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论文编号：	14107
作者编号：	2120213335
上传时间：	2023/6/9 12:37:07
中文题目：	平台治理政策变动对互补者绩效水平的影响和互补者的回应策略研究
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Platform Governance Policy Changes on Complementors’ Performance and Complementor Response Strategies
指导老师：	田莉
中文关键字：	平台治理;互补者战略;平台生态系统;绩效;选择性激励
英文关键字：	Platform Governance;Complementor Strategy;Platform Ecosystem;Performance;Selective Promotion
中文摘要：	在日益壮大的平台型企业发展历程中，平台逐渐形成连接了多种用户群体和互补者的平台生态系统，其治理举措亦受到多方关注。平台的治理政策会对互补者的绩效产生影响，随着平台日益取得主导地位，将平台不断发展的治理政策映射到互补者的绩效结果时，互补者的价值获取可能会受到损害。已有研究多站在平台主视角。从互补者角度出发，研究其在平台生态系统中的战略选择是仍待探究的领域。 通过梳理平台生态系统、平台治理政策和互补者回应策略领域相关文献，本文关注在平台的差异化治理政策之下，不同群体的互补者的价值获取是否会受到不同的影响，以及不同群体的互补者是否会产生差异化的应对策略。本文通过网络爬虫的方式构建了2017年6月至2020年5月共计36个月份的5783款游戏共计 208188个观测值的面板数据用以实证分析。本文对样本数据通过固定面板效应进行双重差分分析，并进行了多项稳健型检验，以分析并探讨Steam平台定价策略改变冲击与互补者绩效水平的关系以及互补者对此的差异性回应策略，得到了如下结论：从绩效来看，平台偏向头部互补者的差异性收入分配政策有利于头部互补者绩效水平的提升，但相对损害了尾部互补者的效益。头部互补者有动力兼容更多操作系统，实施利用网络外部性扩大用户基数的行为，并随之相对减少了降价次数，以及增加了降价幅度，但头部互补者是否会增加渐进式创新行为并未得到数据的支持。 本文分析了平台差异性治理政策对不同规模、不同地位互补者的影响，识别并厘清了互补者异质性的回应策略。这些结论促进互补者视角下的绩效研究、异质性研究以及互补者战略研究的发展。未来研究可以重点关注互补者其他类型的回应策略，以及引入平台生态系统内外其他主体后，互补者回应机制的变化。
英文摘要：	In the development process of growing platform based enterprises, the platform has gradually formed a platform ecosystem that connects multiple user groups and complementors, and its governance measures have also received multiple attention. The governance policies of the platform can have an impact on the performance of complementors. As the platform becomes increasingly dominance, when mapping the evolving governance policies of the platform to the performance results of complementors, the value capture of complementors may be compromised. Previous studies have mostly focused on the platform’s main perspective. From the perspective of complementors, studying their strategic choices in the platform ecosystem is an area that remains to be explored. By reviewing relevant literature in the field of platform ecosystems, platform governance strategies, and complementors’ response strategies, this article focuses on whether the value acquisition of complementors from different groups will be affected differently under the platform’s differentiated governance strategies, and whether complementors from different groups will generate differentiated response strategies. This article constructs panel data of 5,783 games with a total of 208,188 observations for a total of 36 months from June 2017 to May 2020 through a web crawler approach for empirical analysis. This article conducts a differences-in-differences analysis of sample data through fixed panel effects, and conducts multiple robust tests to analyze and explore the relationship between the impact of changes in the pricing strategy of the Steam platform and the performance level of complementors, as well as the differential response strategies of complementors to this. The following conclusions are drawn: From the perspective of performance, the platform’s differential income distribution policies that favor the leaders are beneficial to the improvement of the performance level of the leaders, However, it relatively harms the benefits of the followers. The behavior of leaders that have the motivation to be compatible with more operating systems and utilize network externalities to expand their user base has resulted in a relatively reduced number of price reductions and an increased range of price reductions. However, whether leaders will increase incremental innovation behavior is not supported by data. This article analyzes the impact of platform diversity governance policies on complementors of different sizes and positions, and identifies and clarifies the response strategies for complementors’ heterogeneity. These conclusions promote the development of performance research, heterogeneity research, and complementary strategy research from a complementor’s perspective. Future research can focus on the response strategies of other types of complementors, as well as the changes in their response mechanisms after the introduction of other entities within and outside the platform ecosystem.
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