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论文编号:14727 
作者编号:2120223668 
上传时间:2024/6/7 7:45:15 
中文题目:政府补助、企业杠杆率与企业创新 
英文题目:Government subsidies, debt-to-asset ratios and corporate innovation 
指导老师:张晓农 
中文关键字:政府补助;企业创新;企业杠杆率 
英文关键字:government subsidies; corporate innovation; debt-to-asset ratios 
中文摘要:企业作为国民经济的主要参与者,在实施创新驱动发展战略过程中发挥着重要作用,但是由于创新具有高投入、高风险、长周期、外部性等特征,企业创新不足是我国经济当前发展的重要问题。单纯依靠市场力量难以对企业创新形成最优激励,因此政府逐渐参与到企业活动中以此引导企业创新,政府补助是政府促进企业创新的重要政策手段。但是由于逆向选择、道德风险等问题,政府补助的激励目标与企业利益最大化并不一定相契合,因此往往不能最大化地发挥政府补助的激励效应。政府补助是政府“隐性担保”信号,能够向外部投资者释放正面信息,从而提高企业贷款的可获得性。同时企业杠杆率会因财务放大效应、税盾效应、信号传递效应以及破产风险、委托代理问题等多重作用对企业创新产生影响。基于此,本文以2012年至2022年我国沪深A股非金融业上市企业为研究样本,探究政府补助对企业创新的影响并检验企业杠杆率的中介作用。 首先,对目前学界有关政府补助、企业杠杆率和企业创新的相关文献进行梳理,理清脉络。其次,基于对现有文献的梳理,构建政府补助对企业创新影响的研究框架,在此基础上引入企业杠杆率这一中介变量,并进一步将企业杠杆率按照负债来源分成银行借贷杠杆率、商业信用杠杆率和公司债券杠杆率,探究企业杠杆率在政府补助和企业创新关系中发挥的中介作用。然后,进一步依据产权性质和科技属性进行异质性检验,并通过替换被解释变量法、工具变量法进行稳健性检验和内生性检验。本文得到以下研究结论:(1)政府补助与企业创新存在显著的倒U型关系,即企业创新随政府补助的增加而提升,但是当政府补助达到临界点后,企业创新会受到抑制;(2)企业杠杆率在政府补助与企业创新关系中发挥着中介作用,从负债来源看,银行借贷杠杆率发挥了显著的中介作用;(3)政府补助与非国有企业、非高科技企业的创新呈显著的倒U型关系,而政府补助对国有企业的创新没有显著影响,对高科技企业的创新有显著的促进作用。最后结合上述研究结论,本文从企业和政府两方面提出了有关充分发挥政府补助激励效应的相关建议。 
英文摘要:As a major player in the national economy, enterprises play an important role in the implementation of the innovation-driven development strategy. However, due to the characteristics of innovation, such as high investment, high risk, long cycle and externality and so on, the lack of corporate innovation is an important problem in the current development of China's economy. It is difficult to rely solely on market forces to form optimal incentives for corporate innovation. Therefore, the government has gradually participated in enterprises activities to guide corporate innovation. Government subsidies are the important tool for the government to promote corporate innovation. However, due to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, the incentive objectives of government subsidies do not necessarily match with the maximization of enterprise interests, and thus the incentive effects of government subsidies can not be maximized. Government subsidies are the government's “implicit guarantee” signal, which can release positive information to external investors, thus improving the availability of enterprise loans. At the same time, debt-to-asset ratios will have an impact on corporate innovation due to the financial amplification effect, the tax shield effect, the signaling effect, as well as the bankruptcy risk and the principal-agent problem. Based on this, this paper selects the data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed enterprises from 2012 to 2022 to empirically analyze the impact of government subsidies on corporate innovation and verify the mediating role of debt-to-asset ratios. First of all, the relevant literature about government subsidies, corporate debt-to-asset ratios and corporate innovation at home and abroad is sorted out to clarify the context. Secondly, based on the review of existing literature, a research framework about the impact of government subsidies on corporate innovation is constructed. On this basis, the mediating variable of corporate debt-to-asset ratio are introduced and further divided into bank borrowing leverage, commercial credit leverage and corporate bond leverage according to the source of liabilities, to explore the mediating role of debt-to-asset ratios in the relationship between government subsidies and corporate innovation. Then, this paper further tests the heterogeneity of property rights and technological attributes. Finally, robustness test and endogeneity test are carried out by alternative explained variable method and instrumental variable method. This paper obtains the following research conclusions: (1) there is a significant inverse U-shaped relationship between government subsidies and corporate innovation, that is to say, corporate innovation increases with the increase of government subsidies, but when government subsidies reach the critical point, corporate innovation is inhibited; (2) corporate debt-to-asset ratios have a mediating effect on the relationship between government subsidies and corporate innovation, from the perspective of debt sources, bank loan leverage ratios have a significant mediating effect; (3) government subsidies of non-state-owned enterprises and non-high-tech enterprises have a significant inverse U-shaped relationship with corporate innovation, while government subsidies of state-owned enterprises have no significant impact on corporate innovation and government subsidies of high-tech enterprises have a promoting effect on corporate innovation. Finally, combining the above findings, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from both enterprises and the government to give full play to the incentive effect of government subsidies. 
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