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论文编号：	14838
作者编号：	1120180955
上传时间：	2024/6/25 17:20:56
中文题目：	并购贷款对上市公司并购绩效的影响及其机制研究
英文题目：	Study on Impact of Buyout Loan on M&A Performance of Listed Companies and Its Mechanisms
指导老师：	覃家琦
中文关键字：	并购贷款；全要素生产率；内部投资挤出；并购行为
英文关键字：	Buyout Loan; Total Factor Productivity; crowding-out effect on internal investment; M&A
中文摘要：	自并购重组市场化改革以来，并购市场似乎存在一个悖论：一方面，国家层面高度重视并购重组对经济改革方向、速度和质量的推动作用；而另一方面，金融监管体系又对并购金融服务施加着严格管制，尤其是颇为严格的银行信贷管制。1996年《贷款通则》禁止银行贷款用于权益性投资。直到2008年《商业银行并购贷款风险管理指引》发布，商业银行体系才确立了唯一合法的权益投资信贷产品：并购贷款，但同时也对并购贷款的发放和使用做出了严格限制。2015年管制有所放松，但与日益庞大的市场需求相比，并购贷款供给依然存在短板。现有对中国并购贷款的研究集中于从银行风险管理视角展开案例分析或业务探讨，相对缺乏从公司金融角度开展的实证研究。由于国外研究中涉及的并购贷款与中国并购贷款在业务开展上存在较多差别，其结论在中国市场的适用性未经验证。有鉴于此，本文以中国并购贷款作为研究对象，采用实证方法依次探讨这样两个问题：与没有并购贷款支持的并购相比，并购贷款支持的并购是否有显著不同的并购绩效？如果有，这种影响的机制是什么？ 对并购绩效的比较需要基于统一的评价标准。本文通过变系数随机前沿模型的非参数估计方法将公司全要素生产率分解为代表资本要素质量改善的资本嵌入型全要素生产率、代表劳动要素质量改善的劳动嵌入型全要素生产率和代表技术进步的要素无关型全要素生产率，并以此作为并购绩效的评价依据。 基于A股上市公司的并购重组数据和手工搜集的并购贷款公告数据，本文先后研究了并购贷款对并购绩效的影响、并购贷款影响并购绩效的外部投资即并购行为机制和内部投资机制。通过上述研究得到如下发现： 第一，与没有并购贷款支持的并购相比，有并购贷款支持的并购在事后具有更高的要素无关型全要素生产率和资本嵌入型全要素生产率。由于并购贷款在交易对价中的占比上限为60%且融资主体不一定是上市公司本身，因此，本文检验了其他融资来源和融资主体的混杂效应；在内生性分析中，本文考虑了银行的选择效应，样本自选择偏差和遗漏变量相对强度的影响；同时，本文还检验了变量度量方式和样本期间对结果的影响。上述稳健性检验的结果中，并购贷款对并购绩效的影响依然成立。对并购贷款特征的异质性分析表明，当并购不具有过桥资金属性、是银团贷款、在交易中占比更大、来自更具竞争性的银行市场时，其对要素无关型全要素生产率和资本嵌入型全要素生产率的作用更强。 第二，本文检验了并购贷款作用于并购绩效的两个机制：外部投资即并购行为机制和内部投资机制。对外部投资即并购行为机制的研究发现，与没有并购贷款支持的公司相比，有并购贷款支持的并购更可能是相关并购、具有更低的并购溢价和更高的整合效率，并购贷款通过影响上述并购行为提高公司的要素无关型全要素生产率和资本嵌入型全要素生产率。这个结果在考虑管理能力和并购经验的混杂效应、替换并购动机、并购溢价和整合效率度量方式、考虑样本选择偏差和敏感性分析后依然成立。对并购贷款特征的异质性分析表明，当并购贷款是银团贷款、在并购交易中占比更高和来自竞争更激烈的银行市场时，其通过促进相关并购、降低并购溢价、改进整合效率提高要素无关型全要素生产率和资本嵌入型全要素生产率的作用更强。由于本文在假设推导中默认并购贷款能够发挥债务治理作用，而部分研究发现中国情境下的银行债务不具有治理作用，为了确保假设成立，本文进一步检验了并购贷款对公司治理质量的影响，结果表明，并购贷款提高了公司治理质量，特别是股权治理质量和管理层激励，在一定程度上增强了研究结果的可靠性。 第三，对内部投资机制的研究发现，并购会导致内部投资的挤出效应，与没有并购贷款支持的并购相比，有并购贷款支持的并购对内部投资的挤出效应更小。并购贷款通过减少内部投资变动尤其是无形资本投资变动中的知识资本投资变动和组织资本投资变动提高全要素生产率（主要是代表技术进步的要素无关型全要素生产率）。在考虑银行选择效应和遗漏变量强度、主要变量度量方式的影响后，上述结果依然成立。对并购贷款特征的异质性分析表明，当并购贷款可替代性较低、是银团贷款、在并购交易中占比更高和来自竞争更激烈的银行市场时，其通过减少内部投资变动提高要素无关型全要素生产率的作用更强。由于并购对内部投资的挤出可能源自有限的投资机会，因此本文进一步检验了并购贷款对内部投资捕捉投资机会能力的影响，发现与没有并购贷款支持的并购相比，有并购贷款支持的并购，在事后具有更高的内部投资和投资机会敏感性，进一步佐证了并购贷款能够通过缓解内部投资被挤出提高并购后的公司绩效。 本文的研究有如下三点创新： 第一，本文补充了关于中国并购贷款对并购绩效影响的实证研究。中国并购贷款是金融体系渐进性改革的独特产物，学术界对此虽有所关注，但研究话题集中于商业银行的风险管理，研究形式局限于政策探讨和案例分析，比较缺乏从公司财务视角展开的实证研究。本文采用实证方式对并购贷款及其影响的研究补充了这一不足。此外，并购贷款在制度背景和业务上的差异也将本文对中国并购贷款的研究与国外的并购贷款研究区分开来。 第二，本文验证了并购对内部投资的挤出效应，并且发现并购贷款能够通过减少并购对内部投资尤其是无形资本投资的挤出提高代表技术进步的要素无关型全要素生产率。现有研究讨论了并购与内部投资的关系，但在研究并购绩效时相对忽视了内部投资行为的影响，并购绩效可能是由并购和并购影响下的内部投资共同作用的结果。研究结果回应了学界对并购这一外部扩张形式和内部投资关系的争议。同时，不同于一些先前研究的结论：协同效应是通过削减投资产生的，本文发现了具有相反意义的证据，即投资尤其是无形资本投资削减地越少越有利于公司全要素生产率的提高。 第三，本文通过变系数随机前沿模型的非参数估计方法分解了公司全要素生产率，在微观层面发展了Jorgenson and Griliches (1967)、Jorgenson et al. (1987)等将要素贡献从全要素生产率中进行分离的思路，丰富了关于理解全要素生产率构成的研究。本文通过放松生产函数的固定系数假设和数据分布假设，得以将嵌入要素的全要素生产率从“索洛余值”中分离出来，这种做法不仅与微观经济资本品嵌入式技术进步的现实特征相吻合，在本文中也为分析公司投融资行为提供了更多维度的效率信息。
英文摘要：	Since the market-based reform of mergers and acquisition (M&A), there seems to be a paradox in the M&A market: on the one hand, the national level attaches great importance to the role of M&A in promoting the direction, speed and quality of economic reform; on the other hand, the regulatory system imposes strict controls on M&A financial services, especially on bank financing. In 1996, the Credit Rules stipulated that loans were prohibited from being used for equity investment. It was not until the release of the Guidance on the Risk Management of Buyout Loan of Commercial Bank in 2008 that the commercial banking system established the only legal credit product for equity investment: buyout loan, but there were strict restrictions on the issuance and use of this loan. In 2015, the regulation was relaxed somewhat, but compared with the increasingly huge market demand, the supply of buyout loan still has a short board. In addition, there is a lack of empirical research on China buyout loans academically, as well as many differences between loans in foreign studies and China buyout loans, and the applicability of foreign study conclusions in the Chinese market has not been verified. In view of this, this paper will take Chinese buyout loan as the research object and employ empirical methods to sequentially explore two questions: Is there a significant difference in M&A performance between M&A supported by buyout loans and those without such support? If so, what is the mechanism of this impact? Comparisons of M&A performance need to be based on unified evaluation criteria. This paper decomposes the total factor productivity (TFP) into capital-embedded TFP representing improvements in capital quality, labor-embedded TFP representing improvements in labor quality, and input-free TFP representing technological progress, as a measure of M&A performance. Based on the M&A data of A-share listed companies and manually collected data on buyout loan announcements, this paper successively studies the impact of buyout loans on M&A performance, the internal investment mechanism of buyout loans affecting M&A performance, and the external investment mechanism, namely, the M&A mechanism. The following findings have been obtained through the above studies: Firstly, based on empirical evidence from A-share listed companies, this study demonstrates that bank-financed (supported by buyout loan) M&A exhibit higher inpu-free TFP and capital-embedded TFP compared to non-bank-finaced (without buyout loan support) M&A. This paper examines the confounding effects of other financing sources and the financing entities. In endogeneity analysis, this paper examines the selection effects of banks, the sample self-selection bias and the relative strength of omitted variables. Additionally, this paper investigates the effects of variable measurement methods and sample periods on research outcomes. The results reveal that even after considering the aforementioned effects, the impact of buyout loans on M&A performance remains significant. Heterogeneity analysis of buyout loan indicates that the effect is stronger on input-free TFP and capital-embedded TFP when M&A transactions when buyout loans lack bridging finance attributes, when they are syndicated loans, when they constitute a larger proportion of the transaction, and when they are from a more competitive banking market. Secondly, this paper examines two mechanisms through which buyout loans affect M&A performance: internal investment mechanism and M&A mechanism. The study on the external investment mechanism, namely the M&A mechanism, finds that bank-financed M&As are more likely to involve related acquisitions, have lower premiums, and higher integration efficiency compared to M&A without buyout loan support. Buyout loans enhance input-free TFP and capital-embedded TFP by influencing the aforementioned M&A behaviors. These results hold even after considering the confounding effects of management capabilities and M&A experience, substitution motives for M&A, measurement methods for core variables. Heterogeneity analysis of buyout loan indicates that buyout loans have a stronger effect on enhancing input-free TFP and capital-embedded TFP by promoting related acquisitions, reducing acquisition premiums, and enhancing integration efficiency when they are syndicated loans, constitute a higher proportion in transactions, and originate from more competitive banking markets. Since this paper assumes in the theoretical derivation that buyout loans can serve as a mechanism for debt governance, and some studies suggest that bank debt in the Chinese context may not have governance effects, to ensure the validity of the assumption, this paper further examines the impact of buyout loans on the quality of corporate governance. The results indicate that buyout loans improve corporate governance quality, particularly in terms of equity governance and management incentives, thereby increasing the reliability of the research findings to a certain extent. Regarding the internal investment mechanism, the study reveals that during the M&A process, there exists a crowding-out effect of M&A on internal investment, and bank-financed M&A exhibit less crowding-out of internal investment compared to those without buyout loan support. Buyout loans enhance TFP (primarily representing technological progress in input-free TFP) by reducing fluctuations in internal investment, especially in R&D investment and organizational capital investment. These results hold even after considering the effects of bank selection and the intensity of omitted variables, as well as the measurement methods of key variables. Heterogeneity analysis of buyout loan suggests that buyout loans have a stronger effect on enhancing input-free TFP by reducing fluctuations in internal investment when they have low substitutability, are syndicated loans, constitute a higher proportion in transactions, and originate from more competitive banking markets. Due to the possibility that crowding-out of internal investment in M&A may stem from limited investment opportunities, this paper further examines the influence of buyout loans on the ability to capture investment opportunities. The findings indicate that compared to non-bank-financed M&A, bank-financed M&A exhibit higher post-event internal investment and sensitivity to investment opportunities, further corroborating the ability of buyout loans to improve post-acquisition performance by mitigating crowding-out of internal investment. The contributions of this study are as follows: Firstly, this paper complements empirical research on the impact of acquisition loans on acquisition performance in China. Buyout loans in China are a unique product of the gradual reform of the financial system. Although the academic community has shown some interest, research topics have mainly focused on the risk management of commercial banks, with research forms limited to policy discussions and case analyses. There has been a comparative lack of empirical studies from a corporate financial perspective. This paper supplements this deficiency by empirically studying acquisition loans and their effects. Furthermore, the differences in business aspects of acquisition loans distinguish this paper’s research on Chinese buyout loans from foreign research on buyout loans. Secondly, this paper validates the crowding-out effect of M&A on internal investment and finds that buyout loans can enhance the input-free TFP by reducing the crowding-out effect, especially the crowding-out effecton intangible capital investment. Existing research has discussed the relationship between M&A and internal investment, but relatively overlooked the impact of internal investment behavior when studying M&A performance. M&A performance may result from the combined effect of M&A and the subsequent impact on internal investment. The research findings address the controversy in academia regarding the relationship between M&A as an external expansion form and internal investment. Furthermore, contrary to some previous research conclusions that synergy effects are generated by cutbacks of investments, this paper presents evidence to the contrary, indicating that reducing cuts of investment, especially intangible investment, is more conducive to improving the company’s productivity. Thirdly, this paper decomposes the total factor productivity of companies through the non-parametric estimation method of the variable-coefficient stochastic frontier model, developing the idea of separating factor contributions from TFP at the micro level, as proposed by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), Jorgenson et al. (1987), and others, enriching the research on understanding the components of TFP. By relaxing the fixed coefficient assumption of the production function and the data distribution assumption, this paper separates the factor embedded TFP from the “Solow residual”, which not only aligns with the realistic features of microeconomic capital-embedded technological progress but also provides additional dimensions of efficiency information for analyzing company investment and financing behavior.
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