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论文编号：	14908
作者编号：	1120201106
上传时间：	2024/12/6 10:50:42
中文题目：	非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Non-controlling Major Shareholder on Corporate ESG Decoupling
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	非控股大股东；ESG脱耦；积极发声；退出威胁；公司治理
英文关键字：	non-controlling major shareholder; ESG decoupling; active voice; exit threat; corporate governance
中文摘要：	“双碳”目标提出后，将环境、社会和公司治理（ESG）因素纳入投资考量已经成为资本市场的共识。为了应对不断上升的制度压力以及满足各方利益相关者的诉求，越来越多的企业开始加大ESG投入，重视ESG实践，并加强ESG信息披露力度。通常情况下，企业对外披露的ESG信息应该真实且准确地反映企业ESG表现，但实务界ESG“言行不一”的现象却屡见不鲜。学者们将该现象称为ESG“脱耦”，并认为ESG脱耦是企业内部人员为了满足组织合法性要求而使用的一种印象管理手段。研究表明，企业ESG脱耦不仅迷惑了普通消费者，同时也干扰了投资人以及审计师的判断，进而会对企业价值产生不利影响。因此，该如何缓解企业ESG脱耦现象、提高ESG信息披露的准确性是目前ESG领域亟待解决的重要议题。 良好的公司治理是企业实现可持续发展的制度保证，作为公司治理机制的基础和核心，股权结构是企业发展中最为重要的一项制度安排，对公司治理效率能够产生根本性的影响。近年来，随着资本市场的迅速发展和壮大，以机构投资者为代表的非控股大股东群体逐渐崛起，成为参与公司治理的重要力量。根据现有相关文献，非控股大股东作为持有企业较多股权的利益主体，既有动机也有能力积极参与公司治理，不仅可以对管理层实施有效监督，抑制管理层的私利行为，而且能与控股股东形成相互掣肘，有效抑制上市公司中的双重委托代理冲突。由此可见，非控股大股东在我国上市公司中发挥着不可忽视的作用，能够对企业的经营决策产生重要影响。基于此，在当前我国倡导“负责任投资”、“ESG投资”理念的背景下，面对企业误导投资者的ESG脱耦问题，作为企业重要利益相关者和ESG脱耦所引致风险及不良后果主要承担主体的非控股大股东该如何应对呢？这是本文重点关注的问题。 本文在现有研究的基础上，结合委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和利益相关者理论，以2009至2022年在沪深两市上市的A股上市公司作为研究样本，采用文献研究法、演绎推理法和实证分析法相结合的研究方法，深度探索了非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的影响。随后，本文分别从非控股大股东积极发声和退出威胁两条路径出发，探究了非控股大股东影响企业ESG脱耦的作用机制。接着，本文从股权集中度、内部控制、媒体关注、分析师关注、产权性质和行业性质这六个方面考察了不同的内外部治理情境下非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的差异化影响，从而明晰非控股大股东影响企业ESG脱耦的边界条件。最后，本文还从企业股价崩盘风险和企业价值两个角度进一步探索了非控股大股东通过影响企业ESG脱耦会给企业带来怎样的经济后果。 本文的主要研究结论如下： 第一，非控股大股东能够有效抑制企业ESG脱耦。进一步研究发现，不同类型的非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的影响存在差异，按持股主体划分，机构投资者对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用最大，一般法人次之，自然人最小；按持股时限划分，长期战略型大股东对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用更显著，而短期逐利型大股东对企业ESG脱耦的影响较弱。此外，区分ESG脱耦分项指标发现，非控股大股东对环境责任脱耦、社会责任脱耦和公司治理脱耦三项内容均具有显著的抑制作用，其中，对公司治理脱耦的抑制作用最为明显；相比于企业ESG“寡言多行”，非控股大股东对企业ESG“多言寡行”的抑制作用更明显。 第二，非控股大股东积极发声和退出威胁两种治理方式均可以有效抑制企业ESG脱耦，且后者对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用更明显。在进一步分析中，本文发现不同类型的非控股大股东积极发声和退出威胁对企业ESG脱耦的影响也不同，按持股主体划分，机构投资者积极发声和退出威胁对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用最大，一般法人次之，自然人最小；按持股时限划分，长期战略型大股东积极发声和退出威胁对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用更显著，而短期逐利型大股东积极发声和退出威胁对企业ESG脱耦的影响较弱。此外，区分ESG脱耦分项指标发现，非控股大股东积极发声和退出威胁对企业环境责任脱耦、社会责任脱耦以及公司治理脱耦均具有显著的抑制作用，其中，对公司治理脱耦的抑制作用最为明显；相比于企业ESG“寡言多行”，非控股大股东积极发声和退出威胁对企业ESG“多言寡行”的抑制作用更为明显。 第三，非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用在不同的内外部治理情境下存在差异。基于企业内部治理情境的差异研究发现，相比控股股东绝对控股的企业，非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用在控股股东非绝对控股的企业中更加明显；相比内部控制较好的企业，非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用在内部控制较差的企业中更加明显。基于企业外部治理情境的差异研究发现，媒体关注强化了非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用；分析师关注也强化了非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用。基于企业产权和行业异质性研究发现，非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的抑制作用在非国有企业和非重污染型企业中更加显著。 第四，非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的治理作用具有正向价值效应。非控股大股东通过抑制企业ESG脱耦有效缓解了企业股价崩盘风险、提升了企业价值。 本文的创新之处体现在如下三个方面：第一，本文明确区分ESG信息披露和ESG实际表现两个维度，构建ESG脱耦评价指标，并进一步根据ESG脱耦的三项内容和两种表现形式构建ESG脱耦分项指标，从而为建设完善的ESG评价体系提供了有益参考；第二，本文从治理观和合谋观两个视角，分别讨论了非控股大股东对企业ESG脱耦的影响效果，从而为学术界关于非控股大股东是发挥治理效应还是合谋效应的争论提供了新的经验证据；第三，本文基于企业在ESG责任履行中“言行不一”的脱耦现象，考察了非控股大股东对于企业ESG脱耦的影响效果，并深入探究了积极发声和退出威胁两种不同的治理方式对于ESG脱耦的作用差异，从而为企业进一步完善非控股大股东的治理机制提供了理论依据。
英文摘要：	After the "dual carbon" goal was proposed, incorporating environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) factors into investment considerations has become the consensus of the capital market. In order to cope with the rising institutional pressure and meet the demands of various stakeholders, more and more enterprises have begun to increase ESG investment, pay attention to ESG practice, and strengthen ESG information disclosure. Under normal circumstances, the ESG information disclosed by the enterprise should truly and accurately reflect the ESG performance of enterprises, but the phenomenon of "inconsistent words and deeds" of ESG in practice is not uncommon. Scholars call this phenomenon "ESG decoupling", and believe that ESG decoupling is an impression management method used by enterprise insiders to satisfy the requirements of organizational legitimacy. Research shows that ESG decoupling not only confuses ordinary consumers, but also interferes with the judgment of investors and auditors, which will adversely affect the value of enterprises. Therefore, how to alleviate the ESG decoupling and improve the accuracy of ESG information disclosure is an important issue to be solved urgently in the ESG field. Good corporate governance is the institutional guarantee for enterprises to achieve sustainable development. As the foundation and core of corporate governance mechanism, equity structure is the most important institutional arrangement in the development of the enterprise, and it can have a fundamental impact on the efficiency of corporate governance. In recent years, with the rapid development and expansion of the capital market, non-controlling major shareholders represented by institutional investors have gradually risen and become an important force participating in corporate governance. According to the existing relevant literature, non -controlling major shareholders, as the main interest subject holding a large number of equity in the enterprise, have both motivation and ability to actively participate in corporate governance, which can not only effectively supervise the management and restrain the private interests of the management, but also form mutual constraints with controlling shareholders and effectively inhibit the dual principal-agent conflicts in listed companies. It can be seen that non-controlling major shareholders play an important role in listed companies, and can have an important impact on the business decisions of the enterprise. Based on this, in the current context of advocating the concepts of "responsible investment" and "ESG investment" in China, faced with the problem of ESG decoupling in which enterprises mislead investors, how should the non-controlling major shareholders, as important stakeholders of enterprises and the main subjects bearing the risks and adverse consequences caused by ESG decoupling, deal with it? This is the focus of this dissertation. Based on the existing research, this dissertation combines the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and stakeholder theory, and takes A-share listed companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2022 as research samples. By using the research methods of literature research, deductive reasoning and empirical analysis, this dissertation deeply explores the influence of non-controlling major shareholders on enterprise ESG decoupling. Then, from the two paths of non-controlling major shareholders' active voice and exit threat, this dissertation explores the mechanism of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling. Then, this dissertation examines the differentiated impact of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling under different internal and external governance environments from six aspects: ownership concentration, internal control, media attention, analyst attention, property rights nature and industry nature, so as to clarify the boundary conditions of non-controlling major shareholders' impact on ESG decoupling. Finally, this dissertation further explores the economic consequences that non-controlling major shareholders will bring to enterprises by influencing ESG decoupling from the perspectives of stock price crash risk and corporate value. The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: First, non-controlling major shareholders can effectively inhibit ESG decoupling. Further research shows that different types of non-controlling major shareholders have different impacts on ESG decoupling. According to the main body of shareholding, institutional investors major shareholders have the greatest inhibitory effect on ESG decoupling, followed by general corporate major shareholders, and natural persons major shareholders have the least. According to the shareholding period, long-term strategic major shareholders have more significant inhibition effect on ESG decoupling, while short-term profit-seeking major shareholders have a weaker effect on ESG decoupling. In addition, the sub-index of ESG decoupling shows that non-controlling major shareholders have significant inhibition on environmental responsibility decoupling, social responsibility decoupling and corporate governance decoupling, among which the inhibition on corporate governance decoupling is the most obvious. Compared with the enterprise ESG "did more than talked", the non-controlling major shareholders have a more obvious inhibitory effect on the enterprise ESG "talked more than did". Second, non-controlling major shareholders' active voice and exit threat can both effectively alleviate the problem of enterprise ESG decoupling, and the latter has a more obvious inhibition on enterprise ESG decoupling. In the further analysis, this dissertation finds that different types of non-controlling major shareholders' active voice and exit threat have different impacts on ESG decoupling. According to the main body of shareholding, institutional investors' active voice and exit threat have the most inhibiting effect on ESG decoupling, followed by general corporate major shareholders, and natural persons major shareholders have the least. According to shareholding period, long-term strategic major shareholders' active voice and exit threat have more significant inhibiting effect on ESG decoupling, while short-term profit-seeking major shareholders' active voice and exit threat have a weaker effect on ESG decoupling. In addition, by distinguishing the sub-indexes of ESG decoupling, it is found that the active voice and exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders have significant inhibitory effects on the decoupling of corporate environmental responsibility, social responsibility and corporate governance, among which the inhibition effect on corporate governance decoupling is the most obvious. Compared with enterprise ESG's "did more than talked", non-controlling major shareholders' active voice and exit threat have a more obvious inhibitory effect on enterprise ESG's "talked more than did". Third, the inhibition effect of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling is different under different internal and external governance environments. Based on the differences in the internal governance environment of enterprises, it is found that the inhibition of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling is more obvious in the enterprises with non-absolute controlling shareholders than in the enterprises with absolute controlling shareholders. Compared with the enterprises with better internal control, the inhibition effect of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling is more obvious in the enterprises with poor internal control. Based on the difference of external governance environment, it is found that media attention strengthens the inhibition effect of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling, analysts attention strengthens the inhibition effect of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling. Based on the property rights and industry nature of enterprises, it is found that the inhibition of non-controlling major shareholders on enterprise ESG decoupling is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises and non-heavy polluting enterprises. Fourth, non-controlling major shareholders have a positive value effect on governance of ESG decoupling. Non-controlling major shareholders significantly reduce the risk of stock price collapse, and enhance corporate value by restraining corporate ESG decoupling. Compared with previous studies, the innovation of this dissertation is reflected in the following three aspects: First, this dissertation clearly distinguishes the two dimensions of ESG information disclosure and ESG actual performance, constructs ESG decoupling evaluation indicators, and further constructed an ESG decoupling sub-index according to the three contents and two manifestations of ESG decoupling. It provides a useful reference for constructing a perfect ESG evaluation system. Second, this dissertation discusses the effect of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling from two perspectives of governance and collusion, thus providing new empirical evidence for the academic debate on whether non-controlling major shareholders exert governance effect or collusion effect. Third, based on the decoupling phenomenon of inconsistency between words and deeds in the fulfillment of ESG responsibilities, this dissertation examines the impact of non-controlling major shareholders on ESG decoupling of enterprises, and further explores the differences between the two different governance modes of positive voice and exit threat on ESG decoupling, so as to provide a theoretical basis for enterprises to further improve the governance mechanism of non-controlling major shareholders.
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