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论文编号：	14828
作者编号：	1120201103
上传时间：	2024/6/17 18:10:01
中文题目：	多个大股东并存对企业资产剥离决策的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Multiple Large Shareholders on Asset Divestiture Strategy
指导老师：	薛有志
中文关键字：	多个大股东并存；资产剥离；制衡意愿；制衡能力；制衡行为
英文关键字：	Multiple Large Shareholders；Divestitures；Balances Willingness； Balances Capacity；Balances Behavior
中文摘要：	在“三去一降一补”等多项宏观政策的引导下，我国“十三五”时期政府鼓 励企业坚持深化供给侧结构性改革，淘汰落后产能，加大培育企业的核心竞争力 以实现企业“归核化”发展；“十四五”时期政府进一步推进企业专业化整合， 聚焦主责主业发展实体经济，加快剥离不具备竞争优势、缺乏发展潜力的非主业、 非优势业务，处置无效资产、低效资产。资产剥离决策是实现企业“归核化”发 展的重要方式，可以促进资源的合理配置和结构升级。但是由于企业内部存在信 息不对称，资产剥离决策可能成为控股股东终极隧道行为或管理层自利行为的 途径选择。那么识别并降低此类资产剥离以实现科学决策对企业内部治理结构 提出了一定的现实要求。股权分置改革以来，多个大股东并存逐渐成为普遍的公 司治理结构，其中控股股东和非控股股东之间的制衡关系逐渐受到广泛关注。一 方面，大股东有更强烈的动机监督控股股东和管理层以维护自身利益；另一方面， 大股东拥有更多的信息、资源和专业知识，能够显著提高监督约束的能力和决策 效率。因此，多个大股东并存如何影响企业的资产剥离决策从而促进企业实现可 持续发展是本研究关注的核心问题。 本研究基于委托代理理论、交易成本理论、社会资本理论等理论，以 2007 至2022年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，探讨多个大股东并存对企业资产剥离 决策的影响及中介路径，并进一步建立制衡的“意愿-能力-行为”的研究框架， 探究多个大股东并存的情况下，控股股东与非控股股东、股东与管理层的制衡关 系如何影响剥离决策，并引入企业法治环境约束和内部控制等调节变量以明晰 二者关系的边界条件和影响路径。另外，本研究进一步展开多个大股东并存的情 况下进行资产剥离的经济后果研究，以期从侧面佐证多个大股东是否存在治理 效应。依据上述研究思路进行实证检验，本研究得出以下结论：第一，多个大股 东并存能够降低企业的资产剥离决策并且主要通过信息效应、资源效应和监督 效应影响剥离决策。第二，从制衡意愿来看，多个大股东并存能够降低企业的非 关联性资产剥离、战术性资产剥离和相关性资产剥离。第三．从制衡能力来看， 非控股股东持股比例与企业资产剥离决策无显著关系，但非控股股东派遣董事 比例与资产剥离显著负相关；非控股股东存在机构投资者或国有股东的情况下， 资产剥离决策显著减少；非控股股东为连锁股东或控股股东存在股权质押的情况下，非控股股东的制衡能力越强，资产剥离决策显著降低。第四，从制衡行为 来看，多个大股东通过主动制衡（派遣董事并兼任战略委员会委员）和被动制衡 （退出威胁）来降低资产剥离决策。第五，多个大股东并存且发生资产剥离的情 况下，审计质量得到改善，创新投入提高，企业价值进一步提高，从而侧面佐证 了多个大股东并存发挥了一定的治理效应，促进企业科学决策的实现。 本研究的主要贡献包括以下三点：第一，本研究在鼓励企业“专业化”、“归 核化”发展的背景下，研究多个大股东并存这一普遍存在的股权结构对资产剥离 决策的影响，拓展和丰富了企业资产剥离决策的驱动因素的研究。第二，本研究 基于控股股东和非控股股东间的博弈关系，建立了制衡的“意愿-能力-行为”框 架，对如何缓解战略转型的“阻力”及如何提高非控股股东的博弈能力提供了理 论支撑，为多个大股东如何发挥治理效应提供了一定的经验借鉴。第三，本研究 进一步深入探究了非控股股东治理的行为链条。不仅仅局限于股东派遣董事这 一层面，本研究将治理行为链条深入至战略委员会层面，对揭示战略委员会在战 略决策中所起到的角色起到了一定的作用。
英文摘要：	Under the guidance of the macro policies such as “Three Cuts, One Lower, and One Strengthen”, China insisted on deepening the supply-side structural reform, eliminating backward production capacity, cultivating core competitiveness, and realizing the enterprises’ refocusing development as well as further transformation and upgrading during the 13th Five-Year Plan period. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, China has been continuously promoting the professionalization of enterprises, focusing on the development of the real economy, accelerating the divestiture of non-main business that are lack of competitiveness or potential, and attaching importance to the disposal of ineffective and inefficient assets. The divestiture strategy is an important way to realize the refocusing development of enterprises, which is of great significance to optimize the allocation of resources of enterprises and then realize high-quality development. However, due to information asymmetry within the enterprise, the divestiture strategy may become methods for controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behavior or executives’ self-interest behavior. So, identifying and mitigating such divestitures for scientific decision-making then places certain practical requirements on the internal corporate governance structure. Since the Split-share Structure Reform, multiple large shareholders have gradually become a common corporate governance structure, in which the check and balance between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders have gradually received widespread attention. On the one hand, large shareholders have stronger incentives to supervise controlling shareholders and executives to safeguard their own interests; on the other hand, large shareholders have more information, resources and professional knowledge, which can further improve the ability of supervision and constraint as well as decision-making efficiency. Therefore, how the coexistence of multiple large shareholders affects the firm’s divestiture strategy and thus promotes high-quality sustainable development is the core issue of this dissertation. Based on the theories such as principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory and social capital theory, this dissertation takes A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2022 as the research samples, and explores the impact of multiple large shareholders on divestiture strategy and the mediating mechanisms. At the same time, the research framework of “willingness-ability-behavior” based on checks and balances was established, under which this dissertation explores how the checks and balances between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders, and between shareholders and executives affect the divestiture strategy under the coexistence of multiple large shareholders, as well as introducing moderating variables such as the constraints of the corporate’s law environment and the internal control in order to clarify the boundary conditions and the effect paths of the relationship between the two main variables. In addition, this dissertation further develops the research on economic consequences of divestiture in the case of multiple large shareholders’ coexistence, in order to testify the governance effects of multiple large shareholders coexistence from another side. Based on the above research ideas and corresponding empirical results, this dissertation draws the following conclusions: First, multiple large shareholders could reduce the divestiture strategy mainly through the information effect, resource effect and supervisory effect. Second, in terms of the willingness to balance, multiple large shareholders can reduce non-related asset divestiture, non-strategic asset divestiture and divestiture of related industry. Third, from the viewpoint of balance ability, there is no significant relationship between the shareholding proportion of non-controlling shareholders and firm’s divestiture strategy, but the proportion of directors dispatched by non-controlling shareholders is significantly negatively correlated with divestiture strategy; divestiture strategy is significantly reduced if there are institutional investors and state-owned capital among non-controlling shareholders; in the case where the non-controlling major shareholder is a cross-ownership shareholder or the controlling shareholder has equity pledge, the stronger the non-controlling shareholder’s ability of balance, the more effective it is to reduce the possibility of divestiture strategy. Fourth, from the perspective of balance behavior, multiple large shareholders could reduce the divestiture strategy through active check and balance (dispatching directors and serving as members of the Strategy Committee) and passive check and balance (exit threats). Fifth, in the case of multiple large shareholders co-existing and divestiture occurring, the audit quality is improved,the innovation investment is increased, and the enterprise value is further increased, which supports that multiple large shareholders play a certain role in governance and supervisory effects from another side, and can promote the scientific decision-making. The main contributions of this dissertation include the following three points: First, in the context of encouraging enterprises’ development of “professionalization” and “refocusing”, this dissertation explores the impact of the prevalent shareholding structure of multiple large shareholders on the divestiture strategy, which expands and enriches the researches on the influencing factors of enterprise divestiture decisions. Secondly, based on the game relationship between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders, this dissertation establishes the “willingness-capability behavior” framework in view of check and balance, which provides theoretical support for how to alleviate the “resistance” of strategic transformation and how to improve the game capability of non-controlling shareholders, as well as the empirical evidence for the check and balance process of multiple large shareholders. Thirdly, this dissertation further analyses the behavioral chain of non-controlling shareholders’ governance. It is not only confined to the level of directors dispatched by shareholders, but extended to the level of the Strategy Committee, which plays a certain role in revealing the role of the strategy committee in strategic decision-making.
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