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论文编号：	1508
作者编号：	2120071970
上传时间：	2009/6/22 12:47:05
中文题目：	中国上市公司管理层持股对股利政
英文题目：	An Empirical Research of the I
指导老师：	刘建
中文关键字：	代理成本;股利政策;管理层持股;<
英文关键字：	Agency Costs;Dividend Policy;M
中文摘要：	2006年，中国证监会出台了《上市公司股权激励规范意见（试行）》、《国有控股上市公司（境外）实施股权激励试行办法》、《国有控股上市公司（境内）实施股权激励试行办法》等一系列文件，标志着股权激励在国内资本市场得到监管机构的正式认可。虽然管理层持股在股票市场成立之初便一直存在，但由于中国股票市场上国有控股公司所占份额太大，直到国有控股上市公司股权激励的解禁这一问题才被学界广泛重视。本文从股权激励后管理层派发红利倾向变化的角度入手，研究管理层持股比例对现金股利支付政策的影响。 本文在文献回顾中重点研究现金股利政策的代理理论和管理层持股理论，认为高股利支付政策和管理层持股制度都能带来代理成本的降低。而管理层“经济人”理性的存在，使代理成本降低到某一水平时，不能继续下降，稳定在这一较低水平。即代理成本较低时，如果增大管理层持股比例，股东对高股利支付政策依赖降低，代理成本稳定在这一水平。 为了验证这一假设，本文以沪深两市2005年到2007年的2008组数据为研究样本，采用最小二乘估计和差异性检验的方法进行实证研究。在全样本实证研究后，为了研究各年度差别，本文以年度分组进行了实证研究；为了研究不同代理成本水平下管理层持股与现金股利支付政策的关系，本文以成长性为切入点，进行了成长性分组下的实证研究。 理论分析和实证研究后，本文得出结论：中国上市公司数据总体上支持管理层持股对现金股利支付率的降低作用，并且这种降低作用从2005年到2007年逐年增强，表明中国上市公司代理成本问题逐年好转；成长性分组下的实证结果表明中国上市公司成长性较高代理成本较低的公司中，代理成本因具有更强的稳定性，管理层持股对现金股利支付率的降低作用更为强烈。 虽然本文的定性分析部分是基于已有的公司理论，但实证结果也只是对样本状况的机械整理和反映，受当前上市公司信息披露状况的限制。但本文对实际情况的反映基本上客观准确，最后得出结论，提出建议。
英文摘要：	In 2006, China’s Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated a series of documents such as “Norms of stock rights incentive in listed companies”,“The pilot scheme of stock rights incentive in state-controlling listed companies (outside)”,“The pilot scheme of stock rights incentive in state-controlling listed companies (inside)”, indicating that the stock rights incentive in the domestic capital market met with Regulatory Body’s approbation. Although Managerial Ownership has been existed since when the stock market was set up, it didn’t receive much attention until the Managerial Ownership was approval in state-controlling companies because state-controlling companies represent such a significant proportion of China’s stock market. In this paper, we will research how the tendency of dividend changes when the managers get stock rights incentive. We focused on Agency Cost Theory in Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership Theory in the literature review and found they can both reduce the Agency Costs. When the Agency Costs is reduced to a low level, it will stay steady because of the existence of economic-man model of managers, which means that when the Agency Costs is low enough, if we give more shares to managers, the rate of cash dividend payment will fall. To prove this assumption, this paper promotes an empirical study, taking the 2008 companies’financial data from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from the year 2005 to 2007 as sample. In order to study the differences between each of the years, we conducted an annual packet of empirical research; In order to study the differences between the relationship of management share-holding and rate of cash dividend payment under different agency costs levels, we conducted an agency costs packet of empirical research. After the theoretical analysis and empirical study, this paper concludes: China's listed companies’data support the assumption that the rate of cash dividend payment gets lower when the rate of Managerial Ownership gets higher. The proven gets higher from 2005 to 2007. It also shows that in a high growth company, the agency costs has been reduced to a low enough level and will stay stable, the substitution effect between Managerial Ownership and high rate of cash dividend payment will get stronger than low growth company. Although the section of theory analysis are based on the theory of company, the empirical research is just be summarized automatically and reflected, and it is restricted by the corporate information disclosure of listed companies. The article is trying its best to reduce the disadvantage which comes from various noises. In addition, the actuality is correctly imaged and it draws a conclusion. At last the author puts forth some suggestion in order to embody the practice sense.
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