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论文编号：	14946
作者编号：	1120201071
上传时间：	2024/12/6 17:41:23
中文题目：	竞合关系下平台自有品牌的引入与品牌商的应对策略研究
英文题目：	Strategies for Platform Private Label Introduction and Brand Manufacturer Response in Co-opetition Relationship
指导老师：	李勇建
中文关键字：	平台自有品牌；竞合关系；引入决策；应对策略；博弈模型
英文关键字：	Platform private label; coopetition relationship; introduction decision; response strategy; game model
中文摘要：	在线购物交易量的井喷式增长促使了各大电商平台纷纷引入自有品牌，使得平台与品牌商之间的关系从传统代理或者转售的单向合作（“裁判员”）转变为双向竞合（“裁判员+运动员”）。在复杂的竞合关系和多样的品牌策略下，平台在做引入自有品牌决策之前该权衡哪些关键因素、品牌商面对入侵该如何借助平台的服务来“借力打力”，这一系列新环境下的运营问题亟待被解决。鉴于此，本文聚焦于“竞合关系下平台自有品牌的引入与品牌商的应对策略研究”，按照事前、事后的逻辑顺序，从平台的引入决策出发，逐步扩展到品牌商的应对措施，最终探讨平台与品牌商之间的策略互动，涉及产品类别选择、竞合时机决策、差异化与渠道选择、以及赞助广告决策等四个方面的研究内容。具体的研究内容与结论总结如下： 首先，本文研究了平台自有品牌引入与产品类别选择问题。将产品类别按照竞争程度分为集中类别和分散类别，构建包含平台和品牌商的博弈模型，探讨产品竞争下平台引入自有品牌的条件，并从经济利润和总需求的角度，分析引入自有品牌时的最优产品类别选择差异。研究表明：不管是集中类别还是分散类别，自有品牌基础需求水平和佣金率是影响平台自有品牌引入决策的关键因素。此外，在集中类别下，平台引入自有品牌伤害了品牌商；但在分散类别下，当自有品牌基础需求水平较大、或者基础需求水平较小且交叉价格敏感性较小时，平台引入自有品牌能够使双方都获益。平台在集中类别下引入自有品牌比在分散类别下引入获得更高的利润；相反在分散类别下引入比在集中类别更有利于品类总需求的扩大。 其次，本文研究了平台自有品牌引入时机与竞合策略问题。将消费者的等待行为嵌入平台自有品牌引入的过程，比较了完全合作、前期竞合、后期竞合、以及完全竞合四种策略，探讨了垂直产品竞争与水平企业合作的相互作用如何影响企业利润与消费者剩余。研究表明：平台引入的自有品牌质量水平对终端市场产品的竞争分布有显著影响。同时，自有品牌产品引入的时机取决于自有品牌质量和消费者耐心的共同作用。在低质量自有品牌引入下，随着消费者耐心程度增加，平台的最优策略应该从前期竞合转向后期竞合。此外，当前期竞合策略占优时，平台总是以牺牲消费者剩余为代价获益；而当后期竞合策略占优时，平台和消费者在低质量自有品牌条件下可以实现双赢。 第三，本文研究了平台自有品牌存在下品牌商差异化与渠道选择问题。在品牌商通过平台向消费者提供原有的高质量产品和平台销售自有品牌的基础情形下，考虑了品牌商应对平台自有品牌的两种潜在策略：在平台渠道上推出新的质量差异产品，或者在独家渠道上推出新的质量差异产品。研究表明：新产品引入带来的扩张效应和蚕食效应的相互作用可能导致不应对的基础情景更有利于品牌商，而应对反而有利于平台。对品牌商来说，当扩张效应较大、且质量差异较小时，通过平台渠道引入新产品可能比通过独家渠道引入新产品更有利。此外，当扩张效应较大时，通过平台渠道实施应对可能实现品牌商和平台的双赢。 最后，本文研究了平台自有品牌披露下品牌商赞助广告策略。针对平台对自有品牌的优先展示偏好和产品披露，考察了品牌商赞助广告的购买决策及其对平台披露产品动机的影响。通过捕捉平台的位置优势和品牌商的广告优势，对比分析了平台披露与否和品牌商购买与否的四种情景。研究表明：当经验型消费者比例和广告优势都较大时，平台甚至可能补贴品牌商以促使其购买赞助广告。这主要是由平台对自有品牌自我偏好的位置优势和品牌商购买赞助的广告优势共同作用的结果。无论品牌商是否购买赞助广告，平台的最优策略都是隐藏自有品牌。但是品牌商在平台披露自有品牌下比隐藏下能更积极购买赞助广告。 综上所述，本文首先将产品类别按照竞争程度划分为集中和分散两类，研究了自有品牌引入决策与产品类别内生决策之间的关联性，填补了现有文献的空白。其次，本文将消费者的策略性行为嵌入平台与品牌商的竞合策略选择中，从时间维度探讨了平台在内生质量差异下引入自有品牌的最佳时机。进一步，本文首次将品牌商的新差异化产品引入与渠道选择相结合，作为应对平台自有品牌的策略，揭示了市场扩张效应、质量差异及佣金率等因素在应对策略中的关键作用。最后，从平台和品牌商策略互动的视角，分析了平台自有品牌的位置优势与品牌商的广告优势间的互动关系，探讨了品牌商赞助广告的购买决策及其对平台自有品牌披露动机的影响。
英文摘要：	The explosive growth in online shopping transactions has prompted e-commerce platforms to introduce private labels, transforming the relationship between platforms and brand manufacturers from traditional one-way cooperation as agents or resellers (“referee”) to two-way coopetition (“referee + player”). Under this complex coopetition relationship and diverse brand strategies, key issues arise: What critical factors should platforms weigh before introducing private labels, and how can brand manufacturers leverage platform services to turn challenges into opportunities? These new operational issues in a rapidly evolving environment need to be solved urgently. Given this, this dissertation focuses on “Strategies for Platform Private Label Introduction and Brand Manufacturer Response in Co-opetition Relationship”. Following a logical progression from pre-decision to post-decision stages, the study begins with the platform’s decision to introduce private labels, then extends to brand manufacturers’ response strategies, and ultimately explores the interaction strategies between platforms and brand manufacturers. It involves four main aspects: Product category selection, coopetition timing decisions, differentiation and channel selection, and sponsored advertising decisions. The specific research content and conclusions are summarized as follows: First, this dissertation studies the introduction of platform private label and product category selection. Product categories are divided into the centralized category and the decentralized category based on the competitive landscape, and a game model involving a platform and a brand manufacturer is established to explore under what conditions a platform introduces private labels in product competition. From the perspectives of economic profit and total demand, this dissertation analyzes the difference in optimal product category selection when introducing private labels. The findings indicate that, regardless of centralized or decentralized category, the base demand level of private label and the cross-price sensitivity are critical factors affecting the platform’s decision to introduce private labels. In the centralized category, the introduction of private labels by the platform harms brand manufacturers. However, in the decentralized category, when the base demand level of private label is high, or when it is low and the cross-price sensitivity is low, the introduction of private labels can benefit both the platform and the brand manufacturer. The platform gains higher profits from introducing private labels in the centralized category than in the decentralized one. Conversely, introducing private labels in the decentralized category is more conducive to expanding total demand for the category than in the centralized category. Second, this dissertation investigates the introduction timing of platform private label and coopetition strategy. By embedding consumers’ waiting behavior into the process of private label introduction by the platform, four strategies—full cooperation, cooperation followed by coopetition, coopetition followed by cooperation, and full coopetition—are compared. The study examines how the interaction between vertical product competition and horizontal firm cooperation impacts the firms’ profit and consumer surplus. The findings indicate that the quality level of the platform’s private label significantly affects the competitive landscape of products in the end market. Meanwhile, the timing of private label introduction depends on the combined effects of private label quality and consumer patience. Under the introduction of low-quality private labels, as consumer patience increases, the platform’s optimal strategy should shift from cooperation followed by coopetition to coopetition followed by cooperation. Furthermore, when the cooperation followed by coopetition strategy is dominant, the platform benefits at the expense of consumer surplus; however, when the coopetition followed by cooperation strategy prevails, both the platform and consumers can achieve a win-win outcome under the conditions of low-quality private label. Third, this dissertation examines differentiation and channel selection in the presence of a platform’s private label. Under the basic scenario where the brand manufacturer offers original high-quality products through the platform while the platform sells its private label, two potential response strategies for the brand manufacturer are considered: Launching a new differentiated product either through the platform channel or through an exclusive channel. The findings indicate that the interplay between the expansion effect and the cannibalization effect of new product introduction may result in the basic scenario of non-response being more favorable for the brand manufacturer, while the response strategies benefit the platform. For the brand manufacturer, when the expansion effect is large and the quality differentiation is small, launching a new product through the platform channel may be more advantageous than doing so through an exclusive channel. Furthermore, when the expansion effect is large, responding through the platform channel may create a win-win situation for both the brand manufacturer and the platform. Finally, this dissertation explores sponsored advertising in the presence of a platform’s private label disclosure. In view of the platform’s self-interest preference for prioritizing private labels in product displays and product disclosure, this dissertation examines the purchase decision of sponsored advertising and its influence on the platform’s motivation for product disclosure. By capturing the platform’s position advantage and the brand manufacturer’s advertising advantage, four scenarios of whether the platform discloses or hides product and whether the brand manufacturer purchases or refrains from buying sponsored advertising are compared and analyzed. The findings indicate that when the fraction of sophisticated consumers and the advertising advantage are both large, the platform may even subsidize the brand manufacturer to incentivize the purchase of sponsored advertising. This outcome is driven by the combined effect of the platform’s position advantage of self-preference for private labels and the brand manufacturer’s advertising advantage. Regardless of whether the brand manufacturer purchases sponsored advertising, the platform’s optimal strategy is to hide private labels. However, disclosing private labels is more likely to encourage the brand manufacturer to purchase sponsored advertising than hiding it. In summary, this dissertation first classifies product categories into two types—centralized and decentralized—based on competitive modes. It investigates the relationship between private label introduction decisions and endogenous category selections, addressing gaps in the existing literature. Second, by incorporating consumers’ strategic behavior into the platform-manufacturer co-opetition model, this dissertation explores the optimal timing for the platform to introduce private labels under endogenous quality differentiation. Additionally, this dissertation is the first to combine the introduction of new differentiated products by manufacturers with channel selection as a strategy to counter platform private labels, highlighting the key roles of market expansion effects, quality differences, and commission rates. Finally, from the perspective of strategic interaction between the platform and the brand manufacturer, the dissertation analyzes the interplay between a platform’s position advantage for private labels and a brand manufacturer’s advertising advantage, examining how the brand manufacturer’s sponsored advertising decisions influence the platform’s motivation for the private label disclosure.
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