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论文编号：	14639
作者编号：	2120213287
上传时间：	2024/6/5 16:14:26
中文题目：	管理层薪酬参照点效应与企业创新——基于高新技术企业的经验研究
英文题目：	Reference Point Effect of Executive Compensation and Enterprise Innovation: Empirical Research Based on High-tech Enterprises
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	管理层薪酬；参照点效应；企业创新；高新技术企业
英文关键字：	Executive Compensation; Reference Point Effect; Enterprise Innovation; High-tech Enterprises
中文摘要：	21 世纪以来，经济全球化迅速发展，新一轮科技革命与产业变革加速演进，企业如何在变革中保持优势、在竞争中屹立不倒，创新是唯一出路。企业管理层是企业战略的制定者以及经营管理的负责人，其创新意愿直接影响企业的创新水平和竞争能力。薪酬激励作为最常见的管理层激励措施，已有大量学者对其激发管理层创新意愿的效果展开研究，但是此类研究往往忽略了参照点效应的存在。除绝对薪酬水平以外，管理层对自身薪酬满意度的评估还取决于其将自身薪酬与参照点进行比较的结果，该结果会影响管理层的主观心理感知，进而影响其行为决策。 本文借助三维参照点模型，利用契约参照点理论、互惠理论与社会比较理论，全面分析管理层薪酬在垂直、水平以及现状参照基准上的参照点效应如何影响管理层创新决策。通过实证分析 2012-2022 年在中国 A 股上市的高新技术企业，得出了以下结论：管理层相较于参照点的相对薪酬水平越低，企业的创新投入水平越低，这种关系在垂直、水平与现状这三类参照点上均存在，说明管理层会进行薪酬的社会（包括垂直与水平参照）及个人参照（现状参照），较低的相对薪酬水平会引发其“利益受损感”以及“不公平感”，管理层因此消极对待创新活动。上述结论在使用双向固定效应模型、GMM 动态面板模型、替换变量法等稳健性检验后仍成立，具有可靠性。本文还发现，管理层因社会参照损失心理导致的低水平创新投入会传导至创新产出，显著降低了企业创新产出的数量与质量，但并未发现个人参照损失与创新产出水平的关系。为了更全面的审视管理层薪酬契约，结合最优契约理论，进一步探讨了薪酬业绩敏感性与薪酬粘性对上述关系的调节作用，结果表明这二者都能负向调节社会参照点效应对企业创新的影响。在异质性分析中，本文发现与国有企业相比，非国有企业管理层薪酬参照点效应对创新投入的影响更为显著，且这种差异在三类参照点中均存在。市场竞争地位高的企业管理层的创新决策更易受到社会参照点的影响，而市场竞争地位低的企业则更倾向于进行个人参照。 上述研究结论对企业管理层薪酬设计具有一定的现实启示意义，企业在设计薪酬水平时应充分考虑管理者的参照心理，秉持业绩和参照基准并举的薪酬制定原则，以此从根源上规避参照损失心理对于企业创新带来的负面影响，从机制设计上消除制约企业创新的因素。
英文摘要：	Since the 21st century, with the rapid development of economic globalization and the accelerated evolution of a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, innovation has become the only way for enterprises to maintain their advantages and remain competitive. As the makers of corporate strategies and the responsible parties for operational management, the innovation willingness of the management team directly affects the innovation level and competitiveness of an enterprise. While salary incentives are the most common form of management incentives, numerous scholars have studied their effectiveness in stimulating management's willingness to innovate, often neglecting the existence of reference point effects. Besides the absolute salary level, the management's assessment of its own salary satisfaction also depends on comparing its salary with reference points, which affects their subjective psychological perception and further influences their behavioral decisions. This paper utilizes the three-dimensional reference point model, combined with theories of contractual reference points, reciprocity, and social comparison, to comprehensively analyze how the reference point effects of management compensation, based on vertical, horizontal, and current status benchmarks, affect management's innovative decisions. Through empirical analysis of high-tech enterprises listed on the A-share market in China from 2012 to 2022, the following conclusions are drawn: The lower the relative salary level of the management compared to the reference points, the lower the level of innovative investment in the enterprise. This relationship exists across vertical, horizontal, and current status reference points, indicating that management conducts social (including vertical and horizontal references) and personal references (current status references). A lower relative salary level triggers a sense of loss and unfairness, leading the management to negatively approach innovation activities to eliminate such adverse psychological perceptions. These conclusions remain valid and reliable after robustness tests using a two-way fixed-effects model, GMM dynamic panel model, and variable substitution methods. The paper also finds that the low-level innovative investment resulting from the management's social reference loss can translate into innovative output, significantly reducing the quantity and quality of corporate innovative output, but no relationship is found between personal reference loss and the level of innovative output. To further examine the compensation contract of the management team, this paper explores the moderating effects of pay-performance sensitivity and pay stickiness on the above relationships, finding that both negatively regulate the impact of social reference point effects on corporate innovation. In the heterogeneity analysis, the paper finds that compared with state-owned enterprises, the effect of the management compensation reference point on innovative investment is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises, and this difference exists across all three types of reference points. Management teams in enterprises with a high market competitive position are more susceptible to social reference points in their innovative decisions, while those in enterprises with a low competitive position tend to make more personal references. These research conclusions provide practical implications for the design of management compensation in enterprises. When designing salary levels, enterprises should fully consider the management's reference psychology and adhere to the principle of combining performance and reference benchmarks to eliminate the negative impact of reference loss psychology on corporate innovation from the root and eliminate factors restricting corporate innovation through mechanism design.
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