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| 论文编号: | 1450 | |
| 作者编号: | 031695 | |
| 上传时间: | 2010/5/14 9:43:57 | |
| 中文题目: | 我国上市公司高管激励机制与股权融资偏好的关系研究-基于高新技术企业高管激励机制的分析 | |
| 英文题目: | Equity financing preference Executive incentive system High-tech enterprises | |
| 指导老师: | 周晓苏 | |
| 中文关键字: | 股权融资偏好 高管激励机制 高新技术企业 | |
| 英文关键字: | Equity financing preference Executive incentive system High-tech enterprises | |
| 中文摘要: | 国内现有研究表明,与先内部融资、再债务融资、最后股权融资的优序融资理论相异,我国上市公司在融资方式的选择上表现出强烈的股权融资偏好。过度偏好股权融资给我国上市公司带来了较大的负面影响。因此研究我国上市公司为何如此偏好股权融资,并且在此基础上如何加以治理成为当今学者普遍关注的问题。 对于这一问题现有文献多数是从股权融资成本与公司治理结构的角度进行研究,本文认为高层管理人员的行为也对企业的融资行为有显著的影响。又由于高管人员激励机制是引导高管人员行为的重要机制之一,因此本文将以高管人员的行为以及引导高管人员行为的激励机制作为研究角度来探讨这一问题。 文章将首先从理论上论述高管激励机制与上市公司股权融资偏好的关系,然后对我国上市公司高管激励机制的有效性进行分析,从而从这一角度探索我国上市公司偏好股权融资的动因。再次文章将选取对人力资本投入与重视程度都较高的高新技术企业作为研究样本,对我国上市公司股权融资偏好进行实证研究,以进一步探讨有效的激励机制是否能够对上市公司的股权融资偏好起到一定遏制作用,希望能为改善我国上市公司偏好股权融资的现状提出一定建议。 文章首先通过理论分析,得出高管激励机制的缺失或无效将导致高管人员倾向于股权融资,进而导致上市公司偏好股权融资;而有效的激励机制将在一定程度上遏制高管人员进而遏制上市公司偏好股权融资的结论。其次文章在对我国上市公司高管激励机制的有效性进行分析与检验后,得出我国上市公司高管激励机制无效的结论,从而发现造成我国上市公司偏好股权融资的另一重要原因。再次文章在对高新技术企业进行研究后,发现该类型企业的高管激励机制较为有效,并且在该类型企业内对有效的高管励机制与股权融资偏好的相关性进行了分析与实证检验,得出结论:单独实施年薪制激励机制或者单独实施高管持股激励机制对于股权融资偏好难以起到遏制作用;而在高管人员激励机制有效的前提下,年薪制与高管持股激励机制的同时实施的确能够对上市公司的股权融资偏好起到一定的遏制作用。 | |
| 英文摘要: | Domestic scholars find that listed companies in our country have strong preference to equity financing. It’s contrary to Financing Law in the modern financing theory, which states when some companies raise fund, they will select internal financing firstly, debt financing secondly, and equity financing finally. The phenomenon has taken disadvantages to listed companies in our country. Thus researching why listed companies in our country have strong preference to equity financing and how to deal with it has been an intense issue. Some scholars deem preference to equity financing results from unreasonable financing costs. Some deem it results from company’s governance structure. We deem that the behavior of executives in listed companies has prominent affection on the way of financing. And the executive incentive system is one of the factors affecting the action of executives, including their selection of the way on financing. So this paper will research the issue from this point of view. First of all, we will discuss the relationship between equity financing preference of listed companies and executive incentive system based on theory. Second, we will analyze the effectiveness of the executive incentive system of listed companies in our country, and further expound the reason why these companies have so strong preference to equity financing. Third, we will select high-tech enterprises which pay much attention to the human capital, and go on to discuss whether effective executive incentive system will restrain equity financing preference of listed companies in our country, hoping to be able to put forward some suggestions to cope with this issue. First, we concludes that the lack or ineffectiveness of executive incentive system will result in equity financing preference of executives and result in equity financing preference of the companies. On the contrary, the effective executive incentive system will restrain equity financing preference of listed companies to some extent. Second, after discussing and analyzing the effectiveness of executive incentive system of listed companies in our country, we draw a conclusion that the executive incentive system of listed companies in our country takes no incentive effect and deem that it is an important reason which results listed companies have strong preference to equity financing. Third, after researching the executive incentive system of high-tech enterprises, we find it functions to a certain degree, and through empirical analyzing, draw a conclusion that carrying out yearly monetary income of executives along or stock-based incentive along is difficult to restrain equity financing preference of listed companies. On the condition that the executive incentive system is effective, carrying out yearly monetary income of executives and stock-based incentive at the same time can restrain equity financing preference of listed companies in our country to some extent. | |
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