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论文编号：	14721
作者编号：	2120223625
上传时间：	2024/6/6 23:03:06
中文题目：	医院与第三方医学检测机构的协同与竞争研究
英文题目：	Collaboration and Competition between Tertiary Hospitals and Third-Party Medical Testing Institutions: A Study
指导老师：	刘彦平
中文关键字：	医疗服务；竞争与协同；患者选择行为；斯坦伯格博弈；Hotelling模型
英文关键字：	Medical services; Competition and collaboration; Patients’ choice; Stackelberg game; Hotelling model
中文摘要：	在后疫情时代，第三方医学检测机构同医院的合作日渐密切，成为解决我国医疗资源分布不均衡以及医疗服务总量不足问题的一个重要途径。各大城市的医院纷纷同第三方医学检测机构建立合作关系，而二者的竞争与协同问题也变得越来越重要。 本文研究了医疗服务系统中医院与第三方医学检测机构的协同与竞争问题，从两个角度分别切入，分别应用了需求价格弹性理论和患者选择行为理论构造了医学检测需求函数，二者均以利润最大化为目标导向，对医院同第三方医学检测机构的利润分成问题进行了讨论，为医疗系统效率的提升提出了建议。本文首先参照传统双渠道的需求价格弹性理论构造了医学检测需求函数，在分析医院同第三方医学检测机构竞争与协同过程中，发现医院应该兼顾患者粘性以及服务成本的把控，将部分患者的医学检测服务引流到第三方，对于整个医疗系统的效率提升是有利的。当二者协同的场景下，通过蒙特卡洛模拟数值仿真，本文发现以双方各自的利润最大化作为协同目标的情形优于非协同情况。论文以患者选择行为作为理论基础，通过Hotelling模型刻画了患者效用函数，构造了新的患者需求函数，在此基础上构建了博弈模型，探索了医院与第三方医学检测机构之间的竞争与协同问题，并通过数值分析，对距离成本与医院利润分成占比的敏感性进行了分析与数值验证。 研究结果发现，第三方医学检测机构需要保持其患者等待时间低的优势，对于专业化检测服务承担更多的检测服务责任；第三方医学检测机构的引入有助于缓解医院的待检测患者拥堵问题。论文研究可为医院和第三方医学检测机构的竞争合作提供决策建议，并有利于促进第三方医学检测机构的进一步发展和引入。
英文摘要：	In the post-pandemic era, collaboration between hospitals and third-party medical testing institutions has become increasingly common, serving as an important approach to addressing the uneven distribution of medical resources and the overall shortage of medical services in China. Hospitals in major cities are actively establishing partnerships with third-party medical testing institutions, and the issues of competition and cooperation between the two parties have become increasingly important. This paper investigates the collaboration and competition between hospitals and third-party medical testing institutions within the healthcare service system, approaching the topic from two perspectives. It applies demand price elasticity theory and patient choice behavior theory to construct medical testing demand functions, both aimed at profit maximization, and discusses profit sharing between hospitals and third-party medical testing institutions, providing recommendations for enhancing the efficiency of the healthcare system. Drawing on the traditional dual-channel demand price elasticity theory, this paper constructs medical testing demand functions. In analyzing the competition and cooperation between hospitals and third-party medical testing institutions, it suggests that hospitals should balance patient stickiness and service cost control. Redirecting some patients' medical testing services to third parties is beneficial for improving the efficiency of the entire healthcare system. Under the scenario of cooperation between the two parties, Monte Carlo simulation reveals that the situation where maximizing each party's profit as the collaborative goal is better than the non-cooperative situation. Using patient choice behavior as a theoretical basis, the paper employs the Hotelling model to depict patient utility functions and constructs new patient demand functions. Based on this, it builds a game model to explore the competition and cooperation between hospitals and third-party medical testing institutions. Through numerical analysis, it investigates the sensitivity of distance costs and the proportion of hospital profit sharing. The research findings suggest that third-party medical testing institutions need to maintain their advantage of low patient waiting times and take on more responsibility for specialized testing services. The introduction of third-party medical testing institutions helps alleviate congestion issues with patients awaiting testing in hospitals. This study provides decision-making recommendations for the competition and cooperation between hospitals and third-party medical testing institutions, facilitating the further development and integration of third-party medical testing institutions.
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