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论文编号：	14133
作者编号：	2120213348
上传时间：	2023/6/13 16:48:12
中文题目：	高管股权激励对上市公司股价崩盘风险的影响研究
英文题目：	Executive Equity Incentives and the Stock Price Crash Risk
指导老师：	张国萍
中文关键字：	高管股权激励 股价崩盘风险 机构投资者持股 机构投资者异质性
英文关键字：	Executive Equity Incentive; Stock Price Crash Risk; Institutional Shareholding; Institutional Investor heterogeneity
中文摘要：	我国资本市场发展并不完善，信息环境相对较差，股价崩盘事件时有发生。 股价剧烈波动严重损害了投资者财富与投资信心，不利于资本市场与实体经济 的平稳运行。基于“信息隐藏假说”，高管对“坏消息”的遮掩是股价崩盘的根 本原因。股权激励作为有效缓解委托代理问题、推动企业长期价值提升的重要契 约，其利益协同效应对提高风险承担，促进创新有显著作用;而“堑壕效应”下 高管对提升行权收益的追求会增强其盈余管理、信息披露管理和股价操纵的动 机，使其成为高管自利的另一渠道，加剧信息不对称，为股价崩盘埋下隐患。 基于此，本文以 2009-2021 年 A 股上市公司为样本，实证检验了高管股权 激励与股价崩盘风险的非线性关系。研究发现:(1)高管股权激励强度与个股 股价崩盘风险呈显著的倒 U 型关系。(2)机构投资者持股对股权激励对股价崩 盘风险的倒 U 型影响具有负向调节作用，随着机构持股水平的提高股权激励对 崩盘风险的影响变为正 U 型;高水平的机构投资者持股下股价崩盘风险水平较 高，支持了机构投资者短期投机假说;长期稳定型和压力抵制型机构投资者持股 的负向调节作用更显著。(3)民营和高科技公司样本中高管股权激励强度对股 价崩盘风险的倒 U 型影响更显著;激励标的为股票期权时激励强度的增长使股 价崩盘风险直线增加。 现有文献较多讨论高管股权激励的正面经济后果，较少关注股权激励对市 场风险的负面影响，且鲜有研究关注机构投资者作为具有较强专业性的外部持 股人对缓解股权激励相关风险、提高股权激励效果的作用。本文通过梳理“股权 激励授予——高管风险性行为动机与空间——信息隐藏与股价泡沫——股价崩 盘”的影响机制，明确了高管股权激励和股价崩盘风险的非线性关系，并通过实 证分析进行了验证;将委托代理理论与信息不对称理论相结合，研究了机构投资 者及其异质性的调节作用，为进一步平衡机构投资者持股监督、信息传递机制与 短期投机动机，控制股价崩盘风险提供了实证支持，也为上市公司提高股权激励 风险认知、完善激励方案设计并有效控制市场风险提供了参考。
英文摘要：	With the relatively poor information environment, the development of China's capital market is not perfect and stock price crashes occur from time to time. Violent stock price fluctuations seriously damage investors' wealth and confidence, which is not conducive to the smooth operation of the capital market and the real economy. Based on the "information concealment hypothesis", the cover-up of "bad news" by executives is the root cause of stock price crash. As an important contract to effectively alleviate the principal-agent problem and promote the long-term value of enterprises, the synergistic effect of equity incentives has a significant effect on increasing risk- taking and promoting innovation; however, the pursuit of executives to enhance the exercise income under the "trench effect" will enhance their motives of surplus management, information management and price manipulation, making it another channel for executives' self-interest, exacerbating information asymmetry and laying hidden dangers for stock price crash. This paper empirically tests the non-linear relationship between equity incentives and stock price crash risk using a sample of A-share listed companies from 2009-2021. It is found that: (1) the intensity of executive equity incentives has a significant inverted U-shaped relationship with the stock price crash risk. (2) Institutional investors’ holding has a negative moderating effect, with the effect of equity incentives on crash risk becomes positive U-shape as the level of institutional shareholding increases; the stock price crash risk level is higher with high level of institutional investors' shareholding, which supports the hypothesis of short-term speculation of institutional investors; the negative moderating effect of long-term stable and stress-resistant institutional investors' shareholding is more significant. (3) The non-linear effect is more significant in private and high-tech firms; the increase in incentive intensity stimulates the risk linearly when the underlying incentive is stock options. The existing literature discusses more about the positive economic consequences of executive equity incentives and less about the negative impact of equity incentives on market risk, and few studies focus on the role of institutional investors as external holders in mitigating the risks associated with equity incentives and improving the effectiveness of equity incentives. By sorting out the influence mechanism of "equity grant - executive risky motivation and space - information hiding - stock price bubble - stock price crash risk ", this paper clarifies and tests the inverted U-shape relationship between executive equity incentives and stock price crash risk. By combining principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper investigates the moderating role of institutional investors and its heterogeneity, provides empirical support for further balancing short-term speculative motives of institutional investors with shareholding monitoring and information transmission mechanisms to control stock price crash risk. This paper provides a reference for listed companies to improve the risk perception of equity incentives, improve the design of incentive program and effectively control market risk.
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