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论文编号:14751 
作者编号:1120201080 
上传时间:2024/6/7 18:05:29 
中文题目:激励有效性、子公司化与创新绩效研究 
英文题目:Research on Incentive Effectiveness, Subsidiarization, and Innovation Performance 
指导老师:程新生教授 
中文关键字:创新激励;核心员工;激励有效性;子公司化;创新绩效 
英文关键字:Innovation Incentive; Core Employees; Incentive Effectiveness; Subsidiarization; Innovation Performance 
中文摘要: 本文立足创新绩效提升,基于委托代理理论,围绕核心员工收益分享机制,从核心员工从事创新活动的个人利益和组织利益之间的协调关系入手,结合创新活动长期性和不确定性特征,剖析核心员工利益分享机制未能实现激励核心员工投入创新努力的原因,并据此将激励有效性界定为激励机制设计和执行情况对企业创新资源配置效率和创新成果产生的潜在影响。从是否结合创新活动的长期性特征,设置相应的核心员工中长期利益分享机制和核心员工在中长期利益分享机制中预期获益情况两个方面,研究激励有效性对于创新绩效的影响。以及研究对于面临激励有效性问题的企业,新产品子公司和研发子公司在缓解激励有效性问题中发挥的积极作用。 选择需要不断进行技术创新和研发投入以保持竞争力的制造业企业作为研究核心员工创新激励的对象。以制造业上市公司为例,研究激励有效性、子公司化与创新绩效。研究发现:第一,激励有效性问题对企业短期和长期创新绩效均产生不利影响。第二,新产品子公司对于缓解创新信息不对称,提高核心员工激励合同效率方面具有积极作用,新产品子公司的设立和发展有利于平衡核心员工创新努力和创新收益之间的关系,可以缓解由激励有效性带给创新绩效的不利影响。具体而言,新产品子公司对于中长期激励缺失的影响主要表现在短期创新绩效的提升上,而新产品子公司对于中长期激励效应不足的影响主要表现在长期创新绩效的提升上。第三,研发子公司对于缓解创新信息不对称,提高核心员工激励合同效率方面具有积极作用。但是研发子公司不能缓解由中长期激励缺失带给创新绩效的不利影响。这可能是由于研发子公司以开展基础研究或开发新技术为主,其创新活动的特征和中长期激励缺失之间存在错配所导致。研发子公司可以缓解由中长期激励效应不足带给创新绩效的不利影响,不过其作用更多体现在对于实用新型专利的积极影响上。 基于上述研究结论,本文提出以下政策建议:第一,企业应结合创新战略,实施相应的核心员工中长期激励,以确保高质量创新产出,提升企业的竞争力。第二,实施中长期激励的企业应关注由于核心员工预期收益不足而影响中长期激励效果的情况,随着市场环境的变化和公司战略的调整,适时调整激励计划的具体条款,以保持其激励效应。第三,企业应重视新产品子公司和研发子公司对核心员工创新激励产生的积极影响。第四,相关部门应采取多种方式引导和支持企业采取有效的中长期激励计划,以促进企业高质量发展。并且应进一步加强资本市场建设,提高资本市场透明度,充分发挥其服务实体经济的作用,为中长期激励计划能够更加有效的激发核心员工的创新动力创造环境。 本文结合创新活动的长期性和不确定性特征,界定激励有效性,扩展了“核心员工中长期激励—创新绩效”理论框架;从核心员工预期中长期激励收益情况影响其努力程度的方面,丰富了核心员工创新激励效果的影响因素研究;检验子公司化对于缓解激励有效性问题的作用,从核心员工激励视角丰富了企业子公司化的经济后果研究。本文的研究结论能够帮助企业更好的理解何时以及如何实施核心员工的中长期激励计划,对于进一步完善核心员工激励机制以激励其投入长期创新努力具有重要意义;从创新激励的视角揭示了设立新产品子公司和研发子公司的意义,为企业开展子公司化实践,通过子公司化设计来加强创新激励提供了实践指导。 本文可能的创新点主要体现在以下三个方面:第一,考察核心员工中长期激励缺失和预期中长期激励收益情况对于企业创新绩效的影响,为解释核心员工创新激励效果提供了新的视角。第二,研究新产品子公司和研发子公司通过提升核心员工激励合同的效率缓解激励有效性问题,从优化核心员工创新激励的视角,为子公司化的经济后果提供了新解释。第三,对比了新产品子公司和研发子公司在缓解激励有效性问题方面的差异,为理解分散式创新和集中式创新这两种创新管理方式对于激励效果的异质性影响提供了新的思路,为不同创新管理方式的异质性研究提供了新的视角。 
英文摘要:This dissertation focuses on enhancing innovation performance and is based on the principal-agent theory. Starting with the issue of aligning individual interests with organizational interests in engaging in innovative activities, it revolves the profit-sharing mechanism for core employees. Considering the long-term nature and uncertainty of innovation activities, analyzing the reasons why the profit-sharing mechanism for core employees fails to motivate their innovative efforts, incentive effectiveness is defined as the potential impact of incentive mechanism design and implementation on the efficiency of corporate innovation resource allocation and the generation of innovation outcomes.From the aspects of whether to to establish corresponding long-term benefit-sharing mechanisms, and the expected benefits of core employees in the long-term benefit-sharing mechanisms, the dissertation examines the impact of incentive effectiveness on innovation performance. Additionally, it investigates the positive role of new product subsidiaries and R&D subsidiaries in mitigating the negative impact of incentive effectiveness . Manufacturing firms that require continuous technological innovation and R&D investment to maintain competitiveness are selected as the subjects for the study of innovation incentives for core employees. Taking listed manufacturing companies as an example, the dissertation examines incentive effectiveness, subsidiarization, and innovation performance. The findings are as follows: First, issues of incentive effectiveness negatively impact both short-term and long-term innovation performance. Second, new product subsidiaries play a positive role in mitigating innovation information asymmetry and improving the efficiency of core employees incentive contracts. New product subsidiaries help balance the relationship between core employees' innovation efforts and innovation earnings, mitigating the lack of incentive effectiveness.Specifically, the impact of new product subsidiaries on long-term incentives absence is mainly reflected in the improvement of short-term innovation performance, while their impact on long-term incentive insufficient is primarily in enhancing long-term innovation performance. Third, R&D subsidiaries have a positive role in mitigating innovation information asymmetry and improving the efficiency of core employees incentive contracts. However, R&D subsidiaries cannot alleviate the adverse effects of long-term incentives absence on innovation performance. This may be due to a mismatch between the characteristics of the innovation activities of R&D subsidiaries, which mainly focus on basic research or the development of new technologies, and the absence of long-term incentives. R&D subsidiaries can mitigate the adverse effects of long-term incentive insufficient on innovation output, although their role is more pronounced in the positive impact on utility model patents. This dissertation proposes the following policy recommendations: First, companies should implement long-term incentives for core employees in line with their innovation strategies to ensure high-quality innovation output and enhance corporate competitiveness. Second, companies implementing long-term incentives should pay attention to the situation where the expected long-term incentive benefits are insufficient for core employees. They should adjust the specific terms of the incentive plans timely in response to changes in the market environment and strategic adjustments of the company.Third, companies should recognize the positive impact of new product subsidiaries and R&D subsidiaries on the innovation incentives for core employees. Fourth, relevant departments should adopt various methods to guide and support companies in adopting effective long-term incentive plans to promote high-quality corporate development. Additionally, efforts should be made to further strengthen the construction of the capital market, enhance its transparency, and fully leverage its role in serving the real economy, with the aim of ensuring long-term incentive plans more effectively unleash the potential and innovative drive of employees. This dissertation extends the core employees' long-term incentives - innovation performance theoretical framework.It enriches the study of factors affecting the innovation incentive effects on core employees and the study of the economic consequences of subsidiarization from the perspective of core employee motivation The conclusions of this dissertation can assist businesses in better understanding when and how to implement long-term incentive plans for core employees, which is crucial for further encouraging their commitment to sustained innovative efforts. And the dissertation reveals the significance of establishing new product subsidiaries and R&D subsidiaries, offering practical guidance for companies to engage in subsidiarization practices and to enhance innovation incentives through the design of such subsidiaries. The potential innovations of this dissertation are primarily reflected in the following aspects: First, by examining the impact of the absence of long-term incentives for core employees and their expected long-term incentive earnings on corporate innovation performance, it provides a new perspective for explaining the innovation incentive effects of core employees. Second, by studying how product development subsidiaries and R&D subsidiaries mitigate lack of incentive effectiveness by improving the efficiency of key employee incentive contracts, it provides a new perspective on the economic consequences of subsidiarization from the viewpoint of optimizing key employee innovation incentives.Third, by comparing the differences between new product subsidiaries and R&D subsidiaries in mitigating lack of incentive effectiveness, it offers new insights into understanding the heterogeneous impact of decentralized and centralized innovation management approaches on incentive effects, and provides a fresh perspective for the study of heterogeneity in different innovation management methods. 
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