联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	14069
作者编号：	2120213304
上传时间：	2023/6/8 16:33:12
中文题目：	连锁股东对企业战略激进度影响的实证研究
英文题目：	An empirical Study on the influence of Cross-ownership on Strategic Radicalization
指导老师：	薛有志教授
中文关键字：	连锁股东;战略激进度;治理协同;竞争合谋
英文关键字：	cross-ownership;strategic radicalization;governance coordination;competition collusion
中文摘要：	随着资本市场的发展，越来越多的投资者投资于同行业中多家公司，形成连锁股东的现象。学术界早已关注到这一经济现象并讨论其经济后果，但是仍然存在着“治理协同”和“竞争合谋”两种意见分歧。治理协同效应认为，连锁股东会凭借信息资源优势，以及丰富的管理经验，促进企业间的协作，为企业带来良好的协同发展机会；而竞争合谋假说则认为连锁股东出于最大化投资组合收益的目的，会利用自己的集团势力，在行业内形成合谋，带来垄断威胁，最终不利于企业的发展。目前的学术界对于连锁股东与战略管理的交叉研究并不充分，该领域现有的研究往往局限于连锁股东对某一具体的战略活动的影响，而没有对公司整体的战略导向做出研判。本文深化该领域的研究，以战略激进度为视角，从竞争合谋的角度，探索连锁股东对企业战略定位的影响，以及进一步对企业带来何种经济后果。 本文以2007年-2021年我国A股上市公司为样本研究对象，实证检验了连锁股东对战略激进度的抑制作用。实证结果表明：（1）连锁股东会抑制企业的战略激进度，这更符合“竞争合谋”假说；（2）在集中度更高的行业，市场分割程度更高的地区，以及连锁股东集团势力更大的行业中，连锁股东对于战略激进度的抑制作用更加明显；（3）相比较非国有上市公司，国有上市公司的代理矛盾更加复杂，连锁股东发挥的监管治理作用更加明显，对于企业激进战略的抑制效果也更好；（4）连锁股东通过降低企业战略的激进程度，使企业错失了采取开拓性战略活动带来的发展机遇，如研发创新、开拓新市场等，最终不利于企业价值的提升。本文不仅丰富了连锁股东经济后果的学术成果，为连锁股东的竞争合谋效应提供新的证据，同时也是对战略激进度影响因素的有益补充。对于企业的实践活动与市场监管，国企混改等涉及到的政策法规具有很好的借鉴意义。
英文摘要：	With the development of the capital market, more and more investors invest in multiple companies in the same industry, forming the phenomenon of cross-ownership. The academic circle has long paid attention to this economic phenomenon and discussed its economic consequences, but there are still two kinds of disagreement: "governance coordination" and "competition collusion". According to the governance coordination effect, the cross-owners will promote the cooperation among enterprises by virtue of the advantages of information resources and rich management experience, and bring good opportunities of collaborative development for enterprises. However, the competitive collusion hypothesis holds that for the purpose of maximizing portfolio returns, cross-owners will take advantage of their group power to form collusion in the industry and bring monopoly threat, which is ultimately not conducive to the development of enterprises. At present, the academic circle does not have sufficient cross-research on cross-ownership and strategic management. The existing research in this field is often limited to the influence of cross-ownership on a specific strategic activity, but does not make research and judgment on the overall strategic orientation of the company. This paper deepens the research in this field, from the perspective of strategic radicalization, explores the influence of cross-ownership on the strategic positioning of enterprises and what economic consequences it will bring to enterprises. This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as sample research objects, and empirically tests the influence of chain shareholders on the degree of strategic radicalization. The empirical results show that: (1) Cross-owners can inhibit the strategic radicalization of enterprises, which is more consistent with the "competition collusion" hypothesis; (2) In industries with higher concentration and industries with greater power of cross-owners groups, the inhibitory effect of chain shareholders on the degree of strategic activism is more obvious; (3) Compared with non-state-owned listed companies, the agency conflicts of state-owned listed companies are more complex, and the regulatory and governance role of cross-owners is more obvious, and the inhibition effect on corporate radical strategies is better. (4) By reducing the radical degree of corporate strategy, cross-owners make enterprises miss the development opportunities brought by pioneering strategic activities, such as innovation, opening up new markets, etc., which is ultimately not conducive to the improvement of corporate value. This paper not only enriches the academic results of the economic consequences of cross-ownership and provides new evidence for the collusion effect of cross-ownership, but also is a useful supplement to the factors affecting the degree of strategic radicalization. It has a good reference significance for the policies and regulations related to the practice activities of enterprises, market supervision and the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)