidextrous Green Governance in State-Owned Enterprises
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	国有企业；行政董事；经济董事；趋职性绿色治理；趋利性绿色 治理
英文关键字：	State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs); Administrative Directors; Economic Directors; Career-Oriented Green Governance；Profit-Oriented Green Governance
中文摘要：	国有企业承担着绿色“先行者”与“示范者”的使命，其绿色治理不仅关 乎企业自身可持续发展，也是国家绿色发展战略落地的关键载体。国有企业 中，行政逻辑与经济逻辑对绿色治理具有竞争性要求，这给董事会决策提出关 键挑战。行政逻辑要求绿色治理以政策响应为核心目标，可能忽视绿色实践的 盈利性；经济逻辑要求绿色治理的财务可行性，可能忽视绿色实践的社会效 益。已有研究尚未对董事会决策如何兼顾竞争性制度需求，进而构建国有企业 的包容性绿色治理展开分析。 整合制度逻辑理论、混合组织理论与悖论理论，遵循“竞争性制度逻辑— 董事会决策动态—绿色治理双元”的逻辑路径，本研究聚焦行政—经济董事对 国有企业双元绿色治理的影响。具体而言，研究思路是：（1）由于行政逻辑与 经济逻辑的竞争性需求，作为制度代理人的行政董事与经济董事产生对绿色治 理实践的异质偏好；（2）两者的异质偏好导致董事会集体决策中的张力，表现 为冲突风险与偏移风险；（3）冲突风险与行政董事和经济董事之间的断裂带 （行政—经济董事断裂带）相关，偏移风险与行政董事和经济董事之间的权力 差距（行政—经济董事权力差距）相关；（4）董事会对两类风险的应对策略决 定国有企业的绿色治理双元性。 本研究利用 2008—2023 年国有控股上市公司样本数据进行实证检验。结合 董事选拔来源机制与激励机制，研究明确区分国有企业中的行政董事与经济董 事。研究创新性地提出国有企业“趋职性绿色治理—趋利性绿色治理”的双元 绿色治理框架与指标体系。趋职性绿色治理反映国企高管行政晋升动机驱动的 绿色治理实践；趋利性绿色治理反映国企高管经济利益动机驱动的绿色治理实 践；国有企业的绿色治理双元性表现为趋职性绿色治理和趋利性绿色治理的双 元平衡与双元协同。研究主要结论包括：（1）行政董事对趋职性绿色治理具有 显著的积极影响，而对趋利性绿色治理具有显著的消极影响；行政董事持股弱 化其对趋职性绿色治理的积极影响。相反，经济董事对趋利性绿色治理具有显 著的积极影响，对趋职性绿色治理具有显著的消极影响；经济董事的党员身份 弱化其对趋职性绿色治理的消极影响。高质量经济发展程度较高的省域中，行政董事对趋职性绿色治理的积极影响被强化，而对趋利性绿色治理的消极影响 被弱化；经济董事对趋职性绿色治理的消极影响被弱化，而对趋利性绿色治理 的积极影响被强化。重污染行业企业的行政董事对趋职性绿色治理的参与更 强，经济董事对趋职性绿色治理的消极影响被削弱。环保督察与脱贫攻坚与乡 村振兴审计后，行政董事增强对趋职性绿色治理的参与，经济董事被迫压缩对 趋利性绿色治理的参与。（2）行政—经济董事断裂带，尤其是激活的行政—经 济董事断裂带，提高趋职性绿色治理和趋利性绿色治理的双元平衡与双元协 同；然而，行政—经济董事断裂带降低趋利性绿色治理和趋利性绿色治理的参 与速度。（3）行政—经济董事权力差距对趋职性绿色治理和趋利性绿色治理的 双元平衡与双元协同具有显著的负面作用；独立董事参与度越强，行政—经济 董事权力差距的负面作用越强；相比地方国企，央企中行政—经济董事权力差 距的负面作用更强。 论文的主要创新之处在于：第一，通过董事会断裂带与权力动态，揭示行 政董事与经济董事的共同绿色治理效应。突破聚焦单一主体影响效应的研究局 限，本研究进一步聚焦董事会集体决策的内部动态，包括冲突风险与偏移风险 的表现，以及应对风险的具体策略与董事间博弈过程等，致力于打开国有企业 董事会决策的“黑箱”。本研究通过绿色治理双元性评估绿色治理决策结果， 以此阐明行政董事与经济董事的综合影响。第二，创建国有绿色治理双元性分 析框架，扩展国有企业兼容多重绿色责任的具体策略。本研究将国有企业绿色 治理区分为两种矛盾又相关的类型，包括趋职性绿色治理与趋利性绿色治理。 应用双元性框架，提出趋职性绿色治理与趋利性绿色治理的双元平衡与双元协 同，以此讨论国有企业兼顾不同类型绿色责任的策略。第三，结合董事的选拔 来源机制与激励机制两个维度，改进行政董事与经济董事的界定标准。
英文摘要：	State-owned enterprises (SOEs) bear the dual mission of serving as "pioneers" and "exemplars" in green initiatives. Their green governance is not only critical to their own sustainable development but also serves as a key vehicle for implementing governmental green development strategies. Within SOEs, administrative logic and economic logic impose competing demands on green governance, posing critical challenges to board decision-making. Administrative logic prioritizes policy responsiveness as the core objective of green governance, potentially neglecting the profitability of green practices; economic logic emphasizes the financial feasibility of green governance, potentially overlooking the social benefits of green practices. Existing research has yet to analyze how board decision-making reconciles these competing institutional demands to construct inclusive green governance in SOEs. Integrating institutional logic theory, hybrid organization theory, and paradox theory, and following the logic of "competitive institutional logics → board decisionmaking dynamics → ambidextrous green governance," this study focuses on the impact of administrative-economic directors on the ambidextrous green governance of stateowned enterprises. Specifically, this study proposes that: (1) Due to the competitive demands of administrative logic and economic logic, administrative directors and economic directors act as institutional agents and develop heterogeneous preferences toward green governance practices; (2) Their heterogeneous preferences lead to tensions in board collective decision-making, manifested as conflict risk and deviation risk; (3) Conflict risk is associated with faultlines between administrative directors and economic directors (administrative-economic director faultlines), while deviation risk is related to power gap between administrative directors and economic directors (administrative-economic director power gap); (4) The board’s strategies for addressing the two risks determine the ambidexterity of green governance in stateowned enterprises. This study empirically tests the hypotheses using a sample of state-controlled listed companies in China from 2008 to 2023. By combining director selection mechanisms and incentive systems, the research explicitly distinguishes administrative directors from economic directors in state-owned enterprises. The study innovatively proposes an ambidextrous green governance framework and indicator system for stateowned enterprises, termed " Career-Oriented Green Governance (COGG) VS ProfitOriented Green Governance (POGG)." COGG reflects green governance practices driven by the administrative promotion motivations of state-owned enterprise executives, while POGG reflects practices driven by economic interest motivations. The ambidexterity of green governance in state-owned enterprises is reflected in the balance and combination between COGG and POGG. The research findings include: (1) Administrative directors have a significant positive effect on COGG but a significant negative effect on POGG; shareholding by administrative directors weakens their positive effect on COGG. In contrast, economic directors have a significant positive effect on POGG but a significant negative effect on COGG; the communist party membership of economic directors mitigates their negative effect on COGG. In provinces with higher-quality economic development levels, the positive impact of administrative directors on COGG is strengthened, while their negative impact on POGG is weakened; the negative impact of economic directors on COGG is weakened, while their positive impact on POGG is strengthened. In heavily polluting industries, administrative directors show stronger participation in COGG, while economic directors' negative impact on COGG is reduced. After environmental inspections and poverty alleviation/rural revitalization audits, administrative directors enhance their participation in COGG, while economic directors are forced to reduce their participation in POGG. (2) Administrative-economic director faultlines, particularly activated administrative-economic director faultlines, enhance the ambidexterity between COGG and POGG; however, administrative-economic director faultlines reduce the engagement pace of COGG and POGG. (3) Administrative-economic director power gap has a significant negative effect on the ambidexterity between COGG and POGG; greater independent director involvement strengthens the negative effect of administrative-economic director power gap; compared to local state-owned enterprises, the negative effect of administrative-economic director power gap is stronger in central state-owned enterprises. The main innovations of this study are: First, by analyzing board faultlines and power dynamics, it reveals the co-governance effects of administrative directors and economic directors. Breaking through the research limitations of focusing on singlesubject influence effects, this study further focuses on internal dynamics of board shared decision-making, including manifestations of conflict risks and deviation risks, as well as specific risk-coping strategies and inter-director gaming processes, aiming to open the "black box" of state-owned enterprise board decision-making. This study evaluates green governance decision outcomes through ambidexterous green governance framework, thereby clarifying the comprehensive effects of administrative directors and economic directors. Second, proposing an ambidexterous green governance analysis framework for state-owned enterprises, expanding specific strategies for SOEs to reconcile multiple green responsibilities. This study divides SOE green governance into two contradictory yet related types: COGG and POGG. Applying the ambidexterity framework, it proposes ambidexterous balance and ambidexterous combination between COGG and POGG to discuss SOE strategies for concerning different types of green responsibilities. Third, improving the definition criteria of administrative directors and economic directors by combining two dimensions: directors' selection source mechanisms and incentive mechanisms.
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