联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	14762
作者编号：	2120223652
上传时间：	2024/6/8 11:25:53
中文题目：	打破刚性兑付对国有企业信息披露质量的影响
英文题目：	The Impact of Breaking Rigid Redemption on the Quality of Information Disclosure in State-owned Enterprises
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	打破刚性兑付；信息披露质量；国有企业
英文关键字：	Breaking the rigid redemption of bonds; Information disclosure quality; State-owned enterprise
中文摘要：	20世纪80年代以来，政府隐性担保和刚性兑付促进了中国债券市场的迅速发展。随着我国经济转型和市场化改革的逐步推进，刚性兑付越来越不利于我国市场机制的有效运行和债券市场的高质量发展。2015年4月21日，“11天威MTN2”第一支国有企业债券违约事件标志着我国打破国有企业刚性兑付的开始。打破刚性兑付会对国有企业面临外部环境的市场化程度产生影响，国有企业将在一定程度上成为市场化主体，仅凭借产权性质便可获得低成本债务融资等市场便利的情况将大量减少。基于此，本文以2015年为政策基年，将打破国有企业刚性兑付视为一项准自然实验，以2010年至2020年深交所A股上市发债公司为研究对象，以发债国有企业为实验组，发债其他企业为对照组，以2015年为政策冲击点，运用倾向得分匹配（PSM）为实验组选定对照组后，运用双重差分法（DID）考察了打破刚性兑付对国有企业信息披露质量的影响，并分别从内部治理机制和外部治理机制的角度出发，检验了代理成本和机构投资者持股在此作用过程中的调节作用。 本文的实证检验结果显示：打破刚性兑付使得国有企业信息披露质量有所提升；代理成本越高，打破刚性兑付对信息披露质量的提升作用越显著；机构投资者持股比例越高，打破刚性兑付对信息披露质量的提升作用越显著。在采用了平行趋势检验、安慰剂检验、更换主要变量的衡量方式等稳健性检验方法后，上述结论依旧成立。 本文的研究从政府隐性担保导致的国有企业与其他企业在信贷市场的不对等待遇出发，聚焦打破刚性兑付带来的市场化环境的影响，丰富了打破刚性兑付的经济后果和企业信息披露质量的影响因素的文献。本文的研究说明了继续有序打破刚性兑付的重要性，并从内部治理机制出发说明了提高公司治理水平、优化内部治理机制的重要性，从外部治理机制出发为研究机构投资者在现代企业外部治理中的角色提供了新的视角，指出了机构投资者在提高市场透明度、优化企业治理结构中的重要监督作用。本文的相关结论可以为有序打破刚性兑付和提升企业信息披露质量提供政策参考，为企业内部建设、金融市场的良性发展、建设更加健康成熟的资本市场提供实践指导。
英文摘要：	Since the 1980s, government implicit guarantee and rigid redemption have promoted the rapid development of China's bond market. With the gradual advancement of China's economic transformation and market-oriented reform, rigid redemption is increasingly detrimental to the effective operation of China's market mechanism and the high-quality development of the bond market. On April 21, 2015, the default event of the first state-owned enterprise bond of "11 Tianwei MTN2" marked the beginning of China's breakthrough in the rigid redemption of state-owned enterprises. Breaking the rigid redemption will have an impact on the degree of marketization faced by state-owned enterprises in the external environment. State owned enterprises will become market-oriented entities to a certain extent, and the situation of obtaining low-cost debt financing and other market convenience solely based on their property rights will be greatly reduced. Based on this, this article takes 2015 as the policy base year, regards breaking the rigid redemption of state-owned enterprises as a quasi-natural experiment, takes A-share listed bond issuing companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2020 as the research object, takes state-owned enterprises issuing bonds as the experimental group, other enterprises issuing bonds as the control group, takes 2015 as the policy shock point, uses propensity score matching (PSM) as the experimental group to select the control group, and uses the double difference method (DID) to examine the impact of breaking the rigid redemption on the quality of information disclosure in state-owned enterprises. From the perspectives of internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism, the moderating effect of agency costs and institutional investor shareholding in this process is tested. The results show that: Breaking the rigid redemption has improved the quality of information disclosure for enterprises. The higher the agency cost, the more significant the promoting effect of breaking rigid redemption on the quality of information disclosure. The higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the more significant the promoting effect of breaking rigid redemption on the quality of information disclosure. After using robustness testing methods, the above conclusion still holds. This study starts from the unequal situation between state-owned enterprises and other enterprises in the credit market caused by implicit government guarantees, focusing on the impact of breaking rigid redemption on the market-oriented environment, enriching the literature on the economic consequences of breaking rigid redemption and the factors affecting the quality of enterprise information disclosure. This study demonstrates the importance of continuing to break through rigid redemption in an orderly manner, and highlights the importance of improving corporate governance and optimizing internal governance mechanisms from the perspective of internal governance mechanisms. From the perspective of external governance mechanisms, it provides a new perspective for studying the role of institutional investors in modern corporate external governance, and points out the important supervisory role of institutional investors in improving market transparency and optimizing corporate governance structures. The relevant conclusions of this article can provide policy references for the government and practical guidance for the internal construction of enterprises and the construction of a healthier capital market.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)